Narrative:

During night operations with heavy rain into jfk, the tower was using the non precision VOR/DME approach to runway 22L. On our first attempt we did not have the runway in sight in time to descend to a normal, safe landing so we executed a go around. Runway 22L had no approach lighting system, no REIL, and in heavy rain and with significant ground lights in the area, the runway was impossible to see. Additionally the VOR/DME to runway 22L is offset from the runway. After executing the missed approach tower asked if we wanted a 'visual approach' to runway 22L. We said 'no.' despite relatively good ground visibility, visibility in-flight with heavy rain hitting the windscreen at 160 KTS was limited. When we declined the visual, tower said he would put us at the 'end of the line.' on the second approach we descended from rushy to the intermediate MDA of 600 ft until the 3.0 DME fix. At 600 ft, the tower controller advised us that he had a 'low altitude alert' on us and asked if we had the runway in sight. We advised the controller that we were at 600 ft per the published approach procedure. Shortly thereafter we advised that we had the runway in sight, and landed uneventfully. Our concern was, why the controller had an altitude alert on us when we were on profile for the approach and, why a major international airport like jfk would be conducting non precision approachs to runways with published precision approachs (and especially to runways with no approach lights). Also, is the effect of rain on cockpit visibility considered when determining airport visibility and which type of approachs to conduct.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: JFK TWR ISSUES LOW ALT ALERT AS ACR LEVELS AT PROC ALT FOR VOR RWY 22L.

Narrative: DURING NIGHT OPS WITH HVY RAIN INTO JFK, THE TWR WAS USING THE NON PRECISION VOR/DME APCH TO RWY 22L. ON OUR FIRST ATTEMPT WE DID NOT HAVE THE RWY IN SIGHT IN TIME TO DSND TO A NORMAL, SAFE LNDG SO WE EXECUTED A GAR. RWY 22L HAD NO APCH LIGHTING SYS, NO REIL, AND IN HVY RAIN AND WITH SIGNIFICANT GND LIGHTS IN THE AREA, THE RWY WAS IMPOSSIBLE TO SEE. ADDITIONALLY THE VOR/DME TO RWY 22L IS OFFSET FROM THE RWY. AFTER EXECUTING THE MISSED APCH TWR ASKED IF WE WANTED A 'VISUAL APCH' TO RWY 22L. WE SAID 'NO.' DESPITE RELATIVELY GOOD GND VISIBILITY, VISIBILITY INFLT WITH HVY RAIN HITTING THE WINDSCREEN AT 160 KTS WAS LIMITED. WHEN WE DECLINED THE VISUAL, TWR SAID HE WOULD PUT US AT THE 'END OF THE LINE.' ON THE SECOND APCH WE DSNDED FROM RUSHY TO THE INTERMEDIATE MDA OF 600 FT UNTIL THE 3.0 DME FIX. AT 600 FT, THE TWR CTLR ADVISED US THAT HE HAD A 'LOW ALT ALERT' ON US AND ASKED IF WE HAD THE RWY IN SIGHT. WE ADVISED THE CTLR THAT WE WERE AT 600 FT PER THE PUBLISHED APCH PROC. SHORTLY THEREAFTER WE ADVISED THAT WE HAD THE RWY IN SIGHT, AND LANDED UNEVENTFULLY. OUR CONCERN WAS, WHY THE CTLR HAD AN ALT ALERT ON US WHEN WE WERE ON PROFILE FOR THE APCH AND, WHY A MAJOR INTL ARPT LIKE JFK WOULD BE CONDUCTING NON PRECISION APCHS TO RWYS WITH PUBLISHED PRECISION APCHS (AND ESPECIALLY TO RWYS WITH NO APCH LIGHTS). ALSO, IS THE EFFECT OF RAIN ON COCKPIT VISIBILITY CONSIDERED WHEN DETERMINING ARPT VISIBILITY AND WHICH TYPE OF APCHS TO CONDUCT.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.