Narrative:

The public relations flight was given to me several days in advance regarding a full passenger list to include a company vice president. The mission consisted of a flight with 3 legs. Each leg of the flight would be about 15-20 mins long with a 30 min flight to return to the airport and then back to the hospital. I started the mission with 1 hour 30 mins of fuel on board the helicopter, 900 pounds fuel. The first leg was completed in 19 mins after circling the landing zone a few times. The second leg of the mission is when things started to go wrong. In preparing to start the aircraft, a loud warning alarm sounded similar to the fadec warning horn. I turned off the battery power and scanned the cockpit for misplaced switches. Finding nothing out of place, I started my prestart check from the beginning with no further occurrence of the warning horn. I started the #2 engine first and noted that the #2 generator did not come on line. I turned the generator off and then back to the on position without results. I then started the #1 engine and turned the #1 generator on without a problem. I noted that the cockpit area could not talk on the intercom to the rear cabin area and the pilot's lower EFIS screen did not illuminate while the upper screen showed a composite picture. Also the scas light did not illuminate. Pressing the bus interconnect switch did nothing to correct the problem. I told the vice president of the problem and told her that I could fly away or shut down. She indicated that she did not wish to delay the departure in front of all the people watching our departure. She turned around and asked the people on the cabin area if they were ready for liftoff and we departed the area. After reaching our cruising altitude I noted the fuel and radioed communications and informed them that I had 1 hour (600 pounds) of fuel remaining for our 15 min flight. En route, I attempted to program the GPS for the next leg of the flight. With the scas and autoplt inoperative, it was very difficult to do because of the location of the GPS is such that the pilot's hand covers the display while programming. Also the aircraft is much more difficult to hand fly without the scas system working. My attention was divided between the 2 procedures for longer than would have been normally necessary. However, I did program the GPS and fly to the coordinates only to find that I was over farmland and nowhere near a town. I asked my communications to verify the coordinates twice and I checked my GPS entry twice and confirmed my entry with the vice president sitting in the copilot seat. I then aborted the mission and turned north programming the home base into the GPS. Having additional time while returning to home base, I took out the flight manual looking up the procedure for the generator failure to try to get back some of the system I had lost. I did get the #2 generator back on line and all system were up. I had 30 mins of fuel remaining (300 pounds) and expected I was still close to the public relations landing area and turned back south. I called communications and asked if the area was near one of the preprogrammed GPS position and they said that it was. I dialed in the position and noted that I was 30 mi to the east and with a strong headwind would be tight on fuel. I then programmed an airport east of town and noted that it would only given me an extra 3 mins. My next choice was another airport and noted that I was 18 mins away and had 24 mins (240 pounds) of fuel left. It was close but my best option. As time and fuel counted down, I called in several position reports and could see that it would be close -- maybe only 3 mins remaining while touching down at the fuel pump. The last 100 pounds went quickly with the airport in sight. I was flying over open fields but elected to rely on my original fuel calculations. It was disbelief when the #2 fuel gauge reached zero and the #1 gauge with 10 pounds with 1/2 mi to go the airport. I was hoping it was wrong. Within seconds, the #2 engine flamed out and I lowered the collective letting the #1 engine maintain rotor RPM during the descent. I set up for an autorotation and continued into the wind to the open field below me. I continued the autorotation maneuver to its completion with the expectation of the #1 engine quitting at any moment. The flare, pitch pull, and touchdown with 2 helicopter lengths of ground run resulted with no damage to the aircraft or injuries to the personnel on board. While focusing on the landing maneuver, I did not note when or if the #1 engine flamed out prior to the aircraft coming to a stop. It did, however, flame out prior to engine shutdown. The aircraft came to a stop 300 yards short of its intended destination of the airport fuel pumps. 20 gallons of fuel was added to the aircraft resulting in the fuel gauge starting at zero and then indicating 230 pounds of fuel in the tanks.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: SMT TWIN ENG HELI PLT DEPARTED WITH SEVERE ELECTRICAL PROBS AND THEN RAN OUT OF GAS.

