Narrative:

This event did not happen to me, nor did I observe it. Rather, I obtained the general details through a facility memo along with many other similar events. I feel it is important to begin reporting events like this one since it is a frequent occurrence, because it is far more dangerous than other ATC errors that receive greater attention, and although there are relatively simple solutions, nothing ever seems to be done. For backgnd, I will summarize all the similar events I am aware of, since they are all virtually the same. Due to mountainous terrain, overall poor radar and radio coverage, and the abundance of uncontrolled airports in ZDV, it is not uncommon for departing IFR aircraft to remain non radar long after departure. For this reason, the controller often has to rely on memory and paperwork rather than radar data, which is the focus of a center controller's attention, to ensure that flight plans are properly activated. Not surprisingly, ZDV suffers airspace deviations several times a yr when controllers forget to activate flight plans. Many more go unrpted because the controllers were able to smooth things over with friendly colleagues. Because of the size of many low altitude sectors in ZDV, those aircraft that have been forgotten sometimes fly hundreds of mi without the benefit of separation services before being discovered. There have been cases where forgotten aircraft were noticed on radar, but were assumed to be VFR aircraft on discrete beacon codes -- since the flight plan was never activated no connections were made. Of the 5 or so recent events that I am aware of, none resulted in losses of separation (that could be determined), therefore they were all classified as 'airspace deviations.' this is deceiving since a positively controled aircraft that passes within 2.5 mi of a sector without verbal coordination is classified the same way. Deviations are considered by many to be throw away errors, so forgotten aircraft are not given the attention they deserve. Ironically, unlike separation errors, these forgotten aircraft airspace deviations are relatively easy to prevent. This particular event is generating the usual round of solicitations for ways to prevent similar occurrences, but as usual the controller will likely be told simply to remember next time. I have personally offered simple automation solutions to this problem, as far back as 5 yrs, but all have been ignored in favor of blaming controllers for forgetting and proceeding with business as usual. By far, the simplest solution is to deny the controller a beacon code until the flight plan is activated. Even if the controller forgets to initiate tracking of the aircraft when it departs, every sector to the destination will at least receive flight data. In researching previous events, some of which were perpetrated by close friends, I have become convinced that this solution would have prevented the errors. This is because the computer will automatically track a radar target for which there is a corresponding flight plan. Another part of the problem in this facility is that there is no office or person tasked to make things better, but there are an abundance of people tasked to place blame. But this is common of most bureaucracies. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information: nothing has changed. Facility is, on occasion, having opdevs (airspace) with aircraft departing from these uncontrolled airports. Reporter's automation suggestion to fix the problem has gotten nowhere. Facility does not want the flight plan activated before the aircraft actually departs, because flight progress strips would be printed and distributed too soon, resulting in additional workload because of revisions. About the event noted on the report, reporter said the departure airport is within 30 mi of ZKC boundary. No pre-coordination was accomplished with ZKC according to the facility quality assurance memo.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: RPTR INDICATES THAT ZDV'S PRESENT PROC(S) FOR HANDLING ACFT DEPARTING FROM UNCTLED ARPTS, IS CONDUCIVE TO OPDEVS (AIRSPACE), RPTR MAKES NOTE OF A RECENT EVENT INVOLVING ACFT X WITH ZKC.

