Narrative:

During descent-to-land on runway 8L at atl, several distracting events occurred, the last of which was a SELCAL from our air carrier dispatcher. We had been cleared to 10000 ft. Subsequently, I was certain I heard a clearance to 6000 ft. Just before descending through 9200 ft, I observed the altitude alerter that was set to 10000 ft. I leveled at 9000 ft and asked the first officer to verify the altitude with approach control. A brief delay ensued as the frequency was busy. Before the first officer could call, approach control called us and asked, 'air carrier xx, what altitude are you descending to?' the first officer replied, 10000 ft, then the controller cleared us to 6000 ft. I was not sure why the controller asked about the altitude we were descending to. Did he observe us level at 9000 ft on the way to 6000 ft or did he interrogate because we had descended below 10000 ft? The first officer only recalled being cleared to 10000 ft, but I was sure we were cleared to 6000 ft. The controller did not indicate one way or the other. Therefore, the possibility of an altitude bust existed. Supplemental information from acn 394214: at 9000 ft the captain (PF) asked me what altitude we were cleared to. I referred to the altitude alert indicator (which I had set) which at that time read 10000 ft. He then started the aircraft back up toward 10000 ft. At approximately 9300 ft atl approach questioned, and I responded that we had been cleared to 10000 ft. Approach control then directed us to continue our descent to 6000 ft. Throughout the arrival, a discussion concerning the #2 engine anti-ice valve malfunction was ongoing. This distraction was exacerbated at approximately 12000 ft by the company dispatcher calling in reference to the same malfunction. I believe that too much emphasis was being placed upon a minor mechanical malfunction during a very busy phase of flight. There were too many distrs, including the conduct of the abnormal procedure and ATC. Supplemental information from acn 394208: during initial descent, the captain directed me to contact company maintenance about an engine anti-ice valve. I had finished talking with maintenance when the dispatcher came on the radio. He seemed concerned with the WX and the possibility of sending us to another airfield. It had been approximately 2 mins since my last transmission to the dispatcher. Based on air temperature and cloud layering, the captain had me tell the dispatcher we would continue the approach and keep him advised if we felt a need to divert. The non critical maintenance problem was relayed, but became dragged out into the busy approach phase. The SELCAL was probably another distraction at about the time the aircraft was nearing the assigned altitude.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A B727-200 FLYING AN APCH INTO ATL HAS AN ALTDEV BECAUSE THE FLC WAS DISTR OVER ANOTHER PROB.

Narrative: DURING DSCNT-TO-LAND ON RWY 8L AT ATL, SEVERAL DISTRACTING EVENTS OCCURRED, THE LAST OF WHICH WAS A SELCAL FROM OUR ACR DISPATCHER. WE HAD BEEN CLRED TO 10000 FT. SUBSEQUENTLY, I WAS CERTAIN I HEARD A CLRNC TO 6000 FT. JUST BEFORE DSNDING THROUGH 9200 FT, I OBSERVED THE ALT ALERTER THAT WAS SET TO 10000 FT. I LEVELED AT 9000 FT AND ASKED THE FO TO VERIFY THE ALT WITH APCH CTL. A BRIEF DELAY ENSUED AS THE FREQ WAS BUSY. BEFORE THE FO COULD CALL, APCH CTL CALLED US AND ASKED, 'ACR XX, WHAT ALT ARE YOU DSNDING TO?' THE FO REPLIED, 10000 FT, THEN THE CTLR CLRED US TO 6000 FT. I WAS NOT SURE WHY THE CTLR ASKED ABOUT THE ALT WE WERE DSNDING TO. DID HE OBSERVE US LEVEL AT 9000 FT ON THE WAY TO 6000 FT OR DID HE INTERROGATE BECAUSE WE HAD DSNDED BELOW 10000 FT? THE FO ONLY RECALLED BEING CLRED TO 10000 FT, BUT I WAS SURE WE WERE CLRED TO 6000 FT. THE CTLR DID NOT INDICATE ONE WAY OR THE OTHER. THEREFORE, THE POSSIBILITY OF AN ALT BUST EXISTED. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 394214: AT 9000 FT THE CAPT (PF) ASKED ME WHAT ALT WE WERE CLRED TO. I REFERRED TO THE ALT ALERT INDICATOR (WHICH I HAD SET) WHICH AT THAT TIME READ 10000 FT. HE THEN STARTED THE ACFT BACK UP TOWARD 10000 FT. AT APPROX 9300 FT ATL APCH QUESTIONED, AND I RESPONDED THAT WE HAD BEEN CLRED TO 10000 FT. APCH CTL THEN DIRECTED US TO CONTINUE OUR DSCNT TO 6000 FT. THROUGHOUT THE ARR, A DISCUSSION CONCERNING THE #2 ENG ANTI-ICE VALVE MALFUNCTION WAS ONGOING. THIS DISTR WAS EXACERBATED AT APPROX 12000 FT BY THE COMPANY DISPATCHER CALLING IN REF TO THE SAME MALFUNCTION. I BELIEVE THAT TOO MUCH EMPHASIS WAS BEING PLACED UPON A MINOR MECHANICAL MALFUNCTION DURING A VERY BUSY PHASE OF FLT. THERE WERE TOO MANY DISTRS, INCLUDING THE CONDUCT OF THE ABNORMAL PROC AND ATC. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 394208: DURING INITIAL DSCNT, THE CAPT DIRECTED ME TO CONTACT COMPANY MAINT ABOUT AN ENG ANTI-ICE VALVE. I HAD FINISHED TALKING WITH MAINT WHEN THE DISPATCHER CAME ON THE RADIO. HE SEEMED CONCERNED WITH THE WX AND THE POSSIBILITY OF SENDING US TO ANOTHER AIRFIELD. IT HAD BEEN APPROX 2 MINS SINCE MY LAST XMISSION TO THE DISPATCHER. BASED ON AIR TEMP AND CLOUD LAYERING, THE CAPT HAD ME TELL THE DISPATCHER WE WOULD CONTINUE THE APCH AND KEEP HIM ADVISED IF WE FELT A NEED TO DIVERT. THE NON CRITICAL MAINT PROB WAS RELAYED, BUT BECAME DRAGGED OUT INTO THE BUSY APCH PHASE. THE SELCAL WAS PROBABLY ANOTHER DISTR AT ABOUT THE TIME THE ACFT WAS NEARING THE ASSIGNED ALT.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.