Narrative:

The local training flight originated for eug. The plan was to do multiple practice approachs at cvo with a holding practice. The first approach into cvo went well, and was followed by the published missed with a hold at shedd intersection. After holding for a while, we requested a second approach to cvo. Our request was granted. I flew another approach and once again we decided to do the published miss. On the missed approach, we advised ATC that we wanted to hold at shedd again. He gave us clearance to hold at shedd. I told the controller that I was established in the hold. I then demonstrated how to correct for the crosswind, and adjust my outbound time in order to make our inbound leg 1 min in length. Some time later, while making another turn for the inbound leg, we heard ATC advising another pilot of an aircraft at 4000 ft. As we rounded the corner turning inbound, the controller called the traffic out to us as 12-1 O'clock position, less than 1/2 mi at 4000 ft. I immediately removed my hood (view limiting device) in order to help spot the traffic. When we saw the traffic, it was on a converging course coming from our 1 O'clock position. I would estimate its proximity as 1500 ft horizontal and 0 ft vertical separation. I saw him make a steep turn to the left. He was on the protected side of the hold, maneuvering inside of our holding pattern. Now we were wings level on the inbound leg of the holding pattern and we immediately requested an alternate clearance, which was a request for the GPS approach to runway 3 at eug. The controller responded with a question, 'how would you like to do that?' I replied, 'we'll get back to you on that.' we looked at the approach plate and saw that fritt was the IAF and we decided to request the approach via direct to fritt. Unfortunately, the controller got extremely busy on the radio. About this time we reached shedd and had no choice but to continue straight out. The hold called for another right turn which would have placed us in closer to the maneuvering aircraft and create a collision hazard. Due to the unforeseen combination of circumstances and the resulting situation that called for immediate action, we needed to deviate from our clearance limit and depart the hold. Due to the emergency nature of the situation I was told that we could not safely turn right, which would place us closer to the maneuvering aircraft and jeopardize the safety of the flight. When the controller got a break in communication, he stated, 'I see you have departed the hold, what are your intentions?' I came back, 'proceeding direct to fritt.' this flight path kept us away from the maneuvering aircraft and resolved the nature of the emergency. The controller gave us our new clearance to eug via fritt and GPS runway 3 approach. The approach went well and the flight concluded with a safe landing at eug. In retrospect the departure from the hold should have been preceded by additional radio communications to allow the controller to be more aware of our need for immediate action regarding our flight safety. Preventive actions: 1) more detailed radio communications. 2) more forceful radio communications. 3) report to ATC of VFR conditions. 4) training in less congested times. Supplemental information from acn 450062: factors affecting the events: if ATC had advised of the traffic earlier, better separation would have been possible which would have potentially allowed us to remain in the hold safely. While we wanted to request an immediate departure from the hold due to the conflicting position of the VFR traffic, busy radio xmissions, provided little opening for our communication. In conclusion, I think that my actions described above are consistent with the spirit and letter of far section 91.3A and 91.3B.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A PA28 TRAINING FLT DEPARTED THEIR HOLDING PATTERN FIX WITHOUT AUTH FROM ATC WHEN CONFLICTING TFC LEFT FEW OPTIONS. FREQ CONGESTION AT EUG, OR.