Narrative: THIS EVENT DID NOT HAPPEN TO ME, NOR DID I OBSERVE IT. RATHER, I OBTAINED THE GENERAL DETAILS THROUGH A FACILITY MEMO ALONG WITH MANY OTHER SIMILAR EVENTS. I FEEL IT IS IMPORTANT TO BEGIN RPTING EVENTS LIKE THIS ONE SINCE IT IS A FREQUENT OCCURRENCE, BECAUSE IT IS FAR MORE DANGEROUS THAN OTHER ATC ERRORS THAT RECEIVE GREATER ATTN, AND ALTHOUGH THERE ARE RELATIVELY SIMPLE SOLUTIONS, NOTHING EVER SEEMS TO BE DONE. FOR BACKGND, I WILL SUMMARIZE ALL THE SIMILAR EVENTS I AM AWARE OF, SINCE THEY ARE ALL VIRTUALLY THE SAME. DUE TO MOUNTAINOUS TERRAIN, OVERALL POOR RADAR AND RADIO COVERAGE, AND THE ABUNDANCE OF UNCTLED ARPTS IN ZDV, IT IS NOT UNCOMMON FOR DEPARTING IFR ACFT TO REMAIN NON RADAR LONG AFTER DEP. FOR THIS REASON, THE CTLR OFTEN HAS TO RELY ON MEMORY AND PAPERWORK RATHER THAN RADAR DATA, WHICH IS THE FOCUS OF A CTR CTLR'S ATTN, TO ENSURE THAT FLT PLANS ARE PROPERLY ACTIVATED. NOT SURPRISINGLY, ZDV SUFFERS AIRSPACE DEVS SEVERAL TIMES A YR WHEN CTLRS FORGET TO ACTIVATE FLT PLANS. MANY MORE GO UNRPTED BECAUSE THE CTLRS WERE ABLE TO SMOOTH THINGS OVER WITH FRIENDLY COLLEAGUES. BECAUSE OF THE SIZE OF MANY LOW ALT SECTORS IN ZDV, THOSE ACFT THAT HAVE BEEN FORGOTTEN SOMETIMES FLY HUNDREDS OF MI WITHOUT THE BENEFIT OF SEPARATION SVCS BEFORE BEING DISCOVERED. THERE HAVE BEEN CASES WHERE FORGOTTEN ACFT WERE NOTICED ON RADAR, BUT WERE ASSUMED TO BE VFR ACFT ON DISCRETE BEACON CODES -- SINCE THE FLT PLAN WAS NEVER ACTIVATED NO CONNECTIONS WERE MADE. OF THE 5 OR SO RECENT EVENTS THAT I AM AWARE OF, NONE RESULTED IN LOSSES OF SEPARATION (THAT COULD BE DETERMINED), THEREFORE THEY WERE ALL CLASSIFIED AS 'AIRSPACE DEVS.' THIS IS DECEIVING SINCE A POSITIVELY CTLED ACFT THAT PASSES WITHIN 2.5 MI OF A SECTOR WITHOUT VERBAL COORD IS CLASSIFIED THE SAME WAY. DEVS ARE CONSIDERED BY MANY TO BE THROW AWAY ERRORS, SO FORGOTTEN ACFT ARE NOT GIVEN THE ATTN THEY DESERVE. IRONICALLY, UNLIKE SEPARATION ERRORS, THESE FORGOTTEN ACFT AIRSPACE DEVS ARE RELATIVELY EASY TO PREVENT. THIS PARTICULAR EVENT IS GENERATING THE USUAL ROUND OF SOLICITATIONS FOR WAYS TO PREVENT SIMILAR OCCURRENCES, BUT AS USUAL THE CTLR WILL LIKELY BE TOLD SIMPLY TO REMEMBER NEXT TIME. I HAVE PERSONALLY OFFERED SIMPLE AUTOMATION SOLUTIONS TO THIS PROB, AS FAR BACK AS 5 YRS, BUT ALL HAVE BEEN IGNORED IN FAVOR OF BLAMING CTLRS FOR FORGETTING AND PROCEEDING WITH BUSINESS AS USUAL. BY FAR, THE SIMPLEST SOLUTION IS TO DENY THE CTLR A BEACON CODE UNTIL THE FLT PLAN IS ACTIVATED. EVEN IF THE CTLR FORGETS TO INITIATE TRACKING OF THE ACFT WHEN IT DEPARTS, EVERY SECTOR TO THE DEST WILL AT LEAST RECEIVE FLT DATA. IN RESEARCHING PREVIOUS EVENTS, SOME OF WHICH WERE PERPETRATED BY CLOSE FRIENDS, I HAVE BECOME CONVINCED THAT THIS SOLUTION WOULD HAVE PREVENTED THE ERRORS. THIS IS BECAUSE THE COMPUTER WILL AUTOMATICALLY TRACK A RADAR TARGET FOR WHICH THERE IS A CORRESPONDING FLT PLAN. ANOTHER PART OF THE PROB IN THIS FACILITY IS THAT THERE IS NO OFFICE OR PERSON TASKED TO MAKE THINGS BETTER, BUT THERE ARE AN ABUNDANCE OF PEOPLE TASKED TO PLACE BLAME. BUT THIS IS COMMON OF MOST BUREAUCRACIES. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: NOTHING HAS CHANGED. FACILITY IS, ON OCCASION, HAVING OPDEVS (AIRSPACE) WITH ACFT DEPARTING FROM THESE UNCTLED ARPTS. RPTR'S AUTOMATION SUGGESTION TO FIX THE PROB HAS GOTTEN NOWHERE. FACILITY DOES NOT WANT THE FLT PLAN ACTIVATED BEFORE THE ACFT ACTUALLY DEPARTS, BECAUSE FLT PROGRESS STRIPS WOULD BE PRINTED AND DISTRIBUTED TOO SOON, RESULTING IN ADDITIONAL WORKLOAD BECAUSE OF REVISIONS. ABOUT THE EVENT NOTED ON THE RPT, RPTR SAID THE DEP ARPT IS WITHIN 30 MI OF ZKC BOUNDARY. NO PRE-COORD WAS ACCOMPLISHED WITH ZKC ACCORDING TO THE FACILITY QUALITY ASSURANCE MEMO.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.