Narrative:

I was the PF. Prior to beginning our approach into pit, the captain listened to the ATIS and discovered that the visibility was below that required to begin an ILS to runway 28R. The fog was unforecast and we were only carrying enough fuel to perhaps fly 1 missed approach and hold for a very short time before diverting to our alternate (cak). We went ahead and briefed the ILS runway 28R at pit even though we knew that the visibility was too low. We just figured that either the RVR was improving and we might end up actually flying that approach, or the airport would be turned around and we would end up doing the ILS to runway 10R, CAT III. I took both of the above approach plates out of my binder, because I expected the controllers to send us to runway 10R as we were approaching from the south. This turned out to be a key event. When we contacted pit approach, the controller informed us that we would be doing the ILS runway 28R. The captain asked him what the RVR was and we were informed that it was 1000 ft. We needed 1800 ft RVR to begin the approach, and the captain informed the controller of that fact. The controller came back a few mins later and told us the RVR was 1800 ft, which we considered suspect because it probably meant that the fog was just moving around and could easily go below our minimums again. Anyway, we began the approach, and before we extended the landing gear, the next controller (we had changed sectors by this time) gave us a new RVR of 1000 ft. We told him we would not be able to continue the approach and that we could only hold for about 15 mins until we would have to leave the area. He sent us to a holding fix (ewc) and both the captain and I got very busy. I was programming the FMC and the captain was trying to talk to our dispatcher to find out if he wanted us to go to cak. Half way (2 mins later or less) to ewc the controller gave us an efc time which was 40 mins away and also said he realized that was longer than we could hold, but it was just so that we could have something for lost communications. I acknowledged this, because the captain was still talking to the dispatcher. 30 seconds later, the controller came back and told us that the airport was being turned around and we would be #4 in line for the ILS to runway 10L. I told him that we were nearly down to minimum fuel status and he assured me that we would be vectored right away. I told the captain this and he ended his conversation with the dispatcher. We decided to go ahead and start the approach. At our airline, the captain monitors the autoplt during a CAT III approach regardless of whose turn it was to fly the airplane. We are required to make all CAT III approachs 'autolands' where the autoland lands the airplane. Anyway, he began to brief the approach, and I unknowingly still had the ILS runway 10R approach plate out. Instead of paying close attention to the briefing, I was half listening and working on programming the FMC for the proper approach and missed approach. So I tuned my VOR head to the frequency for the ILS for runway 10R, and the captain tuned and idented his on the ILS for runway 10L. I was so busy trying to keep up with the airplane that I didn't notice the discrepancy. The captain forgot to engage the autoplt on his side (remember I was initially the PF so it was engaged on my side and following commands from my VOR head). So after we were vectored to intercept the localizer (I didn't notice the controller lining us up for runway 10L) the autoplt intercepted the runway 10R localizer. The controller informed us that we were nearly 1/2 mi south of course and the captain was just totally confused, because his localizer never did center. Then the controller asked if we were tracking the runway 10R localizer because if we were, he'd try to arrange it for us just to stay on that approach. I told him that was exactly what had happened and a few seconds later he came back and cleared us for the ILS runway 10R. By this time the captain had tried to turn back to intercept his localizer and had maneuvered the airplane somewhere between the parallel locs, and was continuing his descent. I told him to stop his descent, which confused him even more, and then the controller told us he had a 'minimum altitude alert, climb toxxxx ft and turn left to XXX degrees.' so we had to decide on whether or not to just go to our alternate or get vectored again. I told the controller we just didn't have the fuel for holding and he told us he was going to bring us 'right back around for the runway 10L approach, there'll be no delay.' so we got all of our radios tuned, idented, and correctly set up the autoplt, and started the runway 10L approach without further incident. The landing was completed and we arrived at the gate with the amount of fuel we had determined to be necessary to get to our alternate plus have the reserve left over, or in other words, we had plenty of fuel. Contributing to this incident was my lack of proficiency in the airplane (I have only been on it for 250 hours in 7 months, and this was my first real trip since a 7 week vacation. Also, this was my first CAT III approach other than in the simulator 7 months earlier) and over-concern with the FMC. The automation needed to be prioritized down -- secondary to the basics of good flying. Additionally, the reluctance of the controllers to turn the airport around when it was quite obviously necessary and the unforecast WX were factors, too.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: B737-300 FLC SET UP FOR WRONG APCH AT PIT. WHEN ON APCH, CTLR INTERVENED AND VECTORED THE CREW FOR ANOTHER APCH WHICH TERMINATED SUCCESSFULLY.