Narrative: THE PUBLIC RELATIONS FLT WAS GIVEN TO ME SEVERAL DAYS IN ADVANCE REGARDING A FULL PAX LIST TO INCLUDE A COMPANY VICE PRESIDENT. THE MISSION CONSISTED OF A FLT WITH 3 LEGS. EACH LEG OF THE FLT WOULD BE ABOUT 15-20 MINS LONG WITH A 30 MIN FLT TO RETURN TO THE ARPT AND THEN BACK TO THE HOSPITAL. I STARTED THE MISSION WITH 1 HR 30 MINS OF FUEL ON BOARD THE HELI, 900 LBS FUEL. THE FIRST LEG WAS COMPLETED IN 19 MINS AFTER CIRCLING THE LNDG ZONE A FEW TIMES. THE SECOND LEG OF THE MISSION IS WHEN THINGS STARTED TO GO WRONG. IN PREPARING TO START THE ACFT, A LOUD WARNING ALARM SOUNDED SIMILAR TO THE FADEC WARNING HORN. I TURNED OFF THE BATTERY PWR AND SCANNED THE COCKPIT FOR MISPLACED SWITCHES. FINDING NOTHING OUT OF PLACE, I STARTED MY PRESTART CHK FROM THE BEGINNING WITH NO FURTHER OCCURRENCE OF THE WARNING HORN. I STARTED THE #2 ENG FIRST AND NOTED THAT THE #2 GENERATOR DID NOT COME ON LINE. I TURNED THE GENERATOR OFF AND THEN BACK TO THE ON POS WITHOUT RESULTS. I THEN STARTED THE #1 ENG AND TURNED THE #1 GENERATOR ON WITHOUT A PROB. I NOTED THAT THE COCKPIT AREA COULD NOT TALK ON THE INTERCOM TO THE REAR CABIN AREA AND THE PLT'S LOWER EFIS SCREEN DID NOT ILLUMINATE WHILE THE UPPER SCREEN SHOWED A COMPOSITE PICTURE. ALSO THE SCAS LIGHT DID NOT ILLUMINATE. PRESSING THE BUS INTERCONNECT SWITCH DID NOTHING TO CORRECT THE PROB. I TOLD THE VICE PRESIDENT OF THE PROB AND TOLD HER THAT I COULD FLY AWAY OR SHUT DOWN. SHE INDICATED THAT SHE DID NOT WISH TO DELAY THE DEP IN FRONT OF ALL THE PEOPLE WATCHING OUR DEP. SHE TURNED AROUND AND ASKED THE PEOPLE ON THE CABIN AREA IF THEY WERE READY FOR LIFTOFF AND WE DEPARTED THE AREA. AFTER REACHING OUR CRUISING ALT I NOTED THE FUEL AND RADIOED COMS AND INFORMED THEM THAT I HAD 1 HR (600 LBS) OF FUEL REMAINING FOR OUR 15 MIN FLT. ENRTE, I ATTEMPTED TO PROGRAM THE GPS FOR THE NEXT LEG OF THE FLT. WITH THE SCAS AND AUTOPLT INOP, IT WAS VERY DIFFICULT TO DO BECAUSE OF THE LOCATION OF THE GPS IS SUCH THAT THE PLT'S HAND COVERS THE DISPLAY WHILE PROGRAMMING. ALSO THE ACFT IS MUCH MORE DIFFICULT TO HAND FLY WITHOUT THE SCAS SYS WORKING. MY ATTN WAS DIVIDED BTWN THE 2 PROCS FOR LONGER THAN WOULD HAVE BEEN NORMALLY NECESSARY. HOWEVER, I DID PROGRAM THE GPS AND FLY TO THE COORDINATES ONLY TO FIND THAT I WAS OVER FARMLAND AND NOWHERE NEAR A TOWN. I ASKED MY COMS TO VERIFY THE