Narrative:

Taking off on runway 32, we were cleared for a right turn on course. A cessna was on right downwind for runway 14. As we climbed, the PF began a turn to the left, towards the cessna paralleling us. I said no, right turn. The PF stopped the bank, but did not begin a right turn. Both I and the controller exclaimed 'right turn,' and we started a right turn and departed the pattern. The TCASII showed 700 ft of vertical separation, and I am not certain of the horizontal distance. I did not consider it a near miss, but had we continued on our course it would have been. I am not certain what caused the PF's confusion, but I speculate that the fact that we had landed opposite direction on runway 14, and fatigue from a long schedule may have contributed. My role as PIC is to ensure that this doesn't happen. I typically verbalize the clearance as we take the runway, and in this circumstance, I don't remember if I re-emphasized the right turn. Personally, I was fatigued at the end of a long week, on my 4TH day of 11-13 hours of duty per day. I was also less alert due to the high experience of the first officer, and VFR WX. If I could do it again, I would clearly and strongly verbalize the takeoff clearance after the first officer's readback, and would take the controls to bank the airplane right instead of telling the first officer to do so when there might be a traffic conflict. I also need to treat every takeoff as critical, even at the end of a long week. This one got away from me.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: FO OF AN LTT TURBOPROP STARTED TURNING AFTER TKOF IN THE OPPOSITE DIRECTION THAN ASSIGNED BY TWR. THE CAPT AND TWR CTLR REMINDED THE FO TO TURN THE OTHER WAY WHICH HE SUBSEQUENTLY DID WITHOUT FURTHER CONFLICT.

Narrative: TAKING OFF ON RWY 32, WE WERE CLRED FOR A R TURN ON COURSE. A CESSNA WAS ON R DOWNWIND FOR RWY 14. AS WE CLBED, THE PF BEGAN A TURN TO THE L, TOWARDS THE CESSNA PARALLELING US. I SAID NO, R TURN. THE PF STOPPED THE BANK, BUT DID NOT BEGIN A R TURN. BOTH I AND THE CTLR EXCLAIMED 'R TURN,' AND WE STARTED A R TURN AND DEPARTED THE PATTERN. THE TCASII SHOWED 700 FT OF VERT SEPARATION, AND I AM NOT CERTAIN OF THE HORIZ DISTANCE. I DID NOT CONSIDER IT A NEAR MISS, BUT HAD WE CONTINUED ON OUR COURSE IT WOULD HAVE BEEN. I AM NOT CERTAIN WHAT CAUSED THE PF'S CONFUSION, BUT I SPECULATE THAT THE FACT THAT WE HAD LANDED OPPOSITE DIRECTION ON RWY 14, AND FATIGUE FROM A LONG SCHEDULE MAY HAVE CONTRIBUTED. MY ROLE AS PIC IS TO ENSURE THAT THIS DOESN'T HAPPEN. I TYPICALLY VERBALIZE THE CLRNC AS WE TAKE THE RWY, AND IN THIS CIRCUMSTANCE, I DON'T REMEMBER IF I RE-EMPHASIZED THE R TURN. PERSONALLY, I WAS FATIGUED AT THE END OF A LONG WK, ON MY 4TH DAY OF 11-13 HRS OF DUTY PER DAY. I WAS ALSO LESS ALERT DUE TO THE HIGH EXPERIENCE OF THE FO, AND VFR WX. IF I COULD DO IT AGAIN, I WOULD CLRLY AND STRONGLY VERBALIZE THE TKOF CLRNC AFTER THE FO'S READBACK, AND WOULD TAKE THE CTLS TO BANK THE AIRPLANE R INSTEAD OF TELLING THE FO TO DO SO WHEN THERE MIGHT BE A TFC CONFLICT. I ALSO NEED TO TREAT EVERY TKOF AS CRITICAL, EVEN AT THE END OF A LONG WK. THIS ONE GOT AWAY FROM ME.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.