Narrative:

Background: since a couple of experienced controllers left bedford (bed) tower, the level of miscom and confusion at the airport have increased significantly. In particular, the situational awareness exhibited by the controllers has decreased, increasing pilot workload. Incidents where the controller has had to ask the aircraft on final or downwind to identify himself are now regular occurrences. 'Mangling' of tail numbers occurs daily. On one flight the week before this event, we were given instructions for 3 different tail numbers (xa, xb, xc -- only ours, xa was that of an aircraft in the pattern). In the past in a given situation, the controllers would give a predictable set of options if they could not approve a request -- now we can't even guess. This event: we reported #1 for takeoff and requested to remain in the pattern for a touch-and-go followed by a departure to the north. We were cleared for immediate takeoff (left traffic) in front of a C172. Normally there would have been plenty of time for an immediate takeoff, but we were not aware (until we spoke with the C172 pilot later that evening) that he was 'expediting' for a seneca in trail and was not planning to slow until short final. He closed on us and was instructed to go around (right traffic). (No problem yet.) he 'messed up' and followed us in left traffic, so he saw some of what happened. The frequency was congested so we weren't able to communicate until we were abeam the approach end of the runway. We were instructed to follow a tomahawk ahead on downwind. We were initially unable to identify him. We did see a dark shape (no lights that we could see) apparently 'outbound' on final who was well below pattern altitude. We actually asked the tower if our traffic was still outbound to confirm this. We were overtaking this traffic who was about 4 mi out from the runway so we began to slow. We believe that the tower told us to follow a cessna on a 5 mi final. (In a subsequent telephone conversation the controller said that he told us that we might be resequenced on the cessna.) in either case we idented the cessna inbound at the OM, but since there was no way that the tomahawk could turn inside the cessna, we decided that if they didn't collide we would follow the tomahawk. The tomahawk seemed to 'turn-on-a-dime' to final behind the cessna and we maintained visual contact with both aircraft as we turned final. At that time, the tomahawk and we were cleared to land and taxi back (in the past controllers would give the option of departing the pattern which is what we really wanted). Because of the unexpected clearance, I looked over to the left downwind to see if there was traffic so that we could request to leave the pattern rather than land. At that point I must have lost the tomahawk and refocused on the cessna. We continued inbound, and asked the controller how we could safely leave the pattern. He never replied until about 1 mi out when we were told to go around. The controller had noticed that we were above and overtaking the tomahawk. He and another controller told me by telephone afterward that we were 'not that close,' but the tomahawk pilot reported in a telephone call to the tower that he was able to make out the treads on our tires. I did not see the tomahawk. I am disturbed because the confusion 'caused' by the controller, the slower flying tomahawk inventing a new (non standard) traffic pattern and the time of day should not have been sufficient to cause me to lose sight of the traffic without realizing it. I do not know the experience level of the controller or the other pilot, but standard procedures would have helped me to avoid this situation, while increased vigilance on my part wouldn't have hurt either. Fortunately, we are all able to learn from this experience. (The other occupant of my aircraft was a private pilot who had just regained his currency by flying with me and I invited him along while I flew to give myself some hands-on flying time.)

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: PA28 AND PA38 HAD NMAC IN BED ARPT TFC PATTERN.

