Narrative:

Takeoff and initial climb were normal with full 'J' power. While reviewing the climb checklist out of 10000 ft, the so noticed 7 of 8 low pressure lights illuminated on the fuel panel. Only the #2 aft pressure light was extinguished. There was a slight imbalance between #2 and #3 tanks. At this point, according to the panel indications, #2 aft was the only boost pump working. All of the xfeeds were open. Per the fuel burn sequence, #2 and #3 tanks were to feed all engines for a short period on climb out. Since we were cleared to FL410 and climbing quite rapidly (due to the aircraft's light weight), I suggested a lower altitude for leveloff to ensure adequate fuel pressure and to troubleshoot the malfunction. However, the captain elected to continue the climb for the time being and gave me the flight controls so he could work with the so. Circuit breakers were checked and the cockpit operating manual reviewed. By this time, it was evident that the #2 tank was feeding all engines. (#2 was showing a 3000 to 4000 pound imbalance.) the captain elected to immediately return to the departure airport. He requested priority handling. After parking at the gate, maintenance personnel entered the aircraft and indicated the boost pump circuit breakers had been pulled on the ground for a special check and there was no 'record' of them being reset. I found this quite interesting as there was no record of the check in the logbook onboard the aircraft. There was an inference by ground personnel that we could have returned for another reason. This did not set well with any of the flight crew members. The captain called our chief pilot, chief of training and maintenance control to discuss the situation. Apparently, he was told that no other checks were feasible other than resetting the circuit breakers and ensuring the pumps were putting out pressure. The chief pilot and chief of training were comfortable with our crew continuing on to our original destination. Maintenance completed the checks and we departed and landed at our original destination without incident. I thought we handled the in-flight malfunction fairly well. The captain solicited inputs and made the final decisions. He delegated aircraft control in order to manage the situation first hand. Human error: I find it very hard to believe the so missed low pressure lights on 2 checklists and 3 to 4 flow patterns prior to the takeoff. Under that scenario, the #2 aft light was obviously extinguished and would have presented an unbalanced light pattern, making it even more noticeable. The so is known for being quite meticulous. Logbooks: I'm assuming the boost pump check was entered into the computer based logbook. Non routine maintenance should be entered into the aircraft onboard logbook. This would alert the flight crew of possible abnormalities. Supplemental information from acn 387560: after conducting a normal interior preflight, I proceeded to do the exterior preflight and heard the APU shut down. Maintenance restarted the APU and the INS's were realigned, #4 engine was started at the gate. All procedures and checklists were completed prior to takeoff. Full 75% power was used for takeoff. The takeoff and climb were uneventful. At approximately 10000 ft I did my climb check and noticed several boost pump low pressure lights illuminated. All cockpit circuit breakers were checked and found to be normal. All engines were operating normal. Callback conversation with reporter of acn 387560 revealed the following information: this reporter was the so. With reference to the APU shutting down during his preflight, he said that he was later told by maintenance that there had been a problem with a switch, it having tripped thereby shutting down the APU. The maintenance man thought it was a 'reset switch.' maintenance also said that there was a problem with a faulty battery charger. Since they did not want any electrical problems later, the #4 engine was started at the gate, the aircraft pushed back and the remaining engines started. The APU was then shut down. Reporter said that the captain normally looks at the so's panel for any lights, as the panel should be unlit, with no fuel boost pump lights on. In this event, the captain later said that he had failed to do this visual scan as there had been construction on the airport and he was too preoccupied in taxiing to turn and check for these lights. Through 3000 ft with the flaps retracted, the so went through his xfeed set up, insuring xfeeds open, shutting off main tank boost pumps #1 and #4 to feed out of tanks #2 and #3 to all engines. He had not, up to this point, noticed anything unusual. He said that the panel light selector switch was in the 'bright' position. The only change or difference with this aircraft was that the fuel gauges were of a newer type, a digital rather than the old 'analog' type. The digits within these gauges are amber colored, the same color as the boost pump low pressure warning lights, and would put out a certain level of light from the panel. It is a 'different look than it used to be.' at his 10000 ft climb check he completed his checklists and upon turning back to the panel saw all these bright warning lights on, except #2 aft. He says he could have missed them but doesn't know how. Upon return to the gate the maintenance man mentioned that he thought that the lower 41 circuit breakers were still out except for the #2 aft breaker which had powered the pump for the APU. It was explained that maintenance has a new procedure that they do before departure, he thought it was checking for resistance levels in the boost pump circuits or wiring. This was a procedure he had not heard of before. When asked during callback, he didn't know if pulling the lower 41 breakers would deactivate the boost pump warning lights in the cockpit but didn't think so. He says that the FAA knows of this incident, most likely through a company self disclosure procedure.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: B747-200 FLC RETURNS TO MANILA AFTER TKOF WHEN THE SO NOTES THAT ALL BUT THE AFT #2 TANK BOOST PUMP WARNING LIGHTS WERE ON. ALL SWITCHES WERE 'ON' AND THERE WAS A FUEL IMBALANCE IN TANK #2 INDICATING THAT TANK #2 WAS FEEDING ALL ENGS. THE POSTFLT INSPECTION LATER REVEALED THAT THOSE RESPECTIVE CIRCUIT BREAKERS HAD BEEN PULLED IN A PREVIOUS MAINT SPONSORED GND TEST. THE RPTR'S TEXT IS NOT CLR AS TO WHETHER THEY HAD BEEN PLACED BACK IN OP PRIOR TO THIS FLT. NOT NOTED IN THE LOGBOOK.

