Narrative:

Upon late arrival, captain's first taxi in at gate. Io pointed out taxi scan line-up, red/green bars stop board towards side. Initial confusion with B767-200 stop point, but captain recognized this and corrected to B767-300 stop point. Stray white painted line above B767-300 was mistaken for actual stop line. Thus we stopped short about 1 ft. First officer asked to shut down engines and okay given. Io was behind captain helping explain which stop bar to use. Captain indicated he was in correct spot. Stopped short and should move forward and signaled appropriately. Captain interpreted this as a start engine and taxi forward. During taxi in no ground people were seen by any cockpit crew member. Captain said let's start engines, first officer asked if he was talking to ground people. Captain indicated it was okay as the agent kept signaling to taxi forward. First officer and io both started to start one engine. Captain stated he didn't want to use much power and we would start both engines. After both started, io said ground man signaling hold and shut down. Tug was brought to aircraft to pull forward. Captain was definitely misled in authorizing the 2 engines to be started. Supplemental information from acn 404578: after having left mia 3 hours late, arrived at lhr late and myself and crew were exhausted. Also, this was my first flight into heathrow. I had read all the information concerning the lhr operations, but was not totally familiar with their gate panel operations. Consequently after stopping at the gate and looking at the agent, myself and my crew got the impression that she wanted us to continue to taxi forward. She indicated to move forward. Anyway, my crew and I thought she wanted us to start the engines and move a bit forward. Thus, I directed the engines to be restarted to do as she had wanted. The beacons were turned on for this. Before applying power, a mechanic came forward and directed the engines shut down. It was a lapse in judgement, mostly brought on by exhaustion, unfamiliarity with lhr operations, and the fact that the only individual that I could see was directing me to move the aircraft forward. Supplemental information from acn 404576: since you must be in the captain seat to see these bars correctly, it was difficult to tell from my seat where we were. I stood up and looked over his shoulder trying to assist him in his visual reference and believed we were short. However he said he was okay.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A B767-300 CAPT STOPS HIS ACFT SHORT OF THE STOP LINE DESIGNATED FOR HIS TYPE ACFT. THE FLT HAD JUST ARRIVED IN LHR AND IT WAS THE PIC'S FIRST TRIP INTO LHR. HE STARTED BOTH ENGS TO MOVE UP WHEN TOLD TO SHUT THEM DOWN FROM THE GND CREW.

Narrative: UPON LATE ARR, CAPT'S FIRST TAXI IN AT GATE. IO POINTED OUT TAXI SCAN LINE-UP, RED/GREEN BARS STOP BOARD TOWARDS SIDE. INITIAL CONFUSION WITH B767-200 STOP POINT, BUT CAPT RECOGNIZED THIS AND CORRECTED TO B767-300 STOP POINT. STRAY WHITE PAINTED LINE ABOVE B767-300 WAS MISTAKEN FOR ACTUAL STOP LINE. THUS WE STOPPED SHORT ABOUT 1 FT. FO ASKED TO SHUT DOWN ENGS AND OKAY GIVEN. IO WAS BEHIND CAPT HELPING EXPLAIN WHICH STOP BAR TO USE. CAPT INDICATED HE WAS IN CORRECT SPOT. STOPPED SHORT AND SHOULD MOVE FORWARD AND SIGNALED APPROPRIATELY. CAPT INTERPRETED THIS AS A START ENG AND TAXI FORWARD. DURING TAXI IN NO GND PEOPLE WERE SEEN BY ANY COCKPIT CREW MEMBER. CAPT SAID LET'S START ENGS, FO ASKED IF HE WAS TALKING TO GND PEOPLE. CAPT INDICATED IT WAS OKAY AS THE AGENT KEPT SIGNALING TO TAXI FORWARD. FO AND IO BOTH STARTED TO START ONE ENG. CAPT STATED HE DIDN'T WANT TO USE MUCH PWR AND WE WOULD START BOTH ENGS. AFTER BOTH STARTED, IO SAID GND MAN SIGNALING HOLD AND SHUT DOWN. TUG WAS BROUGHT TO ACFT TO PULL FORWARD. CAPT WAS DEFINITELY MISLED IN AUTHORIZING THE 2 ENGS TO BE STARTED. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 404578: AFTER HAVING LEFT MIA 3 HRS LATE, ARRIVED AT LHR LATE AND MYSELF AND CREW WERE EXHAUSTED. ALSO, THIS WAS MY FIRST FLT INTO HEATHROW. I HAD READ ALL THE INFO CONCERNING THE LHR OPS, BUT WAS NOT TOTALLY FAMILIAR WITH THEIR GATE PANEL OPS. CONSEQUENTLY AFTER STOPPING AT THE GATE AND LOOKING AT THE AGENT, MYSELF AND MY CREW GOT THE IMPRESSION THAT SHE WANTED US TO CONTINUE TO TAXI FORWARD. SHE INDICATED TO MOVE FORWARD. ANYWAY, MY CREW AND I THOUGHT SHE WANTED US TO START THE ENGS AND MOVE A BIT FORWARD. THUS, I DIRECTED THE ENGS TO BE RESTARTED TO DO AS SHE HAD WANTED. THE BEACONS WERE TURNED ON FOR THIS. BEFORE APPLYING PWR, A MECH CAME FORWARD AND DIRECTED THE ENGS SHUT DOWN. IT WAS A LAPSE IN JUDGEMENT, MOSTLY BROUGHT ON BY EXHAUSTION, UNFAMILIARITY WITH LHR OPS, AND THE FACT THAT THE ONLY INDIVIDUAL THAT I COULD SEE WAS DIRECTING ME TO MOVE THE ACFT FORWARD. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 404576: SINCE YOU MUST BE IN THE CAPT SEAT TO SEE THESE BARS CORRECTLY, IT WAS DIFFICULT TO TELL FROM MY SEAT WHERE WE WERE. I STOOD UP AND LOOKED OVER HIS SHOULDER TRYING TO ASSIST HIM IN HIS VISUAL REF AND BELIEVED WE WERE SHORT. HOWEVER HE SAID HE WAS OKAY.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.