Narrative:

On the approach, not yet cleared, and were approximately 2000 ft above the FAF altitude and while on final, were requested to hold 170-180 KTS by approach. Approach speed was about 140 KTS. The captain stated we would 'need clearance soon.' I asked if I should query the controller and he said yes. Upon asking, the controller stated we had been given clearance earlier and was sorry we had missed it and would we have any trouble. I asked the captain and he said no, that he could make it. We went gear down and flaps 3 degrees. I reminded him we could still use speed brakes and we did. I also reminded him that we could descend at a greater rate until 1000 ft AGL and then it was to be 1000 FPM. We were both preoccupied with the approach. I was called out airspeed and descent rate. We kept 1400 FPM below 1000 ft AGL -- I don't know how long. Crossing the overrun we were approximately 15 KTS fast and starting to flare. The captain asked if we had been cleared to land. I said no and told tower we were 'C/south rolling out on the runway.' we had not actually touched down at this point, and were given clearance to land by tower. The problems I see causing this unstable approach and basically landing without clearance are as follows: the controller had missed some calls to us and others earlier in the approach and did not appear to be as in control as much as they usually are. The captain elected to continue the approach (he was an instructor in the aircraft and had been on the plane 6 yrs versus 1 for me). I should have been more vocal for a go around and should have also ensured our clearance to land sooner. It appears that oftentimes we only talk about safety when it is cheap to do so (steep clbouts and dscnts for noise abatement and turns low to the ground -- dca approachs -- V's having 10 NM finals and established on altitude and airspeed).

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: AN A320 FLC PERFORMS A DESTABILIZED APCH WITH A LONG LNDG, CALLING FOR LNDG CLRNC DURING THE FLARE AT BOS, MA.

Narrative: ON THE APCH, NOT YET CLRED, AND WERE APPROX 2000 FT ABOVE THE FAF ALT AND WHILE ON FINAL, WERE REQUESTED TO HOLD 170-180 KTS BY APCH. APCH SPD WAS ABOUT 140 KTS. THE CAPT STATED WE WOULD 'NEED CLRNC SOON.' I ASKED IF I SHOULD QUERY THE CTLR AND HE SAID YES. UPON ASKING, THE CTLR STATED WE HAD BEEN GIVEN CLRNC EARLIER AND WAS SORRY WE HAD MISSED IT AND WOULD WE HAVE ANY TROUBLE. I ASKED THE CAPT AND HE SAID NO, THAT HE COULD MAKE IT. WE WENT GEAR DOWN AND FLAPS 3 DEGS. I REMINDED HIM WE COULD STILL USE SPD BRAKES AND WE DID. I ALSO REMINDED HIM THAT WE COULD DSND AT A GREATER RATE UNTIL 1000 FT AGL AND THEN IT WAS TO BE 1000 FPM. WE WERE BOTH PREOCCUPIED WITH THE APCH. I WAS CALLED OUT AIRSPD AND DSCNT RATE. WE KEPT 1400 FPM BELOW 1000 FT AGL -- I DON'T KNOW HOW LONG. XING THE OVERRUN WE WERE APPROX 15 KTS FAST AND STARTING TO FLARE. THE CAPT ASKED IF WE HAD BEEN CLRED TO LAND. I SAID NO AND TOLD TWR WE WERE 'C/S ROLLING OUT ON THE RWY.' WE HAD NOT ACTUALLY TOUCHED DOWN AT THIS POINT, AND WERE GIVEN CLRNC TO LAND BY TWR. THE PROBS I SEE CAUSING THIS UNSTABLE APCH AND BASICALLY LNDG WITHOUT CLRNC ARE AS FOLLOWS: THE CTLR HAD MISSED SOME CALLS TO US AND OTHERS EARLIER IN THE APCH AND DID NOT APPEAR TO BE AS IN CTL AS MUCH AS THEY USUALLY ARE. THE CAPT ELECTED TO CONTINUE THE APCH (HE WAS AN INSTRUCTOR IN THE ACFT AND HAD BEEN ON THE PLANE 6 YRS VERSUS 1 FOR ME). I SHOULD HAVE BEEN MORE VOCAL FOR A GAR AND SHOULD HAVE ALSO ENSURED OUR CLRNC TO LAND SOONER. IT APPEARS THAT OFTENTIMES WE ONLY TALK ABOUT SAFETY WHEN IT IS CHEAP TO DO SO (STEEP CLBOUTS AND DSCNTS FOR NOISE ABATEMENT AND TURNS LOW TO THE GND -- DCA APCHS -- V'S HAVING 10 NM FINALS AND ESTABLISHED ON ALT AND AIRSPD).

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.