Narrative:

I was approaching lih from the east VFR. I called the tower 15 mi out. The shorts was on the ILS to runway 35 planning a missed approach to kreen as published. 2 B737's were behind the shorts on VOR to runway 35 approachs. When this controller is faced with traffic for runway 35 from the south or southeast and VFR traffic from the east, he requires the VFR traffic to overfly the field and enter on left base for runway 3. This works as long as the runway 35 traffic doesn't go around. In this case the shorts was planning the miss as part of their training sequence. The controller doesn't accept other suggestions. 3 mi east of the field, I had the shorts in sight, also 2-3 mi out. I maintained 1500 ft AGL instead of 800 ft pattern altitude because of concern for his rapid climb on the miss. I requested right traffic for runway 3 to pass behind the shorts. I was again told to cross the field for left base. As the shorts executed his missed approach, I saw we would be very close. I initiated an immediate climb. The shorts passed just beneath us. In retrospect, knowing this controller's rigidity, I should have timed my pattern to be well behind the shorts. However, since I first saw him at 3 mi and the BN2 has a small speed range, there was little I could have done at that point. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information: pilot was on a flight from ogg to lih. He operates as a single pilot part 135 operation. He states the tower is manned by contract controllers. He is concerned with a certain controller's inflexibility. When he hears this voice, he knows that the only approach clearance he will receive is fly overhead the field. In this case, since he was coming from the east, he suggested an alternate approach because of conflict with a training aircraft on the ILS. When the controller proved inflexible, the pilot contacted the shorts on center frequency to coordinate their approach. The shorts would climb slower than normal on his miss, and the islander would shallow his descent to pattern altitude. The shorts was not yet on tower frequency. Even with this coordination, there was still an near midair collision as the shorts turned right into the islander when he made his turn to kreen.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: BN2 AND SH360 HAD AN NMAC OVER RWY 35 AT LIH.

Narrative: I WAS APCHING LIH FROM THE E VFR. I CALLED THE TWR 15 MI OUT. THE SHORTS WAS ON THE ILS TO RWY 35 PLANNING A MISSED APCH TO KREEN AS PUBLISHED. 2 B737'S WERE BEHIND THE SHORTS ON VOR TO RWY 35 APCHS. WHEN THIS CTLR IS FACED WITH TFC FOR RWY 35 FROM THE S OR SE AND VFR TFC FROM THE E, HE REQUIRES THE VFR TFC TO OVERFLY THE FIELD AND ENTER ON L BASE FOR RWY 3. THIS WORKS AS LONG AS THE RWY 35 TFC DOESN'T GO AROUND. IN THIS CASE THE SHORTS WAS PLANNING THE MISS AS PART OF THEIR TRAINING SEQUENCE. THE CTLR DOESN'T ACCEPT OTHER SUGGESTIONS. 3 MI E OF THE FIELD, I HAD THE SHORTS IN SIGHT, ALSO 2-3 MI OUT. I MAINTAINED 1500 FT AGL INSTEAD OF 800 FT PATTERN ALT BECAUSE OF CONCERN FOR HIS RAPID CLB ON THE MISS. I REQUESTED R TFC FOR RWY 3 TO PASS BEHIND THE SHORTS. I WAS AGAIN TOLD TO CROSS THE FIELD FOR L BASE. AS THE SHORTS EXECUTED HIS MISSED APCH, I SAW WE WOULD BE VERY CLOSE. I INITIATED AN IMMEDIATE CLB. THE SHORTS PASSED JUST BENEATH US. IN RETROSPECT, KNOWING THIS CTLR'S RIGIDITY, I SHOULD HAVE TIMED MY PATTERN TO BE WELL BEHIND THE SHORTS. HOWEVER, SINCE I FIRST SAW HIM AT 3 MI AND THE BN2 HAS A SMALL SPD RANGE, THERE WAS LITTLE I COULD HAVE DONE AT THAT POINT. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: PLT WAS ON A FLT FROM OGG TO LIH. HE OPERATES AS A SINGLE PLT PART 135 OP. HE STATES THE TWR IS MANNED BY CONTRACT CTLRS. HE IS CONCERNED WITH A CERTAIN CTLR'S INFLEXIBILITY. WHEN HE HEARS THIS VOICE, HE KNOWS THAT THE ONLY APCH CLRNC HE WILL RECEIVE IS FLY OVERHEAD THE FIELD. IN THIS CASE, SINCE HE WAS COMING FROM THE E, HE SUGGESTED AN ALTERNATE APCH BECAUSE OF CONFLICT WITH A TRAINING ACFT ON THE ILS. WHEN THE CTLR PROVED INFLEXIBLE, THE PLT CONTACTED THE SHORTS ON CTR FREQ TO COORDINATE THEIR APCH. THE SHORTS WOULD CLB SLOWER THAN NORMAL ON HIS MISS, AND THE ISLANDER WOULD SHALLOW HIS DSCNT TO PATTERN ALT. THE SHORTS WAS NOT YET ON TWR FREQ. EVEN WITH THIS COORD, THERE WAS STILL AN NMAC AS THE SHORTS TURNED RIGHT INTO THE ISLANDER WHEN HE MADE HIS TURN TO KREEN.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.