Narrative:

Flight proceeded normally until turning final at bna. The first officer was flying. Aircraft was a little fast on final, and he reduced power substantially to compensate. Once back on speed, he added power back in slowly, but not quite enough to keep speed from slowly decaying. On very short final, sink began developing and he added some power. I urged him to add more. We landed hard and bounced. I got on the controls with him. After the second touchdown I felt vibrations from the left wing and had problems with directional control as well as trouble keeping the wings level. We stopped the aircraft straight ahead using right brake. I asked the tower for the emergency vehicles, which were already on the way. The trucks arrived and we saw no visible smoke or fire, so elected not to evacuate/evacuation. The aft flight attendant said she saw fuel, so we turned off all system and the fire crews foamed the plane. Later, we made an orderly evacuate/evacuation using the forward left escape slide. There were no injuries during evacuate/evacuation. The aircraft sustained damage to the left main landing gear, left wing, and left engine. In retrospect, there were warning signs that could have prevented this. The slow speed decay without adequate correction was primary. I assumed the first officer recognized this also. I have seen similar approachs and techniques used by others. I expected a big flare, but his flare was minor. I should have communicated my misgivings to make sure he was perceiving the same problem. Then I would've known it to be necessary for me to complete the landing. Of course, you never want to have to take an aircraft away from the first officer, and being a new captain, I never had. Perhaps I didn't know where my limits are. I think perhaps that would be something worthwhile to practice in the simulator during captain training. Supplemental information from acn 448664: daylight VFR conditions prevailed and the latest wind information from current ATIS indicated 360 degrees at 9 KTS gust to 16 KTS. We were cleared the visual approach to runway 2L from a left turn on to intercept the final. We proceeded to join the localizer and visually navigation the centerline for runway 2L. The approach was in reasonably smooth air with only light turbulence. A standard landing confign of flaps 40 degrees was established by 1500 ft AGL and airspeed comfortably decelerating to the calculated final approach speed for our landing weight of 76000 pounds. At 500 ft, the approach indications were within normal stabilized limits with reference to speed, sink rate, and GS. Some use of power was made to 'check' the sink rate during landing flare. Actual touchdown was deceptively early and unexpectedly hard with a short rebound, second contact was light. During the rollout a vibration was evident and considerable inputs were required to maintain directional control. The vibration then ceased after a few seconds (the apparent departure of the left gear assembly). Continuous control inputs were required to keep it straight and it became evident that the left wing was slowly settling to the runway surface. Start levers were pulled to shutoff and the cockpit door opened to coordinate with flight attendants. Crash fire rescue equipment was fast on the scene and indicated that no fire or smoke was evident. We completed the evacuate/evacuation checklist, but chose not to evacuate/evacuation. Shortly afterwards we deplaned by L1 slide under the direction of crash fire rescue equipment due to the presence of fuel. Evacuate/evacuation was orderly.

Google
 

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: DC9 CREW HAD L GEAR COLLAPSE ON LNDG.