Narrative: BACKGROUND: SINCE A COUPLE OF EXPERIENCED CTLRS LEFT BEDFORD (BED) TWR, THE LEVEL OF MISCOM AND CONFUSION AT THE ARPT HAVE INCREASED SIGNIFICANTLY. IN PARTICULAR, THE SITUATIONAL AWARENESS EXHIBITED BY THE CTLRS HAS DECREASED, INCREASING PLT WORKLOAD. INCIDENTS WHERE THE CTLR HAS HAD TO ASK THE ACFT ON FINAL OR DOWNWIND TO IDENT HIMSELF ARE NOW REGULAR OCCURRENCES. 'MANGLING' OF TAIL NUMBERS OCCURS DAILY. ON ONE FLT THE WEEK BEFORE THIS EVENT, WE WERE GIVEN INSTRUCTIONS FOR 3 DIFFERENT TAIL NUMBERS (XA, XB, XC -- ONLY OURS, XA WAS THAT OF AN ACFT IN THE PATTERN). IN THE PAST IN A GIVEN SIT, THE CTLRS WOULD GIVE A PREDICTABLE SET OF OPTIONS IF THEY COULD NOT APPROVE A REQUEST -- NOW WE CAN'T EVEN GUESS. THIS EVENT: WE RPTED #1 FOR TKOF AND REQUESTED TO REMAIN IN THE PATTERN FOR A TOUCH-AND-GO FOLLOWED BY A DEP TO THE N. WE WERE CLRED FOR IMMEDIATE TKOF (L TFC) IN FRONT OF A C172. NORMALLY THERE WOULD HAVE BEEN PLENTY OF TIME FOR AN IMMEDIATE TKOF, BUT WE WERE NOT AWARE (UNTIL WE SPOKE WITH THE C172 PLT LATER THAT EVENING) THAT HE WAS 'EXPEDITING' FOR A SENECA IN TRAIL AND WAS NOT PLANNING TO SLOW UNTIL SHORT FINAL. HE CLOSED ON US AND WAS INSTRUCTED TO GAR (R TFC). (NO PROB YET.) HE 'MESSED UP' AND FOLLOWED US IN L TFC, SO HE SAW SOME OF WHAT HAPPENED. THE FREQ WAS CONGESTED SO WE WEREN'T ABLE TO COMMUNICATE UNTIL WE WERE ABEAM THE APCH END OF THE RWY. WE WERE INSTRUCTED TO FOLLOW A TOMAHAWK AHEAD ON DOWNWIND. WE WERE INITIALLY UNABLE TO IDENT HIM. WE DID SEE A DARK SHAPE (NO LIGHTS THAT WE COULD SEE) APPARENTLY 'OUTBOUND' ON FINAL WHO WAS WELL BELOW PATTERN ALT. WE ACTUALLY ASKED THE TWR IF OUR TFC WAS STILL OUTBOUND TO CONFIRM THIS. WE WERE OVERTAKING THIS TFC WHO WAS ABOUT 4 MI OUT FROM THE RWY SO WE BEGAN TO SLOW. WE BELIEVE THAT THE TWR TOLD US TO FOLLOW A CESSNA ON A 5 MI FINAL. (IN A SUBSEQUENT TELEPHONE CONVERSATION THE CTLR SAID THAT HE TOLD US THAT WE MIGHT BE RESEQUENCED ON THE CESSNA.) IN EITHER CASE WE IDENTED THE CESSNA INBOUND AT THE OM, BUT SINCE THERE WAS NO WAY THAT THE TOMAHAWK COULD TURN INSIDE THE CESSNA, WE DECIDED THAT IF THEY DIDN'T COLLIDE WE WOULD FOLLOW THE TOMAHAWK. THE TOMAHAWK SEEMED TO 'TURN-ON-A-DIME' TO FINAL BEHIND THE CESSNA AND WE MAINTAINED VISUAL CONTACT WITH BOTH ACFT AS WE TURNED FINAL. AT THAT TIME, THE TOMAHAWK AND WE WERE CLRED TO LAND AND TAXI BACK (IN THE PAST CTLRS WOULD GIVE THE OPTION OF DEPARTING THE PATTERN WHICH IS WHAT WE REALLY WANTED). BECAUSE OF THE UNEXPECTED CLRNC, I LOOKED OVER TO THE L DOWNWIND TO SEE IF THERE WAS TFC SO THAT WE COULD REQUEST TO LEAVE THE PATTERN RATHER THAN LAND. AT THAT POINT I MUST HAVE LOST THE TOMAHAWK AND REFOCUSED ON THE CESSNA. WE CONTINUED INBOUND, AND ASKED THE CTLR HOW WE COULD SAFELY LEAVE THE PATTERN. HE NEVER REPLIED UNTIL ABOUT 1 MI OUT WHEN WE WERE TOLD TO GAR. THE CTLR HAD NOTICED THAT WE WERE ABOVE AND OVERTAKING THE TOMAHAWK. HE AND ANOTHER CTLR TOLD ME BY TELEPHONE AFTERWARD THAT WE WERE 'NOT THAT CLOSE,' BUT THE TOMAHAWK PLT RPTED IN A TELEPHONE CALL TO THE TWR THAT HE WAS ABLE TO MAKE OUT THE TREADS ON OUR TIRES. I DID NOT SEE THE TOMAHAWK. I AM DISTURBED BECAUSE THE CONFUSION 'CAUSED' BY THE CTLR, THE SLOWER FLYING TOMAHAWK INVENTING A NEW (NON STANDARD) TFC PATTERN AND THE TIME OF DAY SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN SUFFICIENT TO CAUSE ME TO LOSE SIGHT OF THE TFC WITHOUT REALIZING IT. I DO NOT KNOW THE EXPERIENCE LEVEL OF THE CTLR OR THE OTHER PLT, BUT STANDARD PROCS WOULD HAVE HELPED ME TO AVOID THIS SIT, WHILE INCREASED VIGILANCE ON MY PART WOULDN'T HAVE HURT EITHER. FORTUNATELY, WE ARE ALL ABLE TO LEARN FROM THIS EXPERIENCE. (THE OTHER OCCUPANT OF MY ACFT WAS A PVT PLT WHO HAD JUST REGAINED HIS CURRENCY BY FLYING WITH ME AND I INVITED HIM ALONG WHILE I FLEW TO GIVE MYSELF SOME HANDS-ON FLYING TIME.)

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.