Narrative: I WAS THE PF. PRIOR TO BEGINNING OUR APCH INTO PIT, THE CAPT LISTENED TO THE ATIS AND DISCOVERED THAT THE VISIBILITY WAS BELOW THAT REQUIRED TO BEGIN AN ILS TO RWY 28R. THE FOG WAS UNFORECAST AND WE WERE ONLY CARRYING ENOUGH FUEL TO PERHAPS FLY 1 MISSED APCH AND HOLD FOR A VERY SHORT TIME BEFORE DIVERTING TO OUR ALTERNATE (CAK). WE WENT AHEAD AND BRIEFED THE ILS RWY 28R AT PIT EVEN THOUGH WE KNEW THAT THE VISIBILITY WAS TOO LOW. WE JUST FIGURED THAT EITHER THE RVR WAS IMPROVING AND WE MIGHT END UP ACTUALLY FLYING THAT APCH, OR THE ARPT WOULD BE TURNED AROUND AND WE WOULD END UP DOING THE ILS TO RWY 10R, CAT III. I TOOK BOTH OF THE ABOVE APCH PLATES OUT OF MY BINDER, BECAUSE I EXPECTED THE CTLRS TO SEND US TO RWY 10R AS WE WERE APCHING FROM THE S. THIS TURNED OUT TO BE A KEY EVENT. WHEN WE CONTACTED PIT APCH, THE CTLR INFORMED US THAT WE WOULD BE DOING THE ILS RWY 28R. THE CAPT ASKED HIM WHAT THE RVR WAS AND WE WERE INFORMED THAT IT WAS 1000 FT. WE NEEDED 1800 FT RVR TO BEGIN THE APCH, AND THE CAPT INFORMED THE CTLR OF THAT FACT. THE CTLR CAME BACK A FEW MINS LATER AND TOLD US THE RVR WAS 1800 FT, WHICH WE CONSIDERED SUSPECT BECAUSE IT PROBABLY MEANT THAT THE FOG WAS JUST MOVING AROUND AND COULD EASILY GO BELOW OUR MINIMUMS AGAIN. ANYWAY, WE BEGAN THE APCH, AND BEFORE WE EXTENDED THE LNDG GEAR, THE NEXT CTLR (WE HAD CHANGED SECTORS BY THIS TIME) GAVE US A NEW RVR OF 1000 FT. WE TOLD HIM WE WOULD NOT BE ABLE TO CONTINUE THE APCH AND THAT WE COULD ONLY HOLD FOR ABOUT 15 MINS UNTIL WE WOULD HAVE TO LEAVE THE AREA. HE SENT US TO A HOLDING FIX (EWC) AND BOTH THE CAPT AND I GOT VERY BUSY. I WAS PROGRAMMING THE FMC AND THE CAPT WAS TRYING TO TALK TO OUR DISPATCHER TO FIND OUT IF HE WANTED US TO GO TO CAK. HALF WAY (2 MINS LATER OR LESS) TO EWC THE CTLR GAVE US AN EFC TIME WHICH WAS 40 MINS AWAY AND ALSO SAID HE REALIZED THAT WAS LONGER THAN WE COULD HOLD, BUT IT WAS JUST SO THAT WE COULD HAVE SOMETHING FOR LOST COMS. I ACKNOWLEDGED THIS, BECAUSE THE CAPT WAS STILL TALKING TO THE DISPATCHER. 30 SECONDS LATER, THE CTLR CAME BACK AND TOLD US THAT THE ARPT WAS BEING TURNED AROUND AND WE WOULD BE #4 IN LINE FOR THE ILS TO RWY 10L. I TOLD HIM THAT WE WERE NEARLY DOWN TO MINIMUM FUEL STATUS AND HE ASSURED ME THAT WE WOULD BE VECTORED RIGHT AWAY. I TOLD THE CAPT THIS AND HE ENDED HIS CONVERSATION WITH THE DISPATCHER. WE DECIDED TO GO AHEAD AND START THE APCH. AT OUR AIRLINE, THE CAPT MONITORS THE AUTOPLT DURING A CAT III APCH REGARDLESS OF WHOSE TURN IT WAS TO FLY THE AIRPLANE. WE ARE REQUIRED TO MAKE ALL CAT III APCHS 'AUTOLANDS' WHERE THE AUTOLAND LANDS THE