Narrative:

Flying at FL390, the captain asked me to request FL410. Upon requesting, the controller asked how long it would take to climb there. I said 4 mins, but the captain corrected me and said to say 3 mins. The controller granted the request, asking we take 3 1/2 mins. At 2 1/2 mins, the controller asked if we were going to make it. I looked at the captain and he nodded yes, so I told the controller yes. We were at FL395. At 3 mins and FL400, I told the captain we needed 2000 FPM climb to make it. He said/did nothing tangible. At 3 mins 20 seconds and FL402, I took it on myself to tell ATC we weren't going to make it. He gave us a turn to the right approximately 50 degrees, and another aircraft going in the opposite direction a turn right (at FL390) of 40 degrees. The captain used 10 degrees of bank for a turn. I told him that was not enough. The controller then came back and asked us to turn faster, which caused me to re-emphasize my comment to the captain about his turn. We stayed level at FL402 during the turn, and observed the aircraft at FL390 (on TCASII) come within approximately 5 mi. No TCASII alert was given, nor did ATC say we lost separation. I do, however, feel the captain was not proactive in complying with ATC's requests, and maybe rather than strong urging, I needed to assume command during the critical phases. I certainly learned a lesson in allowing a captain to possibly go too far.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: B767 FLC (ACFT X) DID NOT ADHERE TO THE TIME RESTR ISSUED BY THE CTLR TO REACH THEIR ALT. CTLR HAD TO TAKE ACTION TO KEEP BOTH ACFT X AND ACFT Y SEPARATED.

Narrative: FLYING AT FL390, THE CAPT ASKED ME TO REQUEST FL410. UPON REQUESTING, THE CTLR ASKED HOW LONG IT WOULD TAKE TO CLB THERE. I SAID 4 MINS, BUT THE CAPT CORRECTED ME AND SAID TO SAY 3 MINS. THE CTLR GRANTED THE REQUEST, ASKING WE TAKE 3 1/2 MINS. AT 2 1/2 MINS, THE CTLR ASKED IF WE WERE GOING TO MAKE IT. I LOOKED AT THE CAPT AND HE NODDED YES, SO I TOLD THE CTLR YES. WE WERE AT FL395. AT 3 MINS AND FL400, I TOLD THE CAPT WE NEEDED 2000 FPM CLB TO MAKE IT. HE SAID/DID NOTHING TANGIBLE. AT 3 MINS 20 SECONDS AND FL402, I TOOK IT ON MYSELF TO TELL ATC WE WEREN'T GOING TO MAKE IT. HE GAVE US A TURN TO THE R APPROX 50 DEGS, AND ANOTHER ACFT GOING IN THE OPPOSITE DIRECTION A TURN R (AT FL390) OF 40 DEGS. THE CAPT USED 10 DEGS OF BANK FOR A TURN. I TOLD HIM THAT WAS NOT ENOUGH. THE CTLR THEN CAME BACK AND ASKED US TO TURN FASTER, WHICH CAUSED ME TO RE-EMPHASIZE MY COMMENT TO THE CAPT ABOUT HIS TURN. WE STAYED LEVEL AT FL402 DURING THE TURN, AND OBSERVED THE ACFT AT FL390 (ON TCASII) COME WITHIN APPROX 5 MI. NO TCASII ALERT WAS GIVEN, NOR DID ATC SAY WE LOST SEPARATION. I DO, HOWEVER, FEEL THE CAPT WAS NOT PROACTIVE IN COMPLYING WITH ATC'S REQUESTS, AND MAYBE RATHER THAN STRONG URGING, I NEEDED TO ASSUME COMMAND DURING THE CRITICAL PHASES. I CERTAINLY LEARNED A LESSON IN ALLOWING A CAPT TO POSSIBLY GO TOO FAR.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.