Narrative: TKOF AND INITIAL CLB WERE NORMAL WITH FULL 'J' PWR. WHILE REVIEWING THE CLB CHKLIST OUT OF 10000 FT, THE SO NOTICED 7 OF 8 LOW PRESSURE LIGHTS ILLUMINATED ON THE FUEL PANEL. ONLY THE #2 AFT PRESSURE LIGHT WAS EXTINGUISHED. THERE WAS A SLIGHT IMBALANCE BTWN #2 AND #3 TANKS. AT THIS POINT, ACCORDING TO THE PANEL INDICATIONS, #2 AFT WAS THE ONLY BOOST PUMP WORKING. ALL OF THE XFEEDS WERE OPEN. PER THE FUEL BURN SEQUENCE, #2 AND #3 TANKS WERE TO FEED ALL ENGS FOR A SHORT PERIOD ON CLBOUT. SINCE WE WERE CLRED TO FL410 AND CLBING QUITE RAPIDLY (DUE TO THE ACFT'S LIGHT WEIGHT), I SUGGESTED A LOWER ALT FOR LEVELOFF TO ENSURE ADEQUATE FUEL PRESSURE AND TO TROUBLESHOOT THE MALFUNCTION. HOWEVER, THE CAPT ELECTED TO CONTINUE THE CLB FOR THE TIME BEING AND GAVE ME THE FLT CTLS SO HE COULD WORK WITH THE SO. CIRCUIT BREAKERS WERE CHKED AND THE COCKPIT OPERATING MANUAL REVIEWED. BY THIS TIME, IT WAS EVIDENT THAT THE #2 TANK WAS FEEDING ALL ENGS. (#2 WAS SHOWING A 3000 TO 4000 LB IMBALANCE.) THE CAPT ELECTED TO IMMEDIATELY RETURN TO THE DEP ARPT. HE REQUESTED PRIORITY HANDLING. AFTER PARKING AT THE GATE, MAINT PERSONNEL ENTERED THE ACFT AND INDICATED THE BOOST PUMP CIRCUIT BREAKERS HAD BEEN PULLED ON THE GND FOR A SPECIAL CHK AND THERE WAS NO 'RECORD' OF THEM BEING RESET. I FOUND THIS QUITE INTERESTING AS THERE WAS NO RECORD OF THE CHK IN THE LOGBOOK ONBOARD THE ACFT. THERE WAS AN INFERENCE BY GND PERSONNEL THAT WE COULD HAVE RETURNED FOR ANOTHER REASON. THIS DID NOT SET WELL WITH ANY OF THE FLC MEMBERS. THE CAPT CALLED OUR CHIEF PLT, CHIEF OF TRAINING AND MAINT CTL TO DISCUSS THE SIT. APPARENTLY, HE WAS TOLD THAT NO OTHER CHKS WERE FEASIBLE OTHER THAN RESETTING THE CIRCUIT BREAKERS AND ENSURING THE PUMPS WERE PUTTING OUT PRESSURE. THE CHIEF PLT AND CHIEF OF TRAINING WERE COMFORTABLE WITH OUR CREW CONTINUING ON TO OUR ORIGINAL DEST. MAINT COMPLETED THE CHKS AND WE DEPARTED AND LANDED AT OUR ORIGINAL DEST WITHOUT INCIDENT. I THOUGHT WE HANDLED THE INFLT MALFUNCTION FAIRLY WELL. THE CAPT SOLICITED INPUTS AND MADE THE FINAL DECISIONS. HE DELEGATED ACFT CTL IN ORDER TO MANAGE THE SIT FIRST HAND. HUMAN ERROR: I FIND IT VERY HARD TO BELIEVE THE SO MISSED LOW PRESSURE LIGHTS ON 2 CHKLISTS AND 3 TO 4 FLOW PATTERNS PRIOR TO THE TKOF. UNDER THAT SCENARIO, THE #2 AFT LIGHT WAS OBVIOUSLY EXTINGUISHED AND WOULD HAVE PRESENTED AN UNBALANCED LIGHT PATTERN, MAKING IT EVEN MORE NOTICEABLE. THE SO IS KNOWN FOR BEING QUITE METICULOUS. LOGBOOKS: I'M ASSUMING THE BOOST PUMP CHK WAS ENTERED INTO THE COMPUTER BASED LOGBOOK. NON ROUTINE MAINT SHOULD BE ENTERED INTO THE ACFT ONBOARD LOGBOOK. THIS WOULD ALERT THE FLC OF POSSIBLE ABNORMALITIES. