Narrative:

Military charter flight to intended destination prince sultan airport, al kharj, saudi arabia (oekj), controled and staffed by united states military personnel. Airport of actual landing by mistake: king fasil academy, al kharj, saudi arabia (oekh). It is important to note this airport is not depicted on any chart in our possession (operations manual and government FLIP charts) nor is it mentioned in our NOTAMS for al kharj. Therefore, we had no reason to expect or be concerned about a second airport with the same runway orientation in close proximity to our intended destination. Also we were never informed of its existence by either sultan approach control or sultan tower. Sequence of events: on arrival in the area, we were being vectored by sultan approach control. He asked if we would accept a PAR to runway 35. I accepted. Our 2 VHF navs were tuned to al kharj VOR, the only NAVAID we were equipped to receive. (This is where the cause of the event got started. We were monitoring the al kharj VOR for bearing and distance. After post landing discussion we realized that the approach controller, in his subsequent clearance to us, was probably referencing the al kharj TACAN.) at approximately 25 DME southeast we were advised of approach radar failure and cleared to intercept and fly the 20 DME arc southwest to intercept and fly inbound on the 173 degree radial and to expect a PAR at 10 DME. At 10 DME we advised sultan approach with the airport in sight at 12 O'clock. He said the PAR was now OTS, to proceed visually and call sultan tower. We complied and subsequently landed at king fasil. As we taxied off runway 35, sultan tower was calling us to give our location. When we told him where we were, he said we had probably landed at king fasil instead of prince sultan. Up until this point we were never aware nor even suspected that anything was amiss. Contributing factors: minimal navaids including the loss of approach radar and PAR. Lack of proper charting of king fasil airport. Lack of communication: failure of controllers to inform crew of second airport's existence. Failure to inform each other which NAVAID (TACAN or VOR) each was using. Although it was VFR with visibility 6 mi, due to hazy conditions we never at any time had 2 airports in sight, even though they were only 8 mi apart. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information: the aircraft was an L1011-100. The reporter stated that there is an investigation underway regarding this wrong airport landing and 'landing without clearance.' the TACAN frequency (channel 68) was not available to the crew as they had no UHF frequency capability and the TACAN versus VOR was not discussed with the controller. The company had not given any additional information to the crew about 2 other airports in the vicinity of prince sultan, oekj. They were supplied with the standard company manuals and government charts. This operation into oekj was the first time for the crew. No special briefing was given, probably because the crews operated extensively within this country during the gulf war. The company is supportive to the crew and is undertaking steps to ensure that this kind of incident will not occur again. Reporter is not too happy with the attitude or levels of assistance provided by the military controllers. It took 2 hours of coordination with company and the military director at prince sultan to get the aircraft redispatched to that airport from oekh, using takeoff data from another airport with similar runway length and altitude.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: AN L1011 MIL CHARTER FLT LANDS AT THE WRONG ARPT. PLANNED LNDG AT OEKJ BUT LANDED AT OEKH.

