Narrative:

Jfk departing runway 4L landing runway 4R. We cannot run simultaneous departures and lndgs on runway 4L&right because the missed approach crosses over the arrival runway, so we must apply the rule 2 mi increasing to 3 mi within 1 mi off departure end. While working arrival (runway 4R), separation was lost at least a dozen times during my 1 hour on position. Two missed approachs -- the departures had to be run straight out, violating lga's airspace in order to provide separation to the missed approach aircraft. Although the FAA conducted a special evaluation and specifically said simultaneous operations could not be conducted -- even though management at this facility says we can use visual separation -- contrary to the evaluation team's final report. This setup is an accident waiting to happen. We have had 5 near misses in just over a 1 yr time frame on this setup. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information: the reporter believes that a recent regional office evaluation team finding states that the tower application of visual separation between a runway 4L go around and an IFR departure on runway 4R is not correctly being applied. In order for this to be applied correctly, the reporter perceives that the coordination procedure from the local controller to the N90-jfk controller to coordination with and obtain additional go around airspace protection from the N90-lga controller is/cannot be timely effected because there is not enough time to complete this coordination. The reporter alleges that tower management sidesteps this issue by telling the local controller to utilize visual separation. The reporter also alleges that the '2 mi, going to 3 mi rule' is not correctly being applied. Analyst understands all the rules stated, and there appears to be procedural separation in place to protect a go around from an IFR departure. But only the controllers and management can ensure that these rules are being correctly applied. With the heavy demand on the airport, there is a fine line in the exact application of ATC procedures and then the expected anticipated application of these procedures. In other words, aircraft on approach are expected to land and not go around.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: TRACON APCH CTLR OBSERVES SIMULTANEOUS APCHS APPARENTLY CONFLICTING WITH GAR AND OTHER IFR DEPS. DEP CTLR APPARENTLY REQUIRED TO ISSUE HDGS TO DEPARTING ACFT THAT WILL PENETRATE LGA AIRSPACE IN ORDER TO PROVIDE INITIAL SEPARATION BTWN GARS AND OTHER IFR DEPS. CTLR STATES THIS TYPE ACTIVITY IS NOT AUTH.

Narrative: JFK DEPARTING RWY 4L LNDG RWY 4R. WE CANNOT RUN SIMULTANEOUS DEPS AND LNDGS ON RWY 4L&R BECAUSE THE MISSED APCH CROSSES OVER THE ARR RWY, SO WE MUST APPLY THE RULE 2 MI INCREASING TO 3 MI WITHIN 1 MI OFF DEP END. WHILE WORKING ARR (RWY 4R), SEPARATION WAS LOST AT LEAST A DOZEN TIMES DURING MY 1 HR ON POS. TWO MISSED APCHS -- THE DEPS HAD TO BE RUN STRAIGHT OUT, VIOLATING LGA'S AIRSPACE IN ORDER TO PROVIDE SEPARATION TO THE MISSED APCH ACFT. ALTHOUGH THE FAA CONDUCTED A SPECIAL EVALUATION AND SPECIFICALLY SAID SIMULTANEOUS OPS COULD NOT BE CONDUCTED -- EVEN THOUGH MGMNT AT THIS FACILITY SAYS WE CAN USE VISUAL SEPARATION -- CONTRARY TO THE EVALUATION TEAM'S FINAL RPT. THIS SETUP IS AN ACCIDENT WAITING TO HAPPEN. WE HAVE HAD 5 NEAR MISSES IN JUST OVER A 1 YR TIME FRAME ON THIS SETUP. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: THE RPTR BELIEVES THAT A RECENT REGIONAL OFFICE EVALUATION TEAM FINDING STATES THAT THE TWR APPLICATION OF VISUAL SEPARATION BTWN A RWY 4L GAR AND AN IFR DEP ON RWY 4R IS NOT CORRECTLY BEING APPLIED. IN ORDER FOR THIS TO BE APPLIED CORRECTLY, THE RPTR PERCEIVES THAT THE COORD PROC FROM THE LCL CTLR TO THE N90-JFK CTLR TO COORD WITH AND OBTAIN ADDITIONAL GAR AIRSPACE PROTECTION FROM THE N90-LGA CTLR IS/CANNOT BE TIMELY EFFECTED BECAUSE THERE IS NOT ENOUGH TIME TO COMPLETE THIS COORD. THE RPTR ALLEGES THAT TWR MGMNT SIDESTEPS THIS ISSUE BY TELLING THE LCL CTLR TO UTILIZE VISUAL SEPARATION. THE RPTR ALSO ALLEGES THAT THE '2 MI, GOING TO 3 MI RULE' IS NOT CORRECTLY BEING APPLIED. ANALYST UNDERSTANDS ALL THE RULES STATED, AND THERE APPEARS TO BE PROCEDURAL SEPARATION IN PLACE TO PROTECT A GAR FROM AN IFR DEP. BUT ONLY THE CTLRS AND MGMNT CAN ENSURE THAT THESE RULES ARE BEING CORRECTLY APPLIED. WITH THE HVY DEMAND ON THE ARPT, THERE IS A FINE LINE IN THE EXACT APPLICATION OF ATC PROCS AND THEN THE EXPECTED ANTICIPATED APPLICATION OF THESE PROCS. IN OTHER WORDS, ACFT ON APCH ARE EXPECTED TO LAND AND NOT GO AROUND.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.