Narrative:

Established on base leg to runway 27L, approach control cleared us for a visual approach and turned us to intercept to final heading of 300 degrees. Having previously seen and acknowledged our 'traffic to follow,' I complied with the new heading as I glanced inside the cockpit to confirm my rollout heading of 300 degrees and when I looked back outside, I reacquired what I thought was the preceding aircraft to follow. At this distance from the airport, the runways were not yet visible and I was using the localizer to confirm the intercept to final. I saw what I expected to see on the HSI display, that is the CDI deflected to the right. What I did not realize, however, was that I had the wrong localizer frequency dialed in and, therefore, my instruments were giving me incorrect information. When I noticed a B727 at my 2 O'clock high position (I estimate he was 1000 ft above and at about 3/4 of a mi) I knew one of us was overshooting. At this point, I called out the traffic to the captain and I immediately began to bank away from the B727 and looked again at my localizer which still displayed the CDI to the right of course. The captain and I were both surprised at seeing the B727 as it was now obvious that one of us was overshooting final. After a brief exchange, I asked the captain to confirm the localizer frequency whereupon he confirmed we had set in the wrong one. At this time, we could now see all 4 runways, and our mistake was obvious as we corrected back. Approach control also noticed our overshoot and gave us a heading to 240 degrees to reintercept final for runway 27L. We retuned our frequencys and corrected back to the correct course for an uneventful landing. How the problem arose: incorrect localizer frequency tuned. Contributing factors: although VMC conditions prevailed, not being able to see the runways at the time of the occurrence, delayed our discovery of the error. How it was discovered: noticing the B727 who was conducting an approach to runway 26R. Corrective actions: established a vector away from the B727 and reintercepted final for runway 27L. Perceptions, judgements, decisions: the perception that the traffic I was following 2 mi ahead was conducting an approach to runway 27L when he was in fact on runway 26R. Actions or inaction: failure to rechk our NAVAID settings before beginning the approach. This is something that is a normal part of my xchk but since this was a 'visual' approach to a familiar field, I was comfortable that everything was in order since I had a visual on the traffic ahead. Factors affecting the quality of human performance: again, being in a very familiar environment at atl, I allowed my confidence to detract from normal habit patterns -- that of always xchking the navaids. Although I have only 6 months experience with air carrier operations, I have close to 2000 hours of military flying experience and in fighters, and most of it is as an instructor pilot. For yrs, I have taught my students the importance of never getting complacent in the cockpit and yet I fell victim to it. It is imperative to always doublechk frequencys and settings in the cockpit no matter how 'routine' the approach may seem. This was a wake-up call for me that I won't soon forget.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: FO OF AN MD88 OVERSHOT ILS FINAL ON 2 SETS OF PARALLEL RWYS DUE TO HAVING THE WRONG ILS TUNED IN. HIS MISTAKE WAS DISCOVERED WHEN A B727 WAS OBSERVED NEARBY, HIGH AND TO THE R OF THEIR POS. WHEN THE CAPT TUNED IN THE CORRECT ILS, THE PROPER COURSE WAS INTERCEPTED.

