Narrative:

Upon discovery that we were high on approach and it became obvious that any further attempt at completing the landing would be an unstable approach, I informed the captain that we were 'out of luck,' implying that a go around would be necessary. The captain stated 'we'll be fine' and proceeded to slip the B737. I informed the captain that I was uncomfortable with this maneuver and the maneuver was ceased. At 500 ft AGL, where the visual approach is required to be stable at +/-5 KT airspace, on glide path and engines spooled up. I observed us to be +30 KTS high on glide path and engines at idle. I made my 500 ft callout and informed the captain that we were +30 KTS above target speed. The captain stated 'we'll be all right.' and proceeded with the landing. I then requested and received clearance for a 'long landing.' the engines were spooled up just past runway threshold and we touched down 4000 ft down the runway at target +15 KTS. We turned off at taxiway K and proceeded to the gate. The debrief from the captain included a 'thank you for speaking up, but I've slipped these airplanes before and haven't had any problems.' no explanation was offered for why the go around was not executed. The next day I informed the captain that I thought we should have executed a go around and apologized for not advocating my position in a stronger, more informative manner. This action was well received and that was the end of the incident. An unrpted tailwind over the OM opposite to reported airport winds was a contributing factor. The first officer not clearly advocating the desire for a go around and the captain either failing to recognize the first officer's meaning with his callouts or just plain refusing to follow SOP's were the biggest contributors.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A B737 CAPT PERFORMS A DESTABILIZED APCH AND MAKES A LONG LNDG AGAINST THE WISHES OF THE FO AT SFO, CA.

Narrative: UPON DISCOVERY THAT WE WERE HIGH ON APCH AND IT BECAME OBVIOUS THAT ANY FURTHER ATTEMPT AT COMPLETING THE LNDG WOULD BE AN UNSTABLE APCH, I INFORMED THE CAPT THAT WE WERE 'OUT OF LUCK,' IMPLYING THAT A GAR WOULD BE NECESSARY. THE CAPT STATED 'WE'LL BE FINE' AND PROCEEDED TO SLIP THE B737. I INFORMED THE CAPT THAT I WAS UNCOMFORTABLE WITH THIS MANEUVER AND THE MANEUVER WAS CEASED. AT 500 FT AGL, WHERE THE VISUAL APCH IS REQUIRED TO BE STABLE AT +/-5 KT AIRSPACE, ON GLIDE PATH AND ENGS SPOOLED UP. I OBSERVED US TO BE +30 KTS HIGH ON GLIDE PATH AND ENGS AT IDLE. I MADE MY 500 FT CALLOUT AND INFORMED THE CAPT THAT WE WERE +30 KTS ABOVE TARGET SPD. THE CAPT STATED 'WE'LL BE ALL RIGHT.' AND PROCEEDED WITH THE LNDG. I THEN REQUESTED AND RECEIVED CLRNC FOR A 'LONG LNDG.' THE ENGS WERE SPOOLED UP JUST PAST RWY THRESHOLD AND WE TOUCHED DOWN 4000 FT DOWN THE RWY AT TARGET +15 KTS. WE TURNED OFF AT TXWY K AND PROCEEDED TO THE GATE. THE DEBRIEF FROM THE CAPT INCLUDED A 'THANK YOU FOR SPEAKING UP, BUT I'VE SLIPPED THESE AIRPLANES BEFORE AND HAVEN'T HAD ANY PROBS.' NO EXPLANATION WAS OFFERED FOR WHY THE GAR WAS NOT EXECUTED. THE NEXT DAY I INFORMED THE CAPT THAT I THOUGHT WE SHOULD HAVE EXECUTED A GAR AND APOLOGIZED FOR NOT ADVOCATING MY POS IN A STRONGER, MORE INFORMATIVE MANNER. THIS ACTION WAS WELL RECEIVED AND THAT WAS THE END OF THE INCIDENT. AN UNRPTED TAILWIND OVER THE OM OPPOSITE TO RPTED ARPT WINDS WAS A CONTRIBUTING FACTOR. THE FO NOT CLRLY ADVOCATING THE DESIRE FOR A GAR AND THE CAPT EITHER FAILING TO RECOGNIZE THE FO'S MEANING WITH HIS CALLOUTS OR JUST PLAIN REFUSING TO FOLLOW SOP'S WERE THE BIGGEST CONTRIBUTORS.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.