Narrative: FLT PROCEEDED NORMALLY UNTIL TURNING FINAL AT BNA. THE FO WAS FLYING. ACFT WAS A LITTLE FAST ON FINAL, AND HE REDUCED PWR SUBSTANTIALLY TO COMPENSATE. ONCE BACK ON SPD, HE ADDED PWR BACK IN SLOWLY, BUT NOT QUITE ENOUGH TO KEEP SPD FROM SLOWLY DECAYING. ON VERY SHORT FINAL, SINK BEGAN DEVELOPING AND HE ADDED SOME PWR. I URGED HIM TO ADD MORE. WE LANDED HARD AND BOUNCED. I GOT ON THE CTLS WITH HIM. AFTER THE SECOND TOUCHDOWN I FELT VIBRATIONS FROM THE L WING AND HAD PROBS WITH DIRECTIONAL CTL AS WELL AS TROUBLE KEEPING THE WINGS LEVEL. WE STOPPED THE ACFT STRAIGHT AHEAD USING R BRAKE. I ASKED THE TWR FOR THE EMER VEHICLES, WHICH WERE ALREADY ON THE WAY. THE TRUCKS ARRIVED AND WE SAW NO VISIBLE SMOKE OR FIRE, SO ELECTED NOT TO EVAC. THE AFT FLT ATTENDANT SAID SHE SAW FUEL, SO WE TURNED OFF ALL SYS AND THE FIRE CREWS FOAMED THE PLANE. LATER, WE MADE AN ORDERLY EVAC USING THE FORWARD L ESCAPE SLIDE. THERE WERE NO INJURIES DURING EVAC. THE ACFT SUSTAINED DAMAGE TO THE L MAIN LNDG GEAR, L WING, AND L ENG. IN RETROSPECT, THERE WERE WARNING SIGNS THAT COULD HAVE PREVENTED THIS. THE SLOW SPD DECAY WITHOUT ADEQUATE CORRECTION WAS PRIMARY. I ASSUMED THE FO RECOGNIZED THIS ALSO. I HAVE SEEN SIMILAR APCHS AND TECHNIQUES USED BY OTHERS. I EXPECTED A BIG FLARE, BUT HIS FLARE WAS MINOR. I SHOULD HAVE COMMUNICATED MY MISGIVINGS TO MAKE SURE HE WAS PERCEIVING THE SAME PROB. THEN I WOULD'VE KNOWN IT TO BE NECESSARY FOR ME TO COMPLETE THE LNDG. OF COURSE, YOU NEVER WANT TO HAVE TO TAKE AN ACFT AWAY FROM THE FO, AND BEING A NEW CAPT, I NEVER HAD. PERHAPS I DIDN'T KNOW WHERE MY LIMITS ARE. I THINK PERHAPS THAT WOULD BE SOMETHING WORTHWHILE TO PRACTICE IN THE SIMULATOR DURING CAPT TRAINING. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 448664: DAYLIGHT VFR CONDITIONS PREVAILED AND THE LATEST WIND INFO FROM CURRENT ATIS INDICATED 360 DEGS AT 9 KTS GUST TO 16 KTS. WE WERE CLRED THE VISUAL APCH TO RWY 2L FROM A L TURN ON TO INTERCEPT THE FINAL. WE PROCEEDED TO JOIN THE LOC AND VISUALLY NAV THE CTRLINE FOR RWY 2L. THE APCH WAS IN REASONABLY SMOOTH AIR WITH ONLY LIGHT TURB. A STANDARD LNDG CONFIGN OF FLAPS 40 DEGS WAS ESTABLISHED BY 1500 FT AGL AND AIRSPD COMFORTABLY DECELERATING TO THE CALCULATED FINAL APCH SPD FOR OUR LNDG WT OF 76000 LBS. AT 500 FT, THE APCH INDICATIONS WERE WITHIN NORMAL STABILIZED LIMITS WITH REF TO SPD, SINK RATE, AND GS. SOME USE OF PWR WAS MADE TO 'CHK' THE SINK RATE DURING LNDG FLARE. ACTUAL TOUCHDOWN WAS DECEPTIVELY EARLY AND UNEXPECTEDLY HARD WITH A SHORT REBOUND, SECOND CONTACT WAS LIGHT. DURING THE ROLLOUT A VIBRATION WAS EVIDENT AND CONSIDERABLE INPUTS WERE REQUIRED TO MAINTAIN DIRECTIONAL CTL. THE VIBRATION THEN CEASED AFTER A FEW SECONDS (THE APPARENT DEP OF THE L GEAR ASSEMBLY). CONTINUOUS CTL INPUTS WERE REQUIRED TO KEEP IT STRAIGHT AND IT BECAME EVIDENT THAT THE L WING WAS SLOWLY SETTLING TO THE RWY SURFACE. START LEVERS WERE PULLED TO SHUTOFF AND THE COCKPIT DOOR OPENED TO COORDINATE WITH FLT ATTENDANTS. CFR WAS FAST ON THE SCENE AND INDICATED THAT NO FIRE OR SMOKE WAS EVIDENT. WE COMPLETED THE EVAC CHKLIST, BUT CHOSE NOT TO EVAC. SHORTLY AFTERWARDS WE DEPLANED BY L1 SLIDE UNDER THE DIRECTION OF CFR DUE TO THE PRESENCE OF FUEL. EVAC WAS ORDERLY.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.