Narrative:

Upon taxi out and engine start at sfo on sep/xa/99 at XA30, we observed an erratic indication of N1 on engine #2. After following procedures and talking to our company dispatchers and maintenance personnel, we decided that we must return to the gate to have the problem corrected. The deferral procedure required an engine run-up to be performed by maintenance. Maintenance initially offered to sign off the logbook and we (the crew) could do the required run-up just takeoff, then go if everything was ok. We declined because we felt the MEL stated that run-up was a maintenance function and it would not be appropriate for us to accomplish such. After much discussion, it was decided that we would taxi out to do the run-up with the maintenance personnel on board then return to the gate to drop them off before we departed. In the interest of time, the passenger were left on the airplane for run-up. The run-up was accomplished safely and the flight continued as normal. In retrospect, we discussed the possibility of requiring all passenger to deplane before run-ups in the future. Also, we felt like the run-up pad at sfo should not face an active runway in the event of an unsuspected parking brake failure. We took appropriate precautions for safety, but still feel like the run-up pad at sfo could be safer.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A DC10-40 ON A REQUIRED ENG RUN AT SFO THE CREW QUESTIONS THE SAFETY OF OPERATING AT HIGH PWR ON A RUN-UP PAD FACING AN ACTIVE RWY.

Narrative: UPON TAXI OUT AND ENG START AT SFO ON SEP/XA/99 AT XA30, WE OBSERVED AN ERRATIC INDICATION OF N1 ON ENG #2. AFTER FOLLOWING PROCS AND TALKING TO OUR COMPANY DISPATCHERS AND MAINT PERSONNEL, WE DECIDED THAT WE MUST RETURN TO THE GATE TO HAVE THE PROB CORRECTED. THE DEFERRAL PROC REQUIRED AN ENG RUN-UP TO BE PERFORMED BY MAINT. MAINT INITIALLY OFFERED TO SIGN OFF THE LOGBOOK AND WE (THE CREW) COULD DO THE REQUIRED RUN-UP JUST TKOF, THEN GO IF EVERYTHING WAS OK. WE DECLINED BECAUSE WE FELT THE MEL STATED THAT RUN-UP WAS A MAINT FUNCTION AND IT WOULD NOT BE APPROPRIATE FOR US TO ACCOMPLISH SUCH. AFTER MUCH DISCUSSION, IT WAS DECIDED THAT WE WOULD TAXI OUT TO DO THE RUN-UP WITH THE MAINT PERSONNEL ON BOARD THEN RETURN TO THE GATE TO DROP THEM OFF BEFORE WE DEPARTED. IN THE INTEREST OF TIME, THE PAX WERE LEFT ON THE AIRPLANE FOR RUN-UP. THE RUN-UP WAS ACCOMPLISHED SAFELY AND THE FLT CONTINUED AS NORMAL. IN RETROSPECT, WE DISCUSSED THE POSSIBILITY OF REQUIRING ALL PAX TO DEPLANE BEFORE RUN-UPS IN THE FUTURE. ALSO, WE FELT LIKE THE RUN-UP PAD AT SFO SHOULD NOT FACE AN ACTIVE RWY IN THE EVENT OF AN UNSUSPECTED PARKING BRAKE FAILURE. WE TOOK APPROPRIATE PRECAUTIONS FOR SAFETY, BUT STILL FEEL LIKE THE RUN-UP PAD AT SFO COULD BE SAFER.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.