Narrative:

ATC facility: austin tower. Location: austin final. On night en route descent to austin, first officer flying, first officer got late start on descent and was high on extended final. We were cleared north for traffic and then cleared for visual approach and to tower. Both captain and first officer were busy discussing and monitoring this high approach, completing mechanical checklist. We were cleared for s- turns and landing, I believe by tower. After landing and turn-off at mid-field, neither captain nor first officer could remember if tower had cleared us to land. Captain checked with the tower and they could not definitely remember if they had issued landing clearance on tower, but they were watching our landing and there was no problem with them. They said there was no safety problem and issue was closed. Today, apr/thu/98, after receiving and reading the latest update, captain and first officer wanted to submit this situation. Since the change to the S-80 mechanical checklist, removing the two blank spaces that we used for approach and landing clrncs, a fail-safe technique to insure clearance and understanding response has been removed. First officer would like some suggested techniques.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: FLC OF A SUPER MD80 FAILED TO OBTAIN LNDG CLRNC DUE TO DISTR ON A HIGH FINAL AND THE USE OF AN AMENDED CHKLIST WHICH DELETED THE SPACE USED FOR ADDING THE LNDG CLRNC TO THE CHKLIST.

Narrative: ATC FACILITY: AUSTIN TWR. LOCATION: AUSTIN FINAL. ON NIGHT ENRTE DSCNT TO AUSTIN, FO FLYING, FO GOT LATE START ON DSCNT AND WAS HIGH ON EXTENDED FINAL. WE WERE CLRED N FOR TFC AND THEN CLRED FOR VISUAL APCH AND TO TWR. BOTH CAPT AND FO WERE BUSY DISCUSSING AND MONITORING THIS HIGH APCH, COMPLETING MECHANICAL CHKLIST. WE WERE CLRED FOR S- TURNS AND LNDG, I BELIEVE BY TWR. AFTER LNDG AND TURN-OFF AT MID-FIELD, NEITHER CAPT NOR FO COULD REMEMBER IF TWR HAD CLRED US TO LAND. CAPT CHKED WITH THE TWR AND THEY COULD NOT DEFINITELY REMEMBER IF THEY HAD ISSUED LNDG CLRNC ON TWR, BUT THEY WERE WATCHING OUR LNDG AND THERE WAS NO PROB WITH THEM. THEY SAID THERE WAS NO SAFETY PROB AND ISSUE WAS CLOSED. TODAY, APR/THU/98, AFTER RECEIVING AND READING THE LATEST UPDATE, CAPT AND FO WANTED TO SUBMIT THIS SIT. SINCE THE CHANGE TO THE S-80 MECHANICAL CHKLIST, REMOVING THE TWO BLANK SPACES THAT WE USED FOR APCH AND LNDG CLRNCS, A FAIL-SAFE TECHNIQUE TO INSURE CLRNC AND UNDERSTANDING RESPONSE HAS BEEN REMOVED. FO WOULD LIKE SOME SUGGESTED TECHNIQUES.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.