Narrative: THE LCL TRAINING FLT ORIGINATED FOR EUG. THE PLAN WAS TO DO MULTIPLE PRACTICE APCHS AT CVO WITH A HOLDING PRACTICE. THE FIRST APCH INTO CVO WENT WELL, AND WAS FOLLOWED BY THE PUBLISHED MISSED WITH A HOLD AT SHEDD INTXN. AFTER HOLDING FOR A WHILE, WE REQUESTED A SECOND APCH TO CVO. OUR REQUEST WAS GRANTED. I FLEW ANOTHER APCH AND ONCE AGAIN WE DECIDED TO DO THE PUBLISHED MISS. ON THE MISSED APCH, WE ADVISED ATC THAT WE WANTED TO HOLD AT SHEDD AGAIN. HE GAVE US CLRNC TO HOLD AT SHEDD. I TOLD THE CTLR THAT I WAS ESTABLISHED IN THE HOLD. I THEN DEMONSTRATED HOW TO CORRECT FOR THE XWIND, AND ADJUST MY OUTBOUND TIME IN ORDER TO MAKE OUR INBOUND LEG 1 MIN IN LENGTH. SOME TIME LATER, WHILE MAKING ANOTHER TURN FOR THE INBOUND LEG, WE HEARD ATC ADVISING ANOTHER PLT OF AN ACFT AT 4000 FT. AS WE ROUNDED THE CORNER TURNING INBOUND, THE CTLR CALLED THE TFC OUT TO US AS 12-1 O'CLOCK POS, LESS THAN 1/2 MI AT 4000 FT. I IMMEDIATELY REMOVED MY HOOD (VIEW LIMITING DEVICE) IN ORDER TO HELP SPOT THE TFC. WHEN WE SAW THE TFC, IT WAS ON A CONVERGING COURSE COMING FROM OUR 1 O'CLOCK POS. I WOULD ESTIMATE ITS PROX AS 1500 FT HORIZ AND 0 FT VERT SEPARATION. I SAW HIM MAKE A STEEP TURN TO THE L. HE WAS ON THE PROTECTED SIDE OF THE HOLD, MANEUVERING INSIDE OF OUR HOLDING PATTERN. NOW WE WERE WINGS LEVEL ON THE INBOUND LEG OF THE HOLDING PATTERN AND WE IMMEDIATELY REQUESTED AN ALTERNATE CLRNC, WHICH WAS A REQUEST FOR THE GPS APCH TO RWY 3 AT EUG. THE CTLR RESPONDED WITH A QUESTION, 'HOW WOULD YOU LIKE TO DO THAT?' I REPLIED, 'WE'LL GET BACK TO YOU ON THAT.' WE LOOKED AT THE APCH PLATE AND SAW THAT FRITT WAS THE IAF AND WE DECIDED TO REQUEST THE APCH VIA DIRECT TO FRITT. UNFORTUNATELY, THE CTLR GOT EXTREMELY BUSY ON THE RADIO. ABOUT THIS TIME WE REACHED SHEDD AND HAD NO CHOICE BUT TO CONTINUE STRAIGHT OUT. THE HOLD CALLED FOR ANOTHER R TURN WHICH WOULD HAVE PLACED US IN CLOSER TO THE MANEUVERING ACFT AND CREATE A COLLISION HAZARD. DUE TO THE UNFORESEEN COMBINATION OF CIRCUMSTANCES AND THE RESULTING SIT THAT CALLED FOR IMMEDIATE ACTION, WE NEEDED TO DEVIATE FROM OUR CLRNC LIMIT AND DEPART THE HOLD. DUE TO THE EMER NATURE OF THE SIT I WAS TOLD THAT WE COULD NOT SAFELY TURN R, WHICH WOULD PLACE US CLOSER TO THE MANEUVERING ACFT AND JEOPARDIZE THE SAFETY OF THE FLT. WHEN THE CTLR GOT A BREAK IN COM, HE STATED, 'I SEE YOU HAVE DEPARTED THE HOLD, WHAT ARE YOUR INTENTIONS?' I CAME BACK, 'PROCEEDING DIRECT TO FRITT.' THIS FLT PATH KEPT US AWAY FROM THE MANEUVERING ACFT AND RESOLVED THE NATURE OF THE EMER. THE CTLR GAVE US OUR NEW CLRNC TO EUG VIA FRITT AND GPS RWY 3 APCH. THE APCH WENT WELL AND THE FLT CONCLUDED WITH A SAFE LNDG AT EUG. IN RETROSPECT THE DEP FROM THE HOLD SHOULD HAVE BEEN PRECEDED BY ADDITIONAL RADIO COMS TO ALLOW THE CTLR TO BE MORE AWARE OF OUR NEED FOR IMMEDIATE ACTION REGARDING OUR FLT SAFETY. PREVENTIVE ACTIONS: 1) MORE DETAILED RADIO COMS. 2) MORE FORCEFUL RADIO COMS. 3) RPT TO ATC OF VFR CONDITIONS. 4) TRAINING IN LESS CONGESTED TIMES. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 450062: FACTORS AFFECTING THE EVENTS: IF ATC HAD ADVISED OF THE TFC EARLIER, BETTER SEPARATION WOULD HAVE BEEN POSSIBLE WHICH WOULD HAVE POTENTIALLY ALLOWED US TO REMAIN IN THE HOLD SAFELY. WHILE WE WANTED TO REQUEST AN IMMEDIATE DEP FROM THE HOLD DUE TO THE CONFLICTING POS OF THE VFR TFC, BUSY RADIO XMISSIONS, PROVIDED LITTLE OPENING FOR OUR COM. IN CONCLUSION, I THINK THAT MY ACTIONS DESCRIBED ABOVE ARE CONSISTENT WITH THE SPIRIT AND LETTER OF FAR SECTION 91.3A AND 91.3B.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.