Narrative:

I was flying as captain in a CL601 on sep/xa/98. We were instructed to land on runway 19L at las airport. The landing was made by my first officer, and was very normal (ie, reverse thrust, normal braking). After the landing, we were instructed to turn right off the runway, on taxiway west, and to hold short of runway 19R. As my first officer turned off the runway onto taxiway west, we started the after landing checklist, and we both reiterated to hold short of runway 19R (the distance is approximately 30 yards). As we approached runway 19R, taxiway west, my first officer yelled out to me he had no normal braking. I pressed on my brakes as soon as he said this. I also had no means of braking the aircraft to hold short of runway 19R. At this time, my first officer applied full power reverse thrust (it takes approximately 4-6 seconds for reverse to deploy). As we approached the runway, I could see a single engine aircraft taking off. I advised ground control that we could not hold short of the runway, and also at this time I advised my first officer to apply full parking brake, which he did. At this time the nose of the aircraft was about 10 ft onto the runway. The single engine continued his takeoff, and flew over us by 400 ft vertical. We elected to release the parking brake, and get across the runway and clear runway 19R, which we did. On the other side of runway 19R we applied the parking brake, came to a full stop, advised ground to send equipment out and to notify the FBO. We shut down both engines, and APU, and advised ATC that we had lost all of our normal brakes. ATC advised me that everything was ok from their point of view, and that everyone was safe. From the time my first officer yelled out he had no brakes, to the full stop parking brake, was only 3-5 seconds -- it happened very fast. We advised maintenance about this incident, and at present time, maintenance does not know what caused total failure of normal brakes (possible problems, over inflation of strut, or wow switch failure). Taxi speed was approximately 5-8 mph, very slow! I will advise as soon as I am told of the problem. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information: after the incident the pilot researched the act maintenance manual. There is a 7 page procedure to service the struts. Each main gear strut uses proximity switches to tell the aircraft whether it's on the ground or is in flight. The proximity switches are extremely sensitive to strut extension. If they are over-svced, even slightly, they think the aircraft is airborne, and release the brakes accordingly. The company maintenance supervisor apparently did not properly advise the maintenance personnel from the FBO of the critical nature, or the correct procedure for strut service. 4 days previously the aircraft had the landing gear struts go flat. In accordance with their company operations manual the captain contacted the company maintenance supervisor. He told the a&P mechanic at the FBO to just pump the struts up. The aircraft maintenance manual has a 7 page procedure to service the struts. Strut servicing is indicated as critical as incorrectly svced struts may 'cause complete brake failure.'

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: CL60 CREW HAD ACFT BRAKE FAILURE.

Narrative: I WAS FLYING AS CAPT IN A CL601 ON SEP/XA/98. WE WERE INSTRUCTED TO LAND ON RWY 19L AT LAS ARPT. THE LNDG WAS MADE BY MY FO, AND WAS VERY NORMAL (IE, REVERSE THRUST, NORMAL BRAKING). AFTER THE LNDG, WE WERE INSTRUCTED TO TURN R OFF THE RWY, ON TXWY W, AND TO HOLD SHORT OF RWY 19R. AS MY FO TURNED OFF THE RWY ONTO TXWY W, WE STARTED THE AFTER LNDG CHKLIST, AND WE BOTH REITERATED TO HOLD SHORT OF RWY 19R (THE DISTANCE IS APPROX 30 YARDS). AS WE APCHED RWY 19R, TXWY W, MY FO YELLED OUT TO ME HE HAD NO NORMAL BRAKING. I PRESSED ON MY BRAKES AS SOON AS HE SAID THIS. I ALSO HAD NO MEANS OF BRAKING THE ACFT TO HOLD SHORT OF RWY 19R. AT THIS TIME, MY FO APPLIED FULL PWR REVERSE THRUST (IT TAKES APPROX 4-6 SECONDS FOR REVERSE TO DEPLOY). AS WE APCHED THE RWY, I COULD SEE A SINGLE ENG ACFT TAKING OFF. I ADVISED GND CTL THAT WE COULD NOT HOLD SHORT OF THE RWY, AND ALSO AT THIS TIME I ADVISED MY FO TO APPLY FULL PARKING BRAKE, WHICH HE DID. AT THIS TIME THE NOSE OF THE ACFT WAS ABOUT 10 FT ONTO THE RWY. THE SINGLE ENG CONTINUED HIS TKOF, AND FLEW OVER US BY 400 FT VERT. WE ELECTED TO RELEASE THE PARKING BRAKE, AND GET ACROSS THE RWY AND CLR RWY 19R, WHICH WE DID. ON THE OTHER SIDE OF RWY 19R WE APPLIED THE PARKING BRAKE, CAME TO A FULL STOP, ADVISED GND TO SEND EQUIP OUT AND TO NOTIFY THE FBO. WE SHUT DOWN BOTH ENGS, AND APU, AND ADVISED ATC THAT WE HAD LOST ALL OF OUR NORMAL BRAKES. ATC ADVISED ME THAT EVERYTHING WAS OK FROM THEIR POINT OF VIEW, AND THAT EVERYONE WAS SAFE. FROM THE TIME MY FO YELLED OUT HE HAD NO BRAKES, TO THE FULL STOP PARKING BRAKE, WAS ONLY 3-5 SECONDS -- IT HAPPENED VERY FAST. WE ADVISED MAINT ABOUT THIS INCIDENT, AND AT PRESENT TIME, MAINT DOES NOT KNOW WHAT CAUSED TOTAL FAILURE OF NORMAL BRAKES (POSSIBLE PROBS, OVER INFLATION OF STRUT, OR WOW SWITCH FAILURE). TAXI SPD WAS APPROX 5-8 MPH, VERY SLOW! I WILL ADVISE AS SOON AS I AM TOLD OF THE PROB. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: AFTER THE INCIDENT THE PLT RESEARCHED THE ACT MAINT MANUAL. THERE IS A 7 PAGE PROC TO SVC THE STRUTS. EACH MAIN GEAR STRUT USES PROX SWITCHES TO TELL THE ACFT WHETHER IT'S ON THE GND OR IS IN FLT. THE PROX SWITCHES ARE EXTREMELY SENSITIVE TO STRUT EXTENSION. IF THEY ARE OVER-SVCED, EVEN SLIGHTLY, THEY THINK THE ACFT IS AIRBORNE, AND RELEASE THE BRAKES ACCORDINGLY. THE COMPANY MAINT SUPVR APPARENTLY DID NOT PROPERLY ADVISE THE MAINT PERSONNEL FROM THE FBO OF THE CRITICAL NATURE, OR THE CORRECT PROC FOR STRUT SVC. 4 DAYS PREVIOUSLY THE ACFT HAD THE LNDG GEAR STRUTS GO FLAT. IN ACCORDANCE WITH THEIR COMPANY OPS MANUAL THE CAPT CONTACTED THE COMPANY MAINT SUPVR. HE TOLD THE A&P MECH AT THE FBO TO JUST PUMP THE STRUTS UP. THE ACFT MAINT MANUAL HAS A 7 PAGE PROC TO SVC THE STRUTS. STRUT SVCING IS INDICATED AS CRITICAL AS INCORRECTLY SVCED STRUTS MAY 'CAUSE COMPLETE BRAKE FAILURE.'

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.