Narrative:

Aircraft had 2 mels. One related to a purge valve on the right air-conditioning pack. Maintenance had placed an 'inoperative' placard next to the right pack switch in the cockpit. After reviewing the MEL, we were led to believe that the right pack was inoperative and verified that the flight was filed at 25000 ft for single pack operation. After takeoff, the remaining operative pack failed. This resulted in a loss of cabin pressurization and necessitated a return to the departure airport. After returning to the gate, maintenance informed me that the MEL on the right pack only pertained to a maintenance function and that the pack should have been operated normally. Had this been the case, the flight could have continued to its destination with the subsequent in-flight failure. This occurrence was a result of a vague MEL that, unlike the majority, had no operational effect on the system. Obviously, it would be helpful if maintenance could either refrain from placing an 'inoperative' placard on a normally functioning system, or provide an annotation to the MEL stating that the inoperative component does not affect the flight crew.

Google
 

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A B737-300 IN CLB AT 8000 FT RETURNED TO THE FIELD DUE TO FAILURE OF THE L AIR-CONDITIONING PACK AND WITH THE MISTAKEN IMPRESSION THE R AIR-CONDITIONING PACK WAS ALSO DEFERRED INOP.

Narrative: ACFT HAD 2 MELS. ONE RELATED TO A PURGE VALVE ON THE R AIR-CONDITIONING PACK. MAINT HAD PLACED AN 'INOP' PLACARD NEXT TO THE R PACK SWITCH IN THE COCKPIT. AFTER REVIEWING THE MEL, WE WERE LED TO BELIEVE THAT THE R PACK WAS INOP AND VERIFIED THAT THE FLT WAS FILED AT 25000 FT FOR SINGLE PACK OP. AFTER TKOF, THE REMAINING OPERATIVE PACK FAILED. THIS RESULTED IN A LOSS OF CABIN PRESSURIZATION AND NECESSITATED A RETURN TO THE DEP ARPT. AFTER RETURNING TO THE GATE, MAINT INFORMED ME THAT THE MEL ON THE R PACK ONLY PERTAINED TO A MAINT FUNCTION AND THAT THE PACK SHOULD HAVE BEEN OPERATED NORMALLY. HAD THIS BEEN THE CASE, THE FLT COULD HAVE CONTINUED TO ITS DEST WITH THE SUBSEQUENT INFLT FAILURE. THIS OCCURRENCE WAS A RESULT OF A VAGUE MEL THAT, UNLIKE THE MAJORITY, HAD NO OPERATIONAL EFFECT ON THE SYS. OBVIOUSLY, IT WOULD BE HELPFUL IF MAINT COULD EITHER REFRAIN FROM PLACING AN 'INOP' PLACARD ON A NORMALLY FUNCTIONING SYS, OR PROVIDE AN ANNOTATION TO THE MEL STATING THAT THE INOP COMPONENT DOES NOT AFFECT THE FLC.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.