Narrative:

I completed my flight engineer chkride 2 months before this occurrence and I have flown 5 trips on this aircraft since this chkout. The particular aircraft we were using had numerous MEL's, including the antiskid being inoperative. Our company uses a notebook computer to compute our performance numbers including: takeoff and landing numbers, weights and required runway lengths for both dispatch and landing purposes. With the particular computer program our company utilizes, the flight engineer scrolls through 13 pages on the computer screen to come up with the final weights and numbers which are xferred to a flight manifest which the captain signs. However, I failed to enter the proper information into the computer and the computer was not told that the antiskid was inoperative. The captain has no way of knowing what the flight engineer has or has not entered into the computer because he is only seeing the final numbers on the flight manifest. The computer program defaults automatically to the normal situation, which is the antiskid being operative. Therefore, for dispatch landing purposes we were overweight. Our dispatchers also failed to enter the proper data into their computers (same computer program) and another check failed to catch this error. Our company realized the problem en route to our destination and notified us via ACARS. We (the crew) verified on the computer (with the antiskid inoperative) that the aircraft was within landing weights at our arrival airport. The company is investigating how to bring the captain into the loop with what exactly the flight engineer has entered into the computer. This way there is a third set of eyes to check the takeoff numbers and other performance data.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A DC10 WITH ITS ANTISKID INOP TAKES OFF WITH INCORRECT TKOF DATA AND COMPUTED WTS FOR LNDG AT DEST ARPT, ZZZ, US.

Narrative: I COMPLETED MY FE CHKRIDE 2 MONTHS BEFORE THIS OCCURRENCE AND I HAVE FLOWN 5 TRIPS ON THIS ACFT SINCE THIS CHKOUT. THE PARTICULAR ACFT WE WERE USING HAD NUMEROUS MEL'S, INCLUDING THE ANTISKID BEING INOP. OUR COMPANY USES A NOTEBOOK COMPUTER TO COMPUTE OUR PERFORMANCE NUMBERS INCLUDING: TKOF AND LNDG NUMBERS, WTS AND REQUIRED RWY LENGTHS FOR BOTH DISPATCH AND LNDG PURPOSES. WITH THE PARTICULAR COMPUTER PROGRAM OUR COMPANY UTILIZES, THE FE SCROLLS THROUGH 13 PAGES ON THE COMPUTER SCREEN TO COME UP WITH THE FINAL WTS AND NUMBERS WHICH ARE XFERRED TO A FLT MANIFEST WHICH THE CAPT SIGNS. HOWEVER, I FAILED TO ENTER THE PROPER INFO INTO THE COMPUTER AND THE COMPUTER WAS NOT TOLD THAT THE ANTISKID WAS INOP. THE CAPT HAS NO WAY OF KNOWING WHAT THE FE HAS OR HAS NOT ENTERED INTO THE COMPUTER BECAUSE HE IS ONLY SEEING THE FINAL NUMBERS ON THE FLT MANIFEST. THE COMPUTER PROGRAM DEFAULTS AUTOMATICALLY TO THE NORMAL SIT, WHICH IS THE ANTISKID BEING OPERATIVE. THEREFORE, FOR DISPATCH LNDG PURPOSES WE WERE OVERWT. OUR DISPATCHERS ALSO FAILED TO ENTER THE PROPER DATA INTO THEIR COMPUTERS (SAME COMPUTER PROGRAM) AND ANOTHER CHK FAILED TO CATCH THIS ERROR. OUR COMPANY REALIZED THE PROB ENRTE TO OUR DEST AND NOTIFIED US VIA ACARS. WE (THE CREW) VERIFIED ON THE COMPUTER (WITH THE ANTISKID INOP) THAT THE ACFT WAS WITHIN LNDG WTS AT OUR ARR ARPT. THE COMPANY IS INVESTIGATING HOW TO BRING THE CAPT INTO THE LOOP WITH WHAT EXACTLY THE FE HAS ENTERED INTO THE COMPUTER. THIS WAY THERE IS A THIRD SET OF EYES TO CHK THE TKOF NUMBERS AND OTHER PERFORMANCE DATA.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.