Narrative:

We were on a downwind (right) for runway 24R at lax at 2500 ft MSL. Approach control asked if we had the airport in sight. We told them we did not. The controller advised we were #2 for the runway following another aircraft approaching the harbor freeway and asked if we saw that aircraft. We responded that we did not. We were then put on a base heading of 160 degrees, about 1 mi northeast of romen OM. Base was short as winds aloft were from the north (330 degrees/27 KTS). The controller then asked if we had the aircraft on final in sight, we responded that we did. He instructed us to follow the aircraft ahead and cleared for the visual approach. Immediately the controller was talking to another aircraft. We were close to the final and approaching the localizer at a steep angle. We went through the localizer in a steep turn back to the northwest to intercept. In the mean time we told the controller we couldn't proceed with the visual because the aircraft ahead disappeared into the overcast and the airport wasn't visible. The controller instructed us to turn to 360 degrees and maintain 3500 ft. As we turned to the north, we received a TCASII TA, then an RA (to climb). There was parallel traffic ahead and below us for runway 25L. We were then vectored downwind and executed an ILS runway 24R, tops of the overcast were 1600-1700 ft, base of overcast was 500 ft MSL (400 ft AGL). To help the above situation if it were mandatory to have and report the airport in sight as well as the preceding aircraft. This would compensate for changing WX conditions as was the case on our approach. Previous WX was basically clear and 10+ mi. Supplemental information from acn 391526: poor analysis of WX. Failure to brief or display a lead radial. We assumed our traffic to follow was flying a visual. Hesitation to tell the captain to start a sharp turn toward the runway. I believe that socal approach set us up with a very tight turn to final and heading right at traffic on the parallel runway. This overshoot could have been avoided if we had not accepted clearance for the visual approach. In addition, if we had briefed and displayed a lead radial we might have noticed sooner what was happening to us. In the future, I will be much more careful about accepting visual approach clrncs.

Google
 

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: ACR FLC VECTORED AND CLRED FOR VISUAL APCH AT LAX RWY 24R LOST SIGHT OF TFC AND ARPT DUE TO WX. ACFT SLID ACROSS FINAL APCH COURSE TOWARDS TFC MANEUVERING FOR RWY 25R. FLC REACTED TO TCASII TA RA. CTLR VECTORED ACFT BACK FOR ANOTHER APCH. FO CITES NOT REACTING QUICKLY TO WX, TFC, TIGHT SEQUENCING BY ATC, AND CAPT FLYING SKILLS.

Narrative: WE WERE ON A DOWNWIND (RIGHT) FOR RWY 24R AT LAX AT 2500 FT MSL. APCH CTL ASKED IF WE HAD THE ARPT IN SIGHT. WE TOLD THEM WE DID NOT. THE CTLR ADVISED WE WERE #2 FOR THE RWY FOLLOWING ANOTHER ACFT APCHING THE HARBOR FREEWAY AND ASKED IF WE SAW THAT ACFT. WE RESPONDED THAT WE DID NOT. WE WERE THEN PUT ON A BASE HDG OF 160 DEGS, ABOUT 1 MI NE OF ROMEN OM. BASE WAS SHORT AS WINDS ALOFT WERE FROM THE N (330 DEGS/27 KTS). THE CTLR THEN ASKED IF WE HAD THE ACFT ON FINAL IN SIGHT, WE RESPONDED THAT WE DID. HE INSTRUCTED US TO FOLLOW THE ACFT AHEAD AND CLRED FOR THE VISUAL APCH. IMMEDIATELY THE CTLR WAS TALKING TO ANOTHER ACFT. WE WERE CLOSE TO THE FINAL AND APCHING THE LOC AT A STEEP ANGLE. WE WENT THROUGH THE LOC IN A STEEP TURN BACK TO THE NW TO INTERCEPT. IN THE MEAN TIME WE TOLD THE CTLR WE COULDN'T PROCEED WITH THE VISUAL BECAUSE THE ACFT AHEAD DISAPPEARED INTO THE OVCST AND THE ARPT WASN'T VISIBLE. THE CTLR INSTRUCTED US TO TURN TO 360 DEGS AND MAINTAIN 3500 FT. AS WE TURNED TO THE N, WE RECEIVED A TCASII TA, THEN AN RA (TO CLB). THERE WAS PARALLEL TFC AHEAD AND BELOW US FOR RWY 25L. WE WERE THEN VECTORED DOWNWIND AND EXECUTED AN ILS RWY 24R, TOPS OF THE OVCST WERE 1600-1700 FT, BASE OF OVCST WAS 500 FT MSL (400 FT AGL). TO HELP THE ABOVE SIT IF IT WERE MANDATORY TO HAVE AND RPT THE ARPT IN SIGHT AS WELL AS THE PRECEDING ACFT. THIS WOULD COMPENSATE FOR CHANGING WX CONDITIONS AS WAS THE CASE ON OUR APCH. PREVIOUS WX WAS BASICALLY CLR AND 10+ MI. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 391526: POOR ANALYSIS OF WX. FAILURE TO BRIEF OR DISPLAY A LEAD RADIAL. WE ASSUMED OUR TFC TO FOLLOW WAS FLYING A VISUAL. HESITATION TO TELL THE CAPT TO START A SHARP TURN TOWARD THE RWY. I BELIEVE THAT SOCAL APCH SET US UP WITH A VERY TIGHT TURN TO FINAL AND HEADING RIGHT AT TFC ON THE PARALLEL RWY. THIS OVERSHOOT COULD HAVE BEEN AVOIDED IF WE HAD NOT ACCEPTED CLRNC FOR THE VISUAL APCH. IN ADDITION, IF WE HAD BRIEFED AND DISPLAYED A LEAD RADIAL WE MIGHT HAVE NOTICED SOONER WHAT WAS HAPPENING TO US. IN THE FUTURE, I WILL BE MUCH MORE CAREFUL ABOUT ACCEPTING VISUAL APCH CLRNCS.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.