Narrative: MIL CHARTER FLT TO INTENDED DEST PRINCE SULTAN ARPT, AL KHARJ, SAUDI ARABIA (OEKJ), CTLED AND STAFFED BY UNITED STATES MIL PERSONNEL. ARPT OF ACTUAL LNDG BY MISTAKE: KING FASIL ACADEMY, AL KHARJ, SAUDI ARABIA (OEKH). IT IS IMPORTANT TO NOTE THIS ARPT IS NOT DEPICTED ON ANY CHART IN OUR POSSESSION (OPS MANUAL AND GOV FLIP CHARTS) NOR IS IT MENTIONED IN OUR NOTAMS FOR AL KHARJ. THEREFORE, WE HAD NO REASON TO EXPECT OR BE CONCERNED ABOUT A SECOND ARPT WITH THE SAME RWY ORIENTATION IN CLOSE PROX TO OUR INTENDED DEST. ALSO WE WERE NEVER INFORMED OF ITS EXISTENCE BY EITHER SULTAN APCH CTL OR SULTAN TWR. SEQUENCE OF EVENTS: ON ARR IN THE AREA, WE WERE BEING VECTORED BY SULTAN APCH CTL. HE ASKED IF WE WOULD ACCEPT A PAR TO RWY 35. I ACCEPTED. OUR 2 VHF NAVS WERE TUNED TO AL KHARJ VOR, THE ONLY NAVAID WE WERE EQUIPPED TO RECEIVE. (THIS IS WHERE THE CAUSE OF THE EVENT GOT STARTED. WE WERE MONITORING THE AL KHARJ VOR FOR BEARING AND DISTANCE. AFTER POST LNDG DISCUSSION WE REALIZED THAT THE APCH CTLR, IN HIS SUBSEQUENT CLRNC TO US, WAS PROBABLY REFING THE AL KHARJ TACAN.) AT APPROX 25 DME SE WE WERE ADVISED OF APCH RADAR FAILURE AND CLRED TO INTERCEPT AND FLY THE 20 DME ARC SW TO INTERCEPT AND FLY INBOUND ON THE 173 DEG RADIAL AND TO EXPECT A PAR AT 10 DME. AT 10 DME WE ADVISED SULTAN APCH WITH THE ARPT IN SIGHT AT 12 O'CLOCK. HE SAID THE PAR WAS NOW OTS, TO PROCEED VISUALLY AND CALL SULTAN TWR. WE COMPLIED AND SUBSEQUENTLY LANDED AT KING FASIL. AS WE TAXIED OFF RWY 35, SULTAN TWR WAS CALLING US TO GIVE OUR LOCATION. WHEN WE TOLD HIM WHERE WE WERE, HE SAID WE HAD PROBABLY LANDED AT KING FASIL INSTEAD OF PRINCE SULTAN. UP UNTIL THIS POINT WE WERE NEVER AWARE NOR EVEN SUSPECTED THAT ANYTHING WAS AMISS. CONTRIBUTING FACTORS: MINIMAL NAVAIDS INCLUDING THE LOSS OF APCH RADAR AND PAR. LACK OF PROPER CHARTING OF KING FASIL ARPT. LACK OF COM: FAILURE OF CTLRS TO INFORM CREW OF SECOND ARPT'S EXISTENCE. FAILURE TO INFORM EACH OTHER WHICH NAVAID (TACAN OR VOR) EACH WAS USING. ALTHOUGH IT WAS VFR WITH VISIBILITY 6 MI, DUE TO HAZY CONDITIONS WE NEVER AT ANY TIME HAD 2 ARPTS IN SIGHT, EVEN THOUGH THEY WERE ONLY 8 MI APART. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: THE ACFT WAS AN L1011-100. THE RPTR STATED THAT THERE IS AN INVESTIGATION UNDERWAY REGARDING THIS WRONG ARPT LNDG AND 'LWOC.' THE TACAN FREQ (CHANNEL 68) WAS NOT AVAILABLE TO THE CREW AS THEY HAD NO UHF FREQ CAPABILITY AND THE TACAN VERSUS VOR WAS NOT DISCUSSED WITH THE CTLR. THE COMPANY HAD NOT GIVEN ANY ADDITIONAL INFO TO THE CREW ABOUT 2 OTHER ARPTS IN THE VICINITY OF PRINCE SULTAN, OEKJ. THEY WERE SUPPLIED WITH THE STANDARD COMPANY MANUALS AND GOV CHARTS. THIS OP INTO OEKJ WAS THE FIRST TIME FOR THE CREW. NO SPECIAL BRIEFING WAS GIVEN, PROBABLY BECAUSE THE CREWS OPERATED EXTENSIVELY WITHIN THIS COUNTRY DURING THE GULF WAR. THE COMPANY IS SUPPORTIVE TO THE CREW AND IS UNDERTAKING STEPS TO ENSURE THAT THIS KIND OF INCIDENT WILL NOT OCCUR AGAIN. RPTR IS NOT TOO HAPPY WITH THE ATTITUDE OR LEVELS OF ASSISTANCE PROVIDED BY THE MIL CTLRS. IT TOOK 2 HRS OF COORD WITH COMPANY AND THE MIL DIRECTOR AT PRINCE SULTAN TO GET THE ACFT REDISPATCHED TO THAT ARPT FROM OEKH, USING TKOF DATA FROM ANOTHER ARPT WITH SIMILAR RWY LENGTH AND ALT.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.