Narrative:

The SID in use for newark was the ewr runway 6, runway in use was runway 4L for departure. Takeoff was normal, the PF was the first officer. In complying with the SID at 4 mi our heading was 060 degrees magnetic. We were instructed to contact departure. After contact was confirmed, we were instructed to turn right to a heading of 330 degrees and climb and maintain 5000 ft. The ewr SID states at 4 mi a left turn to a heading of 290 degrees. I then queried the controller about the right turn and asked him to confirm the turn to the right. The controller confirmed the turn to the right and the heading change to 330 degrees and to climb to maintain 5000 ft. We complied with his instructions and the first officer and I both commented that this turn, to the right, was a long way about to get where we needed to go. At 3500 ft MSL, the controller contacted us to stop our climb at 4000 ft MSL. At the same time our TCASII system gave us a traffic alert. The TCASII system was reporting traffic to our left and within 500 ft of our altitude and approximately within 1-2 mi of our position. The controller then contacted us again and told us to descend now to 3000 ft. Our altitude was coming through 3800 ft with the first officer trying to comply with the first instruction to level off at 4000 ft. I had changed the altitude window from 5000 ft to 4000 ft then to 3000 ft to comply with the controller's instructions. The first officer was pushing the nose over to avoid an overshoot of the assigned altitude and to avoid any further conflict with the other aircraft. After leveloff at 3000 ft, I then queried the controller as to why we were not advised about the aircraft to our left and about the loss of altitude separation. He (the controller) then stated that he had instructed us to turn left to 330 degrees not right. I then stated to him that I had queried him twice about the turn to the right and that we were complying with his instructions. He then instructed us to climb and maintain 5000 ft. After a few mins of silence (from the controller) he replied to my inquiry as to his instructions. He stated that this was his fault, he had instructed us to turn right. I then asked if he was going to file a report or file a violation on the situation. He stated, no, he did not feel any action would be taken since he felt that traffic separation had not been compromised. He also stated, if I had no problem with the situation he had no problem. The question is not that he or I had a problem with this situation is, does the other captain have a problem with this situation? Traffic separation was lost. If my TCASII system reported the conflict, I know the other captain's TCASII system should have reported the same. Since both aircraft were on different radio frequency, I am sure this problem will be recorded and reported to the FAA. My personal opinion to this situation is that I should have pressed the controller about his instructions since it did not comply to the SID. This type of situation could have led to midair disaster over a very heavy populated area. The other question is when do you not comply with a controller's instruction? With heavy radio congestion, in the ny area, and the amount of aircraft tying to leave or arrive from 3 major airports, compliance with controller's instruction is almost mandatory. There is no time for lengthy conversations with the controllers. Nor does the controller (it seems) have time to have one with you.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A B737-800 FLC HAS AN ENCOUNTER WITH OTHER DEP TFC WHILE MAKING A R TURN TO THE NW WHEN 4 MI E OF EWR, NJ.

