Narrative:

On our departure off runway 23 at eko, nv, the captain and myself failed to negotiate the proper SID. Rather than turning left to join V32 eastbound (bqu 073 degree radial), the captain flew out on the 241 degree radial (bqu) to join V32 wbound. ZLC turned us back around to rejoin the eastbound airway over bqu. I don't like eko's tower practice of issuing clrncs while the aircraft is taxiing to the active runway. In our operation, a clearance issued like this requires the first officer to return to the before start checklist and input the correct radio frequencys, altitude alerter, altitude, and transponder code. A challenge is then required of the captain -- in this scenario, a captain taxiing a plane, to confirm these frequencys, code, and altitude. At eko, where commercial operators are but a short taxi from runway 23, I found this kind of procedure of issuing clearance creates a last moment rush, to complete the checklists for both the cockpit and cabin crews. I would much rather be offered a clearance with a void time while waiting at the gate to be pushed back. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information: reporter states that the clearance is not issued until the aircraft leaves the gate and is taxiing. The short taxi distance is a complicating factor. There is not time to follow the procedures of checklists and setting up the departure. The flight crew expected to follow the takeoff and departure procedures on the airport chart and were set up for that. They were issued the clearance as described and felt rushed to depart. Icing conditions existed which complicated the departure even more. Reporter now realizes they should have just stopped and set up the departure properly before takeoff.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: FLC OF B737 ON DEP MAKES VICTOR AIRWAY INTERCEPT BUT IN THE OPPOSITE DIRECTION FROM WHICH THEY WERE ASSIGNED. ATC CATCHES THE ERROR.

Narrative: ON OUR DEP OFF RWY 23 AT EKO, NV, THE CAPT AND MYSELF FAILED TO NEGOTIATE THE PROPER SID. RATHER THAN TURNING L TO JOIN V32 EBOUND (BQU 073 DEG RADIAL), THE CAPT FLEW OUT ON THE 241 DEG RADIAL (BQU) TO JOIN V32 WBOUND. ZLC TURNED US BACK AROUND TO REJOIN THE EBOUND AIRWAY OVER BQU. I DON'T LIKE EKO'S TWR PRACTICE OF ISSUING CLRNCS WHILE THE ACFT IS TAXIING TO THE ACTIVE RWY. IN OUR OP, A CLRNC ISSUED LIKE THIS REQUIRES THE FO TO RETURN TO THE BEFORE START CHKLIST AND INPUT THE CORRECT RADIO FREQS, ALT ALERTER, ALT, AND XPONDER CODE. A CHALLENGE IS THEN REQUIRED OF THE CAPT -- IN THIS SCENARIO, A CAPT TAXIING A PLANE, TO CONFIRM THESE FREQS, CODE, AND ALT. AT EKO, WHERE COMMERCIAL OPERATORS ARE BUT A SHORT TAXI FROM RWY 23, I FOUND THIS KIND OF PROC OF ISSUING CLRNC CREATES A LAST MOMENT RUSH, TO COMPLETE THE CHKLISTS FOR BOTH THE COCKPIT AND CABIN CREWS. I WOULD MUCH RATHER BE OFFERED A CLRNC WITH A VOID TIME WHILE WAITING AT THE GATE TO BE PUSHED BACK. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: RPTR STATES THAT THE CLRNC IS NOT ISSUED UNTIL THE ACFT LEAVES THE GATE AND IS TAXIING. THE SHORT TAXI DISTANCE IS A COMPLICATING FACTOR. THERE IS NOT TIME TO FOLLOW THE PROCS OF CHKLISTS AND SETTING UP THE DEP. THE FLC EXPECTED TO FOLLOW THE TKOF AND DEP PROCS ON THE ARPT CHART AND WERE SET UP FOR THAT. THEY WERE ISSUED THE CLRNC AS DESCRIBED AND FELT RUSHED TO DEPART. ICING CONDITIONS EXISTED WHICH COMPLICATED THE DEP EVEN MORE. RPTR NOW REALIZES THEY SHOULD HAVE JUST STOPPED AND SET UP THE DEP PROPERLY BEFORE TKOF.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.