Narrative:

There is a continuing problem that needs to be addressed: when a fleet type is being modified, there is an interim time period where the MEL is ineffective in regards to the modification. The latest example is B727A hush kit modification. The first problem that occurs is how to identify which aircraft has been modified. There is nothing that alerts the dispatcher that he is dispatching a B727A with a hush kit modification. Because the dispatcher is not aware that the B727A has a hush kit modification he could easily base a landing weight on flaps 30 degrees which, according to an office memo ynzz, is to be used only in emergencys. Hopefully, if the dispatcher bases a departure on flaps 5 degrees, the computer will alert him that this flap setting is not valid. There needs to be a visual cue in the computer associated with the aircraft tail number to alert the dispatcher that he has a hush kit aircraft. There is a special message zyz that advises until further notice 2 mels are not authority/authorized. It was suggested to the company to ask the FAA if the zyz special message could be utilized as a revision to the MEL until the printed page was received. This was rejected by the company in 1992 and again in 1996. Although the company rejected the idea of the zyz MEL revision, they still attempt to modify the MEL through this vehicle. I contacted the maintenance controller about my concerns with this modification and he said that as of dec/xa/98 there is no MEL revision. The controller went on to say that maintenance has locked out the computer to ensure these MEL items cannot be issued. I advised the controller that since both items are crew placardable, that this bypasses the computer lockout and presents an interesting scenario. Aircraft is at a station with no maintenance and captain calls with either anti-skid or EPR indications MEL. The captain and dispatcher agree the flight can go because there is nothing in the MEL to prohibit this.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A DISPATCHER RPTS THAT THE ACR HAS NO METHOD TO IDENT ACFT OF THE SAME FLEET THAT ARE MODIFIED AND HAVE DIFFERENT MEL REQUIREMENTS.

Narrative: THERE IS A CONTINUING PROB THAT NEEDS TO BE ADDRESSED: WHEN A FLEET TYPE IS BEING MODIFIED, THERE IS AN INTERIM TIME PERIOD WHERE THE MEL IS INEFFECTIVE IN REGARDS TO THE MODIFICATION. THE LATEST EXAMPLE IS B727A HUSH KIT MODIFICATION. THE FIRST PROB THAT OCCURS IS HOW TO IDENT WHICH ACFT HAS BEEN MODIFIED. THERE IS NOTHING THAT ALERTS THE DISPATCHER THAT HE IS DISPATCHING A B727A WITH A HUSH KIT MODIFICATION. BECAUSE THE DISPATCHER IS NOT AWARE THAT THE B727A HAS A HUSH KIT MODIFICATION HE COULD EASILY BASE A LNDG WT ON FLAPS 30 DEGS WHICH, ACCORDING TO AN OFFICE MEMO YNZZ, IS TO BE USED ONLY IN EMERS. HOPEFULLY, IF THE DISPATCHER BASES A DEP ON FLAPS 5 DEGS, THE COMPUTER WILL ALERT HIM THAT THIS FLAP SETTING IS NOT VALID. THERE NEEDS TO BE A VISUAL CUE IN THE COMPUTER ASSOCIATED WITH THE ACFT TAIL NUMBER TO ALERT THE DISPATCHER THAT HE HAS A HUSH KIT ACFT. THERE IS A SPECIAL MESSAGE ZYZ THAT ADVISES UNTIL FURTHER NOTICE 2 MELS ARE NOT AUTH. IT WAS SUGGESTED TO THE COMPANY TO ASK THE FAA IF THE ZYZ SPECIAL MESSAGE COULD BE UTILIZED AS A REVISION TO THE MEL UNTIL THE PRINTED PAGE WAS RECEIVED. THIS WAS REJECTED BY THE COMPANY IN 1992 AND AGAIN IN 1996. ALTHOUGH THE COMPANY REJECTED THE IDEA OF THE ZYZ MEL REVISION, THEY STILL ATTEMPT TO MODIFY THE MEL THROUGH THIS VEHICLE. I CONTACTED THE MAINT CTLR ABOUT MY CONCERNS WITH THIS MODIFICATION AND HE SAID THAT AS OF DEC/XA/98 THERE IS NO MEL REVISION. THE CTLR WENT ON TO SAY THAT MAINT HAS LOCKED OUT THE COMPUTER TO ENSURE THESE MEL ITEMS CANNOT BE ISSUED. I ADVISED THE CTLR THAT SINCE BOTH ITEMS ARE CREW PLACARDABLE, THAT THIS BYPASSES THE COMPUTER LOCKOUT AND PRESENTS AN INTERESTING SCENARIO. ACFT IS AT A STATION WITH NO MAINT AND CAPT CALLS WITH EITHER ANTI-SKID OR EPR INDICATIONS MEL. THE CAPT AND DISPATCHER AGREE THE FLT CAN GO BECAUSE THERE IS NOTHING IN THE MEL TO PROHIBIT THIS.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.