Narrative: ESTABLISHED ON BASE LEG TO RWY 27L, APCH CTL CLRED US FOR A VISUAL APCH AND TURNED US TO INTERCEPT TO FINAL HDG OF 300 DEGS. HAVING PREVIOUSLY SEEN AND ACKNOWLEDGED OUR 'TFC TO FOLLOW,' I COMPLIED WITH THE NEW HDG AS I GLANCED INSIDE THE COCKPIT TO CONFIRM MY ROLLOUT HDG OF 300 DEGS AND WHEN I LOOKED BACK OUTSIDE, I REACQUIRED WHAT I THOUGHT WAS THE PRECEDING ACFT TO FOLLOW. AT THIS DISTANCE FROM THE ARPT, THE RWYS WERE NOT YET VISIBLE AND I WAS USING THE LOC TO CONFIRM THE INTERCEPT TO FINAL. I SAW WHAT I EXPECTED TO SEE ON THE HSI DISPLAY, THAT IS THE CDI DEFLECTED TO THE R. WHAT I DID NOT REALIZE, HOWEVER, WAS THAT I HAD THE WRONG LOC FREQ DIALED IN AND, THEREFORE, MY INSTS WERE GIVING ME INCORRECT INFO. WHEN I NOTICED A B727 AT MY 2 O'CLOCK HIGH POS (I ESTIMATE HE WAS 1000 FT ABOVE AND AT ABOUT 3/4 OF A MI) I KNEW ONE OF US WAS OVERSHOOTING. AT THIS POINT, I CALLED OUT THE TFC TO THE CAPT AND I IMMEDIATELY BEGAN TO BANK AWAY FROM THE B727 AND LOOKED AGAIN AT MY LOC WHICH STILL DISPLAYED THE CDI TO THE R OF COURSE. THE CAPT AND I WERE BOTH SURPRISED AT SEEING THE B727 AS IT WAS NOW OBVIOUS THAT ONE OF US WAS OVERSHOOTING FINAL. AFTER A BRIEF EXCHANGE, I ASKED THE CAPT TO CONFIRM THE LOC FREQ WHEREUPON HE CONFIRMED WE HAD SET IN THE WRONG ONE. AT THIS TIME, WE COULD NOW SEE ALL 4 RWYS, AND OUR MISTAKE WAS OBVIOUS AS WE CORRECTED BACK. APCH CTL ALSO NOTICED OUR OVERSHOOT AND GAVE US A HDG TO 240 DEGS TO REINTERCEPT FINAL FOR RWY 27L. WE RETUNED OUR FREQS AND CORRECTED BACK TO THE CORRECT COURSE FOR AN UNEVENTFUL LNDG. HOW THE PROB AROSE: INCORRECT LOC FREQ TUNED. CONTRIBUTING FACTORS: ALTHOUGH VMC CONDITIONS PREVAILED, NOT BEING ABLE TO SEE THE RWYS AT THE TIME OF THE OCCURRENCE, DELAYED OUR DISCOVERY OF THE ERROR. HOW IT WAS DISCOVERED: NOTICING THE B727 WHO WAS CONDUCTING AN APCH TO RWY 26R. CORRECTIVE ACTIONS: ESTABLISHED A VECTOR AWAY FROM THE B727 AND REINTERCEPTED FINAL FOR RWY 27L. PERCEPTIONS, JUDGEMENTS, DECISIONS: THE PERCEPTION THAT THE TFC I WAS FOLLOWING 2 MI AHEAD WAS CONDUCTING AN APCH TO RWY 27L WHEN HE WAS IN FACT ON RWY 26R. ACTIONS OR INACTION: FAILURE TO RECHK OUR NAVAID SETTINGS BEFORE BEGINNING THE APCH. THIS IS SOMETHING THAT IS A NORMAL PART OF MY XCHK BUT SINCE THIS WAS A 'VISUAL' APCH TO A FAMILIAR FIELD, I WAS COMFORTABLE THAT EVERYTHING WAS IN ORDER SINCE I HAD A VISUAL ON THE TFC AHEAD. FACTORS AFFECTING THE QUALITY OF HUMAN PERFORMANCE: AGAIN, BEING IN A VERY FAMILIAR ENVIRONMENT AT ATL, I ALLOWED MY CONFIDENCE TO DETRACT FROM NORMAL HABIT PATTERNS -- THAT OF ALWAYS XCHKING THE NAVAIDS. ALTHOUGH I HAVE ONLY 6 MONTHS EXPERIENCE WITH ACR OPS, I HAVE CLOSE TO 2000 HRS OF MIL FLYING EXPERIENCE AND IN FIGHTERS, AND MOST OF IT IS AS AN INSTRUCTOR PLT. FOR YRS, I HAVE TAUGHT MY STUDENTS THE IMPORTANCE OF NEVER GETTING COMPLACENT IN THE COCKPIT AND YET I FELL VICTIM TO IT. IT IS IMPERATIVE TO ALWAYS DOUBLECHK FREQS AND SETTINGS IN THE COCKPIT NO MATTER HOW 'ROUTINE' THE APCH MAY SEEM. THIS WAS A WAKE-UP CALL FOR ME THAT I WON'T SOON FORGET.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.