COORDINATES TWICE AND I CHKED MY GPS ENTRY TWICE AND CONFIRMED MY ENTRY WITH THE VICE PRESIDENT SITTING IN THE COPLT SEAT. I THEN ABORTED THE MISSION AND TURNED N PROGRAMMING THE HOME BASE INTO THE GPS. HAVING ADDITIONAL TIME WHILE RETURNING TO HOME BASE, I TOOK OUT THE FLT MANUAL LOOKING UP THE PROC FOR THE GENERATOR FAILURE TO TRY TO GET BACK SOME OF THE SYS I HAD LOST. I DID GET THE #2 GENERATOR BACK ON LINE AND ALL SYS WERE UP. I HAD 30 MINS OF FUEL REMAINING (300 LBS) AND EXPECTED I WAS STILL CLOSE TO THE PUBLIC RELATIONS LNDG AREA AND TURNED BACK S. I CALLED COMS AND ASKED IF THE AREA WAS NEAR ONE OF THE PREPROGRAMMED GPS POS AND THEY SAID THAT IT WAS. I DIALED IN THE POS AND NOTED THAT I WAS 30 MI TO THE E AND WITH A STRONG HEADWIND WOULD BE TIGHT ON FUEL. I THEN PROGRAMMED AN ARPT E OF TOWN AND NOTED THAT IT WOULD ONLY GIVEN ME AN EXTRA 3 MINS. MY NEXT CHOICE WAS ANOTHER ARPT AND NOTED THAT I WAS 18 MINS AWAY AND HAD 24 MINS (240 LBS) OF FUEL LEFT. IT WAS CLOSE BUT MY BEST OPTION. AS TIME AND FUEL COUNTED DOWN, I CALLED IN SEVERAL POS RPTS AND COULD SEE THAT IT WOULD BE CLOSE -- MAYBE ONLY 3 MINS REMAINING WHILE TOUCHING DOWN AT THE FUEL PUMP. THE LAST 100 LBS WENT QUICKLY WITH THE ARPT IN SIGHT. I WAS FLYING OVER OPEN FIELDS BUT ELECTED TO RELY ON MY ORIGINAL FUEL CALCULATIONS. IT WAS DISBELIEF WHEN THE #2 FUEL GAUGE REACHED ZERO AND THE #1 GAUGE WITH 10 LBS WITH 1/2 MI TO GO THE ARPT. I WAS HOPING IT WAS WRONG. WITHIN SECONDS, THE #2 ENG FLAMED OUT AND I LOWERED THE COLLECTIVE LETTING THE #1 ENG MAINTAIN ROTOR RPM DURING THE DSCNT. I SET UP FOR AN AUTOROTATION AND CONTINUED INTO THE WIND TO THE OPEN FIELD BELOW ME. I CONTINUED THE AUTOROTATION MANEUVER TO ITS COMPLETION WITH THE EXPECTATION OF THE #1 ENG QUITTING AT ANY MOMENT. THE FLARE, PITCH PULL, AND TOUCHDOWN WITH 2 HELI LENGTHS OF GND RUN RESULTED WITH NO DAMAGE TO THE ACFT OR INJURIES TO THE PERSONNEL ON BOARD. WHILE FOCUSING ON THE LNDG MANEUVER, I DID NOT NOTE WHEN OR IF THE #1 ENG FLAMED OUT PRIOR TO THE ACFT COMING TO A STOP. IT DID, HOWEVER, FLAME OUT PRIOR TO ENG SHUTDOWN. THE ACFT CAME TO A STOP 300 YARDS SHORT OF ITS INTENDED DEST OF THE ARPT FUEL PUMPS. 20 GALLONS OF FUEL WAS ADDED TO THE ACFT RESULTING IN THE FUEL GAUGE STARTING AT ZERO AND THEN INDICATING 230 LBS OF FUEL IN THE TANKS.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.