Narrative:

We were inbound to pwm. It was night, WX was clear and I briefed a visual approach to runway 29. Pwm has a charted visual, the 'harbor visual 29,' so I asked the captain whether we should expect that procedure or a normal VFR pattern. The captain had extensive past experience operating into and out of pwm (albeit some yrs earlier), yet he was certain that ATC would want us to execute the published procedure for noise abatement. All our charts (both company and FAA information) indicated the airport area is extremely noise sensitive, so the captain's reasoning seemed perfectly valid. (I, too, had prior experience at pwm, but not in jets, so I was not as familiar with noise abatement procedures as the captain.) approach control vectored us for the downwind, then cleared us for the visual and told us to contact tower. Tower cleared us to land. As we turned base, I began to maneuver to follow the waterways surrounding downtown portland, which makes a considerably wider pattern than a normal VFR rectangular pattern. At this point, tower came up on frequency and politely said 'no big deal, but the harbor visual is not authority/authorized at night. Just continue, you're still cleared to land.' we landed uneventfully and there was no conflict with other traffic. 2 things could have prevented this occurrence. First, if there was any doubt, and there was, we should have asked the controller exactly what we were expected to do. Since a visual approach is somewhat discretionary, it was easy for us to think it was ok to follow the published procedure track, even though that specific approach was not mentioned by name. Nonetheless, we still should have asked. Second, nowhere in our company information, nor the approach plate itself, is it written that the procedure is not authority/authorized at night. Having that information would certainly have cleared up some of the confusion. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information: reporter indicated that the captain was very familiar with the airport and briefed on the use of the harbor visual to runway 29. They flew the approach only to be informed on the dog leg to final that what they were doing was not proper. The harbor visual was not to be used at nighttime. There were no indications on any commercial or FAA charts to indicate a time restr. The flight made contact with the controller after landing to inquire about the validity of the harbor visual. They were informed that when it is used at nighttime, too many flcs line up on the wrong runway. With all the lights at nighttime, there is a disorientation that seems to cause this. The controller did clear them for a visual, but did not specify a harbor visual. The flight crew feels they should have made an inquiry regarding the lack of a specific assigned visual.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A B727 MAKES AND IS CLRED FOR A VISUAL APCH TO PWM. THE FLC PERFORMS THE HARBOR VISUAL TO RWY 29 APCH. AFTER COMPLETING THE APCH THEY ARE INFORMED THAT THEY ARE NOT TO PERFORM THIS VISUAL AT NIGHTTIME.

Narrative: WE WERE INBOUND TO PWM. IT WAS NIGHT, WX WAS CLR AND I BRIEFED A VISUAL APCH TO RWY 29. PWM HAS A CHARTED VISUAL, THE 'HARBOR VISUAL 29,' SO I ASKED THE CAPT WHETHER WE SHOULD EXPECT THAT PROC OR A NORMAL VFR PATTERN. THE CAPT HAD EXTENSIVE PAST EXPERIENCE OPERATING INTO AND OUT OF PWM (ALBEIT SOME YRS EARLIER), YET HE WAS CERTAIN THAT ATC WOULD WANT US TO EXECUTE THE PUBLISHED PROC FOR NOISE ABATEMENT. ALL OUR CHARTS (BOTH COMPANY AND FAA INFO) INDICATED THE ARPT AREA IS EXTREMELY NOISE SENSITIVE, SO THE CAPT'S REASONING SEEMED PERFECTLY VALID. (I, TOO, HAD PRIOR EXPERIENCE AT PWM, BUT NOT IN JETS, SO I WAS NOT AS FAMILIAR WITH NOISE ABATEMENT PROCS AS THE CAPT.) APCH CTL VECTORED US FOR THE DOWNWIND, THEN CLRED US FOR THE VISUAL AND TOLD US TO CONTACT TWR. TWR CLRED US TO LAND. AS WE TURNED BASE, I BEGAN TO MANEUVER TO FOLLOW THE WATERWAYS SURROUNDING DOWNTOWN PORTLAND, WHICH MAKES A CONSIDERABLY WIDER PATTERN THAN A NORMAL VFR RECTANGULAR PATTERN. AT THIS POINT, TWR CAME UP ON FREQ AND POLITELY SAID 'NO BIG DEAL, BUT THE HARBOR VISUAL IS NOT AUTH AT NIGHT. JUST CONTINUE, YOU'RE STILL CLRED TO LAND.' WE LANDED UNEVENTFULLY AND THERE WAS NO CONFLICT WITH OTHER TFC. 2 THINGS COULD HAVE PREVENTED THIS OCCURRENCE. FIRST, IF THERE WAS ANY DOUBT, AND THERE WAS, WE SHOULD HAVE ASKED THE CTLR EXACTLY WHAT WE WERE EXPECTED TO DO. SINCE A VISUAL APCH IS SOMEWHAT DISCRETIONARY, IT WAS EASY FOR US TO THINK IT WAS OK TO FOLLOW THE PUBLISHED PROC TRACK, EVEN THOUGH THAT SPECIFIC APCH WAS NOT MENTIONED BY NAME. NONETHELESS, WE STILL SHOULD HAVE ASKED. SECOND, NOWHERE IN OUR COMPANY INFO, NOR THE APCH PLATE ITSELF, IS IT WRITTEN THAT THE PROC IS NOT AUTH AT NIGHT. HAVING THAT INFO WOULD CERTAINLY HAVE CLRED UP SOME OF THE CONFUSION. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: RPTR INDICATED THAT THE CAPT WAS VERY FAMILIAR WITH THE ARPT AND BRIEFED ON THE USE OF THE HARBOR VISUAL TO RWY 29. THEY FLEW THE APCH ONLY TO BE INFORMED ON THE DOG LEG TO FINAL THAT WHAT THEY WERE DOING WAS NOT PROPER. THE HARBOR VISUAL WAS NOT TO BE USED AT NIGHTTIME. THERE WERE NO INDICATIONS ON ANY COMMERCIAL OR FAA CHARTS TO INDICATE A TIME RESTR. THE FLT MADE CONTACT WITH THE CTLR AFTER LNDG TO INQUIRE ABOUT THE VALIDITY OF THE HARBOR VISUAL. THEY WERE INFORMED THAT WHEN IT IS USED AT NIGHTTIME, TOO MANY FLCS LINE UP ON THE WRONG RWY. WITH ALL THE LIGHTS AT NIGHTTIME, THERE IS A DISORIENTATION THAT SEEMS TO CAUSE THIS. THE CTLR DID CLR THEM FOR A VISUAL, BUT DID NOT SPECIFY A HARBOR VISUAL. THE FLC FEELS THEY SHOULD HAVE MADE AN INQUIRY REGARDING THE LACK OF A SPECIFIC ASSIGNED VISUAL.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.