AIRPLANE. ANYWAY, HE BEGAN TO BRIEF THE APCH, AND I UNKNOWINGLY STILL HAD THE ILS RWY 10R APCH PLATE OUT. INSTEAD OF PAYING CLOSE ATTN TO THE BRIEFING, I WAS HALF LISTENING AND WORKING ON PROGRAMMING THE FMC FOR THE PROPER APCH AND MISSED APCH. SO I TUNED MY VOR HEAD TO THE FREQ FOR THE ILS FOR RWY 10R, AND THE CAPT TUNED AND IDENTED HIS ON THE ILS FOR RWY 10L. I WAS SO BUSY TRYING TO KEEP UP WITH THE AIRPLANE THAT I DIDN'T NOTICE THE DISCREPANCY. THE CAPT FORGOT TO ENGAGE THE AUTOPLT ON HIS SIDE (REMEMBER I WAS INITIALLY THE PF SO IT WAS ENGAGED ON MY SIDE AND FOLLOWING COMMANDS FROM MY VOR HEAD). SO AFTER WE WERE VECTORED TO INTERCEPT THE LOC (I DIDN'T NOTICE THE CTLR LINING US UP FOR RWY 10L) THE AUTOPLT INTERCEPTED THE RWY 10R LOC. THE CTLR INFORMED US THAT WE WERE NEARLY 1/2 MI S OF COURSE AND THE CAPT WAS JUST TOTALLY CONFUSED, BECAUSE HIS LOC NEVER DID CTR. THEN THE CTLR ASKED IF WE WERE TRACKING THE RWY 10R LOC BECAUSE IF WE WERE, HE'D TRY TO ARRANGE IT FOR US JUST TO STAY ON THAT APCH. I TOLD HIM THAT WAS EXACTLY WHAT HAD HAPPENED AND A FEW SECONDS LATER HE CAME BACK AND CLRED US FOR THE ILS RWY 10R. BY THIS TIME THE CAPT HAD TRIED TO TURN BACK TO INTERCEPT HIS LOC AND HAD MANEUVERED THE AIRPLANE SOMEWHERE BTWN THE PARALLEL LOCS, AND WAS CONTINUING HIS DSCNT. I TOLD HIM TO STOP HIS DSCNT, WHICH CONFUSED HIM EVEN MORE, AND THEN THE CTLR TOLD US HE HAD A 'MINIMUM ALT ALERT, CLB TOXXXX FT AND TURN L TO XXX DEGS.' SO WE HAD TO DECIDE ON WHETHER OR NOT TO JUST GO TO OUR ALTERNATE OR GET VECTORED AGAIN. I TOLD THE CTLR WE JUST DIDN'T HAVE THE FUEL FOR HOLDING AND HE TOLD US HE WAS GOING TO BRING US 'RIGHT BACK AROUND FOR THE RWY 10L APCH, THERE'LL BE NO DELAY.' SO WE GOT ALL OF OUR RADIOS TUNED, IDENTED, AND CORRECTLY SET UP THE AUTOPLT, AND STARTED THE RWY 10L APCH WITHOUT FURTHER INCIDENT. THE LNDG WAS COMPLETED AND WE ARRIVED AT THE GATE WITH THE AMOUNT OF FUEL WE HAD DETERMINED TO BE NECESSARY TO GET TO OUR ALTERNATE PLUS HAVE THE RESERVE LEFT OVER, OR IN OTHER WORDS, WE HAD PLENTY OF FUEL. CONTRIBUTING TO THIS INCIDENT WAS MY LACK OF PROFICIENCY IN THE AIRPLANE (I HAVE ONLY BEEN ON IT FOR 250 HRS IN 7 MONTHS, AND THIS WAS MY FIRST REAL TRIP SINCE A 7 WK VACATION. ALSO, THIS WAS MY FIRST CAT III APCH OTHER THAN IN THE SIMULATOR 7 MONTHS EARLIER) AND OVER-CONCERN WITH THE FMC. THE AUTOMATION NEEDED TO BE PRIORITIZED DOWN -- SECONDARY TO THE BASICS OF GOOD FLYING. ADDITIONALLY, THE RELUCTANCE OF THE CTLRS TO TURN THE ARPT AROUND WHEN IT WAS QUITE OBVIOUSLY NECESSARY AND THE UNFORECAST WX WERE FACTORS, TOO.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.