Narrative:

Normal start up and taxi out after loading cargo including special cargo (horses for syd) with 4 grooms. Shortly after lift-off which was normal, I heard an unmistakably loud noise (which I never want to hear again) of a container at P1 coming loose. Note B727-284 has 12 position. Locks were up as per our procedure at all stations. P2 locks stop approximately 3700 pounds container from going to open P3 position and ultimately to P4 position where loss of human (grooms) and animal life could have occurred. Captain (PNF) immediately assesses aircraft control. First officer (PF) reports no control problems. Grooms report immediately extent of problem. Leveloff at 2000 ft MSL to assess situation. Excellent CRM and leadership by captain who directs me (so) to compute new center of gravity with load shift before dumping fuel. Center of gravity calculated with fuel dumping per the schedule. Container slides a second time while fuel dumping is in progress. Crew decides to land overweight due to the uncontrollable nature of container shifts. Grooms secure container with brownline straps and throw contents to P1 to lighten container load. I consider myself a 'load shift survivor' lucky and grateful to have had such a great crew. I welcome FAA/NASA investigation to discover how this occurred.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: AN ACR B727 FREIGHTER FLC HAS THE P1 CONTAINER BREAK LOOSE FROM ITS LOCKED POS AND SHIFT DURING INITIAL CLBOUT. THE FLC EVALUATED THE SIT AND DECIDED TO RETURN TO AKL FOR AN OVERWT LNDG.

Narrative: NORMAL START UP AND TAXI OUT AFTER LOADING CARGO INCLUDING SPECIAL CARGO (HORSES FOR SYD) WITH 4 GROOMS. SHORTLY AFTER LIFT-OFF WHICH WAS NORMAL, I HEARD AN UNMISTAKABLY LOUD NOISE (WHICH I NEVER WANT TO HEAR AGAIN) OF A CONTAINER AT P1 COMING LOOSE. NOTE B727-284 HAS 12 POS. LOCKS WERE UP AS PER OUR PROC AT ALL STATIONS. P2 LOCKS STOP APPROX 3700 LBS CONTAINER FROM GOING TO OPEN P3 POS AND ULTIMATELY TO P4 POS WHERE LOSS OF HUMAN (GROOMS) AND ANIMAL LIFE COULD HAVE OCCURRED. CAPT (PNF) IMMEDIATELY ASSESSES ACFT CTL. FO (PF) RPTS NO CTL PROBS. GROOMS RPT IMMEDIATELY EXTENT OF PROB. LEVELOFF AT 2000 FT MSL TO ASSESS SIT. EXCELLENT CRM AND LEADERSHIP BY CAPT WHO DIRECTS ME (SO) TO COMPUTE NEW CTR OF GRAVITY WITH LOAD SHIFT BEFORE DUMPING FUEL. CTR OF GRAVITY CALCULATED WITH FUEL DUMPING PER THE SCHEDULE. CONTAINER SLIDES A SECOND TIME WHILE FUEL DUMPING IS IN PROGRESS. CREW DECIDES TO LAND OVERWT DUE TO THE UNCONTROLLABLE NATURE OF CONTAINER SHIFTS. GROOMS SECURE CONTAINER WITH BROWNLINE STRAPS AND THROW CONTENTS TO P1 TO LIGHTEN CONTAINER LOAD. I CONSIDER MYSELF A 'LOAD SHIFT SURVIVOR' LUCKY AND GRATEFUL TO HAVE HAD SUCH A GREAT CREW. I WELCOME FAA/NASA INVESTIGATION TO DISCOVER HOW THIS OCCURRED.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.