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 387560: AFTER CONDUCTING A NORMAL INTERIOR PREFLT, I PROCEEDED TO DO THE EXTERIOR PREFLT AND HEARD THE APU SHUT DOWN. MAINT RESTARTED THE APU AND THE INS'S WERE REALIGNED, #4 ENG WAS STARTED AT THE GATE. ALL PROCS AND CHKLISTS WERE COMPLETED PRIOR TO TKOF. FULL 75% PWR WAS USED FOR TKOF. THE TKOF AND CLB WERE UNEVENTFUL. AT APPROX 10000 FT I DID MY CLB CHK AND NOTICED SEVERAL BOOST PUMP LOW PRESSURE LIGHTS ILLUMINATED. ALL COCKPIT CIRCUIT BREAKERS WERE CHKED AND FOUND TO BE NORMAL. ALL ENGS WERE OPERATING NORMAL. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR OF ACN 387560 REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: THIS RPTR WAS THE SO. WITH REF TO THE APU SHUTTING DOWN DURING HIS PREFLT, HE SAID THAT HE WAS LATER TOLD BY MAINT THAT THERE HAD BEEN A PROB WITH A SWITCH, IT HAVING TRIPPED THEREBY SHUTTING DOWN THE APU. THE MAINT MAN THOUGHT IT WAS A 'RESET SWITCH.' MAINT ALSO SAID THAT THERE WAS A PROB WITH A FAULTY BATTERY CHARGER. SINCE THEY DID NOT WANT ANY ELECTRICAL PROBS LATER, THE #4 ENG WAS STARTED AT THE GATE, THE ACFT PUSHED BACK AND THE REMAINING ENGS STARTED. THE APU WAS THEN SHUT DOWN. RPTR SAID THAT THE CAPT NORMALLY LOOKS AT THE SO'S PANEL FOR ANY LIGHTS, AS THE PANEL SHOULD BE UNLIT, WITH NO FUEL BOOST PUMP LIGHTS ON. IN THIS EVENT, THE CAPT LATER SAID THAT HE HAD FAILED TO DO THIS VISUAL SCAN AS THERE HAD BEEN CONSTRUCTION ON THE ARPT AND HE WAS TOO PREOCCUPIED IN TAXIING TO TURN AND CHK FOR THESE LIGHTS. THROUGH 3000 FT WITH THE FLAPS RETRACTED, THE SO WENT THROUGH HIS XFEED SET UP, INSURING XFEEDS OPEN, SHUTTING OFF MAIN TANK BOOST PUMPS #1 AND #4 TO FEED OUT OF TANKS #2 AND #3 TO ALL ENGS. HE HAD NOT, UP TO THIS POINT, NOTICED ANYTHING UNUSUAL. HE SAID THAT THE PANEL LIGHT SELECTOR SWITCH WAS IN THE 'BRIGHT' POS. THE ONLY CHANGE OR DIFFERENCE WITH THIS ACFT WAS THAT THE FUEL GAUGES WERE OF A NEWER TYPE, A DIGITAL RATHER THAN THE OLD 'ANALOG' TYPE. THE DIGITS WITHIN THESE GAUGES ARE AMBER COLORED, THE SAME COLOR AS THE BOOST PUMP LOW PRESSURE WARNING LIGHTS, AND WOULD PUT OUT A CERTAIN LEVEL OF LIGHT FROM THE PANEL. IT IS A 'DIFFERENT LOOK THAN IT USED TO BE.' AT HIS 10000 FT CLB CHK HE COMPLETED HIS CHKLISTS AND UPON TURNING BACK TO THE PANEL SAW ALL THESE BRIGHT WARNING LIGHTS ON, EXCEPT #2 AFT. HE SAYS HE COULD HAVE MISSED THEM BUT DOESN'T KNOW HOW. UPON RETURN TO THE GATE THE MAINT MAN MENTIONED THAT HE THOUGHT THAT THE LOWER 41 CIRCUIT BREAKERS WERE STILL OUT EXCEPT FOR THE #2 AFT BREAKER WHICH HAD POWERED THE PUMP FOR THE APU. IT WAS EXPLAINED THAT MAINT HAS A NEW PROC THAT THEY DO BEFORE DEP, HE THOUGHT IT WAS CHKING FOR RESISTANCE LEVELS IN THE BOOST PUMP CIRCUITS OR WIRING. THIS WAS A PROC HE HAD NOT HEARD OF BEFORE. WHEN ASKED DURING CALLBACK, HE DIDN'T KNOW IF PULLING THE LOWER 41 BREAKERS WOULD DEACTIVATE THE BOOST PUMP WARNING LIGHTS IN THE COCKPIT BUT DIDN'T THINK SO. HE SAYS THAT THE FAA KNOWS OF THIS INCIDENT, MOST LIKELY THROUGH A COMPANY SELF DISCLOSURE PROC.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.