Narrative:

Taxied onto runway 23L, an active runway, without clearance. We were cleared to taxi from gate to runway 23L. We taxied from the ramp via taxiway A5 onto the active, instead of ramp to taxiway A8 to hold short of runway 23L. Rdu ground control called it to our attention as the aircraft nose crossed the runway boundary line. The captain recognized it simultaneously as he observed runway red centerline lights. Ground control then cleared us to back-taxi for takeoff. Apologies were made. There was no other traffic and no conflicts. Contributing factors: 1) fatigue. Captain was flying the maximum hours within FAA rules. He flew 7 days in a row. This was the last leg of a 4 day trip. Previous leg was delayed 1 hour due to maintenance. Subsequently, crew was rushing to make up lost time. 2) splitting of crew duties. First officer was starting second engine upon initial taxi and during runway incursion. Taxi speed was normal, but time available from ramp to takeoff was short (no other aircraft and near approach end). This is normal procedure, but denies one pilot as backup to the other. 3) unfamiliar airport at night. Captain may not have flown into rdu for several months. Also, it was night operations. His impression was, he needed to exit the ramp and join the parallel taxiway which turned out to be the runway itself. The captain poorly reviewed the airport diagram. 4) first officer failed to maintain situational awareness on captain's taxi while busy starting the second engine and running ground checks. Preventive measures: this was a crew mistake. When one crew member is fatigued or not at 100%, the entire crew should slow down procedures and carefully complete all steps.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: MD88 CREW TAXIED ONTO ACTIVE RWY WITHOUT CLRNC.

Narrative: TAXIED ONTO RWY 23L, AN ACTIVE RWY, WITHOUT CLRNC. WE WERE CLRED TO TAXI FROM GATE TO RWY 23L. WE TAXIED FROM THE RAMP VIA TXWY A5 ONTO THE ACTIVE, INSTEAD OF RAMP TO TXWY A8 TO HOLD SHORT OF RWY 23L. RDU GND CTL CALLED IT TO OUR ATTN AS THE ACFT NOSE CROSSED THE RWY BOUNDARY LINE. THE CAPT RECOGNIZED IT SIMULTANEOUSLY AS HE OBSERVED RWY RED CTRLINE LIGHTS. GND CTL THEN CLRED US TO BACK-TAXI FOR TKOF. APOLOGIES WERE MADE. THERE WAS NO OTHER TFC AND NO CONFLICTS. CONTRIBUTING FACTORS: 1) FATIGUE. CAPT WAS FLYING THE MAX HRS WITHIN FAA RULES. HE FLEW 7 DAYS IN A ROW. THIS WAS THE LAST LEG OF A 4 DAY TRIP. PREVIOUS LEG WAS DELAYED 1 HR DUE TO MAINT. SUBSEQUENTLY, CREW WAS RUSHING TO MAKE UP LOST TIME. 2) SPLITTING OF CREW DUTIES. FO WAS STARTING SECOND ENG UPON INITIAL TAXI AND DURING RWY INCURSION. TAXI SPD WAS NORMAL, BUT TIME AVAILABLE FROM RAMP TO TKOF WAS SHORT (NO OTHER ACFT AND NEAR APCH END). THIS IS NORMAL PROC, BUT DENIES ONE PLT AS BACKUP TO THE OTHER. 3) UNFAMILIAR ARPT AT NIGHT. CAPT MAY NOT HAVE FLOWN INTO RDU FOR SEVERAL MONTHS. ALSO, IT WAS NIGHT OPS. HIS IMPRESSION WAS, HE NEEDED TO EXIT THE RAMP AND JOIN THE PARALLEL TXWY WHICH TURNED OUT TO BE THE RWY ITSELF. THE CAPT POORLY REVIEWED THE ARPT DIAGRAM. 4) FO FAILED TO MAINTAIN SITUATIONAL AWARENESS ON CAPT'S TAXI WHILE BUSY STARTING THE SECOND ENG AND RUNNING GND CHKS. PREVENTIVE MEASURES: THIS WAS A CREW MISTAKE. WHEN ONE CREW MEMBER IS FATIGUED OR NOT AT 100%, THE ENTIRE CREW SHOULD SLOW DOWN PROCS AND CAREFULLY COMPLETE ALL STEPS.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.