Narrative:

Departing phx runway 26R on st johns 2 departure starting the right turn at 9 DME we experienced an autoplt disconnect, followed by an ECAM for thrust reverser 1 failure, generator 1 failure, AC ess bus failure, autothrust failure, flight directors failure, facility 1 failure, captain pfd, nd, and upper ECAM failures and momentary failure of first officer's, pfd, nd, and lower ECAM and both VHF radios as well as failures of blower fan, extract fan, and galley power, in both the normal and override position. While completing the right turn to a 060 degree heading as called for on the SID (we had no radios or navigation displays), we were able to restore the AC ess bus and use of VHF communication #1, at which time departure control called out B737 traffic at our 2 O'clock position. The first officer (PF) continued the right turn in order to keep the traffic in sight, while I worked through the ECAM and attempted to restore additional system. I informed the controller that we had the traffic in sight, and that we were experiencing electrical problems, and requested radar vectors clear of traffic and terrain, and that we would be returning to phx for landing. While being vectored the controller asked if we had performed a normal departure. I answered yes, however, in retrospect we probably did have a significantly reduced rate of climb, due to the lack of flight instruments. I asked if there was any problems, the controller responded, negative. I called on the phone after we landed, and the supervisor again assured me that there was no problem. From our perspective the initial problem was caused by equipment failure, if any other problems existed, I do not know of any viable suggestions. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information: reporter captain has excellent coordination and feedback from his company. Though they still don't know what triggered the multiple failure they did replace numerous components among which were generator line connectors (glc), electrical lines, connectors and various components. The #1 VHF should revert to the battery bus in event of loss of power and when the event occurred both primary screens/instruments went blank except for the standby gyroscope horizon, standby airspeed and altimeter, plus the #1 VHF radio initially was off leading the captain to think he had total electrical failure including the battery. However, the radio came back on after about 15 seconds. That particular failure apparently was a mystery to everyone. Reporter had communicated with his company maintenance, training department and union safety committee.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A320 ACFT ON SID HAD FAILURE OF #1 ELECTRICAL BUSSES AND RELATED FLT INSTS, AUTOPLT, ETC. FLC NOTIFIED CTLR REQUESTING VECTORS BACK FOR LNDG.

Narrative: DEPARTING PHX RWY 26R ON ST JOHNS 2 DEP STARTING THE R TURN AT 9 DME WE EXPERIENCED AN AUTOPLT DISCONNECT, FOLLOWED BY AN ECAM FOR THRUST REVERSER 1 FAILURE, GENERATOR 1 FAILURE, AC ESS BUS FAILURE, AUTOTHRUST FAILURE, FLT DIRECTORS FAILURE, FAC 1 FAILURE, CAPT PFD, ND, AND UPPER ECAM FAILURES AND MOMENTARY FAILURE OF FO'S, PFD, ND, AND LOWER ECAM AND BOTH VHF RADIOS AS WELL AS FAILURES OF BLOWER FAN, EXTRACT FAN, AND GALLEY PWR, IN BOTH THE NORMAL AND OVERRIDE POS. WHILE COMPLETING THE R TURN TO A 060 DEG HDG AS CALLED FOR ON THE SID (WE HAD NO RADIOS OR NAV DISPLAYS), WE WERE ABLE TO RESTORE THE AC ESS BUS AND USE OF VHF COM #1, AT WHICH TIME DEP CTL CALLED OUT B737 TFC AT OUR 2 O'CLOCK POS. THE FO (PF) CONTINUED THE R TURN IN ORDER TO KEEP THE TFC IN SIGHT, WHILE I WORKED THROUGH THE ECAM AND ATTEMPTED TO RESTORE ADDITIONAL SYS. I INFORMED THE CTLR THAT WE HAD THE TFC IN SIGHT, AND THAT WE WERE EXPERIENCING ELECTRICAL PROBS, AND REQUESTED RADAR VECTORS CLR OF TFC AND TERRAIN, AND THAT WE WOULD BE RETURNING TO PHX FOR LNDG. WHILE BEING VECTORED THE CTLR ASKED IF WE HAD PERFORMED A NORMAL DEP. I ANSWERED YES, HOWEVER, IN RETROSPECT WE PROBABLY DID HAVE A SIGNIFICANTLY REDUCED RATE OF CLB, DUE TO THE LACK OF FLT INSTS. I ASKED IF THERE WAS ANY PROBS, THE CTLR RESPONDED, NEGATIVE. I CALLED ON THE PHONE AFTER WE LANDED, AND THE SUPVR AGAIN ASSURED ME THAT THERE WAS NO PROB. FROM OUR PERSPECTIVE THE INITIAL PROB WAS CAUSED BY EQUIP FAILURE, IF ANY OTHER PROBS EXISTED, I DO NOT KNOW OF ANY VIABLE SUGGESTIONS. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: RPTR CAPT HAS EXCELLENT COORD AND FEEDBACK FROM HIS COMPANY. THOUGH THEY STILL DON'T KNOW WHAT TRIGGERED THE MULTIPLE FAILURE THEY DID REPLACE NUMEROUS COMPONENTS AMONG WHICH WERE GENERATOR LINE CONNECTORS (GLC), ELECTRICAL LINES, CONNECTORS AND VARIOUS COMPONENTS. THE #1 VHF SHOULD REVERT TO THE BATTERY BUS IN EVENT OF LOSS OF PWR AND WHEN THE EVENT OCCURRED BOTH PRIMARY SCREENS/INSTS WENT BLANK EXCEPT FOR THE STANDBY GYROSCOPE HORIZON, STANDBY AIRSPD AND ALTIMETER, PLUS THE #1 VHF RADIO INITIALLY WAS OFF LEADING THE CAPT TO THINK HE HAD TOTAL ELECTRICAL FAILURE INCLUDING THE BATTERY. HOWEVER, THE RADIO CAME BACK ON AFTER ABOUT 15 SECONDS. THAT PARTICULAR FAILURE APPARENTLY WAS A MYSTERY TO EVERYONE. RPTR HAD COMMUNICATED WITH HIS COMPANY MAINT, TRAINING DEPT AND UNION SAFETY COMMITTEE.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.