Narrative: THE SID IN USE FOR NEWARK WAS THE EWR RWY 6, RWY IN USE WAS RWY 4L FOR DEP. TKOF WAS NORMAL, THE PF WAS THE FO. IN COMPLYING WITH THE SID AT 4 MI OUR HEADING WAS 060 DEGS MAGNETIC. WE WERE INSTRUCTED TO CONTACT DEP. AFTER CONTACT WAS CONFIRMED, WE WERE INSTRUCTED TO TURN R TO A HEADING OF 330 DEGS AND CLB AND MAINTAIN 5000 FT. THE EWR SID STATES AT 4 MI A L TURN TO A HEADING OF 290 DEGS. I THEN QUERIED THE CTLR ABOUT THE R TURN AND ASKED HIM TO CONFIRM THE TURN TO THE R. THE CTLR CONFIRMED THE TURN TO THE R AND THE HEADING CHANGE TO 330 DEGS AND TO CLB TO MAINTAIN 5000 FT. WE COMPLIED WITH HIS INSTRUCTIONS AND THE FO AND I BOTH COMMENTED THAT THIS TURN, TO THE R, WAS A LONG WAY ABOUT TO GET WHERE WE NEEDED TO GO. AT 3500 FT MSL, THE CTLR CONTACTED US TO STOP OUR CLB AT 4000 FT MSL. AT THE SAME TIME OUR TCASII SYS GAVE US A TFC ALERT. THE TCASII SYS WAS RPTING TFC TO OUR L AND WITHIN 500 FT OF OUR ALT AND APPROX WITHIN 1-2 MI OF OUR POS. THE CTLR THEN CONTACTED US AGAIN AND TOLD US TO DSND NOW TO 3000 FT. OUR ALT WAS COMING THROUGH 3800 FT WITH THE FO TRYING TO COMPLY WITH THE FIRST INSTRUCTION TO LEVEL OFF AT 4000 FT. I HAD CHANGED THE ALT WINDOW FROM 5000 FT TO 4000 FT THEN TO 3000 FT TO COMPLY WITH THE CTLR'S INSTRUCTIONS. THE FO WAS PUSHING THE NOSE OVER TO AVOID AN OVERSHOOT OF THE ASSIGNED ALT AND TO AVOID ANY FURTHER CONFLICT WITH THE OTHER ACFT. AFTER LEVELOFF AT 3000 FT, I THEN QUERIED THE CTLR AS TO WHY WE WERE NOT ADVISED ABOUT THE ACFT TO OUR L AND ABOUT THE LOSS OF ALT SEPARATION. HE (THE CTLR) THEN STATED THAT HE HAD INSTRUCTED US TO TURN L TO 330 DEGS NOT R. I THEN STATED TO HIM THAT I HAD QUERIED HIM TWICE ABOUT THE TURN TO THE R AND THAT WE WERE COMPLYING WITH HIS INSTRUCTIONS. HE THEN INSTRUCTED US TO CLB AND MAINTAIN 5000 FT. AFTER A FEW MINS OF SILENCE (FROM THE CTLR) HE REPLIED TO MY INQUIRY AS TO HIS INSTRUCTIONS. HE STATED THAT THIS WAS HIS FAULT, HE HAD INSTRUCTED US TO TURN R. I THEN ASKED IF HE WAS GOING TO FILE A RPT OR FILE A VIOLATION ON THE SIT. HE STATED, NO, HE DID NOT FEEL ANY ACTION WOULD BE TAKEN SINCE HE FELT THAT TFC SEPARATION HAD NOT BEEN COMPROMISED. HE ALSO STATED, IF I HAD NO PROB WITH THE SIT HE HAD NO PROB. THE QUESTION IS NOT THAT HE OR I HAD A PROB WITH THIS SIT IS, DOES THE OTHER CAPT HAVE A PROB WITH THIS SIT? TFC SEPARATION WAS LOST. IF MY TCASII SYS RPTED THE CONFLICT, I KNOW THE OTHER CAPT'S TCASII SYS SHOULD HAVE RPTED THE SAME. SINCE BOTH ACFT WERE ON DIFFERENT RADIO FREQ, I AM SURE THIS PROB WILL BE RECORDED AND RPTED TO THE FAA. MY PERSONAL OPINION TO THIS SIT IS THAT I SHOULD HAVE PRESSED THE CTLR ABOUT HIS INSTRUCTIONS SINCE IT DID NOT COMPLY TO THE SID. THIS TYPE OF SIT COULD HAVE LED TO MIDAIR DISASTER OVER A VERY HVY POPULATED AREA. THE OTHER QUESTION IS WHEN DO YOU NOT COMPLY WITH A CTLR'S INSTRUCTION? WITH HVY RADIO CONGESTION, IN THE NY AREA, AND THE AMOUNT OF ACFT TYING TO LEAVE OR ARRIVE FROM 3 MAJOR ARPTS, COMPLIANCE WITH CTLR'S INSTRUCTION IS ALMOST MANDATORY. THERE IS NO TIME FOR LENGTHY CONVERSATIONS WITH THE CTLRS. NOR DOES THE CTLR (IT SEEMS) HAVE TIME TO HAVE ONE WITH YOU.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.