Narrative:

On aug/xa/98 at approximately XA36Z on sector 8 in area 2 there was a loss of separation between 2 aircraft in the hayes center nebraska area. Unlike other operrors, this situation had some unusual contributory factors. The first event leading up to the loss of separation was the fact that this sector was alerted 15 mins prior that it will be exceeding the number of aircraft the sector can safely handle. Second, and most importantly, when the supervisor in charge was notified by traffic management that sector 8 was about to exceed the recommended volume of traffic, he proceeded to leave the control room on a work break. Normally, supervisors will take these work breaks during light traffic periods. If needed, supervisors will assign a controller in charge to watch the area while he/she is away on a break. In this particular instance the controller in charge was not capable of handling area duties during peak traffic periods. In her defense, she did not receive proper training, thus not able to make staffing or traffic management decisions, and should not have been assigned these duties during these high volume traffic periods. Supervisors have the ultimate responsibility to maintain a safe control room environment. I understand that supervisors need breaks just as controllers do. However, their first priority should be to oversee the operations of the area, especially during busy traffic periods. Although supervisor in charge was not controling these aircraft, his presence may have prevented this incident.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: LOSS OF SEPARATION OCCURRED BTWN 2 ACFT AT FL330 IN THE ZDV AREA.

Narrative: ON AUG/XA/98 AT APPROX XA36Z ON SECTOR 8 IN AREA 2 THERE WAS A LOSS OF SEPARATION BTWN 2 ACFT IN THE HAYES CTR NEBRASKA AREA. UNLIKE OTHER OPERRORS, THIS SIT HAD SOME UNUSUAL CONTRIBUTORY FACTORS. THE FIRST EVENT LEADING UP TO THE LOSS OF SEPARATION WAS THE FACT THAT THIS SECTOR WAS ALERTED 15 MINS PRIOR THAT IT WILL BE EXCEEDING THE NUMBER OF ACFT THE SECTOR CAN SAFELY HANDLE. SECOND, AND MOST IMPORTANTLY, WHEN THE SUPVR IN CHARGE WAS NOTIFIED BY TFC MGMNT THAT SECTOR 8 WAS ABOUT TO EXCEED THE RECOMMENDED VOLUME OF TFC, HE PROCEEDED TO LEAVE THE CTL ROOM ON A WORK BREAK. NORMALLY, SUPVRS WILL TAKE THESE WORK BREAKS DURING LIGHT TFC PERIODS. IF NEEDED, SUPVRS WILL ASSIGN A CIC TO WATCH THE AREA WHILE HE/SHE IS AWAY ON A BREAK. IN THIS PARTICULAR INSTANCE THE CIC WAS NOT CAPABLE OF HANDLING AREA DUTIES DURING PEAK TFC PERIODS. IN HER DEFENSE, SHE DID NOT RECEIVE PROPER TRAINING, THUS NOT ABLE TO MAKE STAFFING OR TFC MGMNT DECISIONS, AND SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN ASSIGNED THESE DUTIES DURING THESE HIGH VOLUME TFC PERIODS. SUPVRS HAVE THE ULTIMATE RESPONSIBILITY TO MAINTAIN A SAFE CTL ROOM ENVIRONMENT. I UNDERSTAND THAT SUPVRS NEED BREAKS JUST AS CTLRS DO. HOWEVER, THEIR FIRST PRIORITY SHOULD BE TO OVERSEE THE OPS OF THE AREA, ESPECIALLY DURING BUSY TFC PERIODS. ALTHOUGH SUPVR IN CHARGE WAS NOT CTLING THESE ACFT, HIS PRESENCE MAY HAVE PREVENTED THIS INCIDENT.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.