Narrative:

During cruise flight at FL350, position N3907 W03820 the first officer and myself started to smell electrical smoke. We could not immediately determine its source. (The captain was on his break, in the passenger cabin.) I went to forward galley to ask cabin attendants if they smelled anything unusual. Told them to get captain. Back in cockpit the smell was worse. Donned oxygen masks. First officer and I completed electrical smoke and fire and smoke removal emergency checklists. Captain and I switched seats at that time and first officer started turn back to lajes, azores (lpla/ter). Original flight (mad-phl). I called santa maria oceanic control, declared an emergency, and advised our intentions. Contacted new york oceanic control for phone patch to company dispatch. Advised of situation. The cabin attendants were briefed of return. At that point smoke had dissipated, but smell was bad. Landed in lajes at XE30. No evacuate/evacuation required. Aircraft was inspected by local mechanic for a foreign air carrier. Appropriate inspections for ETOPS and overweight landing were performed. Due to duty time constraints by the time inspections were complete we overnighted. On nov/xx/97 we departed lpla for kphl at XA20. With everything that went on, we forgot to sign logbook for MEL follow-up action for inoperative right engine integrated drive generator. Follow-up action was completed, though, per MEL book. Remainder of flight completed without incident. Some human factor thoughts. This was my second in-flight diversion in just over 1 month for smoke in cockpit. Last time we were 50 mi from cyhz. Things happened fast. We were on the ground in 14 mins. This time it was just over 1 hour. It is very stressful with some denial thrown in. Some procedures are questioned or not completed in entirety (descent to 10000 ft on smoke removal checklist). It is just not as smooth as in the simulator. We never thought about the possibility of ditching except at one point when passing near the island of flores we asked about the airport there (4800 ft strip) 100 mi west of lajes. We would try that before putting it in the water. The lead cabin attendant never came up and went over his checklist (test) with captain. Emergency situation at unfamiliar airport, airport personnel not familiar with your operation makes for a long day. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information: the reporter was the international relief officer on a B767-200 flight from europe to phl when the flight crew detected an electrical odor and smoke in the cockpit. After a brief check to see if the galley could be the source, they donned oxygen masks and started through the smoke and fumes checklist without being able to find the source of the smoke. The captain had been notified and he had returned and the reporter said that the captain made an immediate decision to declare an emergency and to divert to the nearest suitable airport. The reporter was tasked with planning the divert and with plotting general courses to all available airports in the area. The lppo controller suggested diverting to laj and the flight crew used the FMS to navigation directly there. The reporter said that the support from ARTCC and the personnel at laj was excellent. He also used the FMS to plot and update courses to smaller airports and islands along the diversion route if, in case an actual fire started, they had to ditch or make a landing at an unsuitable airport. The reporter had recent practice in this exercise, he said, because he had diverted 1 month ago when a forward equipment cooling fan had failed and caused vibration and smoke in the aircraft. After landing, the maintenance technicians from a foreign flag carrier found a short in the electrical circuit to the radar and TCASII display. They were able to repair the circuit in a few hours, but the flight crew was by this time forced by duty time considerations to rest overnight. Incidentally, the aircraft was already operating under MEL provisions with the right engine integrated drive generator inoperative, but there were no parts available to repair that problem. The MEL actions to continue without the integrated drive generator were completed by the maintenance technicians, but the flight crew forgot to complete the signoffs in the logbook. The reporter was critical of thelead cabin attendant who, apparently, did not function very well during this emergency. He said that the flight crew was unable to get the lead to come to the cockpit or talk about their planning or checklist coordination.

Related reports:

Google
 

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A B767 ACR FLC HAD SMOKE IN THE COCKPIT AND AFTER GOING THROUGH THEIR CHKLIST AND DECLARING AN EMER TO LPPO THEY DIVERTED TO AN ALTERNATE ARPT. THE SMOKE WAS CAUSED BY AN ELECTRICAL SHORT IN THE RADAR DISPLAY IN THE COCKPIT.

Narrative: DURING CRUISE FLT AT FL350, POS N3907 W03820 THE FO AND MYSELF STARTED TO SMELL ELECTRICAL SMOKE. WE COULD NOT IMMEDIATELY DETERMINE ITS SOURCE. (THE CAPT WAS ON HIS BREAK, IN THE PAX CABIN.) I WENT TO FORWARD GALLEY TO ASK CABIN ATTENDANTS IF THEY SMELLED ANYTHING UNUSUAL. TOLD THEM TO GET CAPT. BACK IN COCKPIT THE SMELL WAS WORSE. DONNED OXYGEN MASKS. FO AND I COMPLETED ELECTRICAL SMOKE AND FIRE AND SMOKE REMOVAL EMER CHKLISTS. CAPT AND I SWITCHED SEATS AT THAT TIME AND FO STARTED TURN BACK TO LAJES, AZORES (LPLA/TER). ORIGINAL FLT (MAD-PHL). I CALLED SANTA MARIA OCEANIC CTL, DECLARED AN EMER, AND ADVISED OUR INTENTIONS. CONTACTED NEW YORK OCEANIC CTL FOR PHONE PATCH TO COMPANY DISPATCH. ADVISED OF SIT. THE CABIN ATTENDANTS WERE BRIEFED OF RETURN. AT THAT POINT SMOKE HAD DISSIPATED, BUT SMELL WAS BAD. LANDED IN LAJES AT XE30. NO EVAC REQUIRED. ACFT WAS INSPECTED BY LCL MECH FOR A FOREIGN ACR. APPROPRIATE INSPECTIONS FOR ETOPS AND OVERWT LNDG WERE PERFORMED. DUE TO DUTY TIME CONSTRAINTS BY THE TIME INSPECTIONS WERE COMPLETE WE OVERNIGHTED. ON NOV/XX/97 WE DEPARTED LPLA FOR KPHL AT XA20. WITH EVERYTHING THAT WENT ON, WE FORGOT TO SIGN LOGBOOK FOR MEL FOLLOW-UP ACTION FOR INOP R ENG INTEGRATED DRIVE GENERATOR. FOLLOW-UP ACTION WAS COMPLETED, THOUGH, PER MEL BOOK. REMAINDER OF FLT COMPLETED WITHOUT INCIDENT. SOME HUMAN FACTOR THOUGHTS. THIS WAS MY SECOND INFLT DIVERSION IN JUST OVER 1 MONTH FOR SMOKE IN COCKPIT. LAST TIME WE WERE 50 MI FROM CYHZ. THINGS HAPPENED FAST. WE WERE ON THE GND IN 14 MINS. THIS TIME IT WAS JUST OVER 1 HR. IT IS VERY STRESSFUL WITH SOME DENIAL THROWN IN. SOME PROCS ARE QUESTIONED OR NOT COMPLETED IN ENTIRETY (DSCNT TO 10000 FT ON SMOKE REMOVAL CHKLIST). IT IS JUST NOT AS SMOOTH AS IN THE SIMULATOR. WE NEVER THOUGHT ABOUT THE POSSIBILITY OF DITCHING EXCEPT AT ONE POINT WHEN PASSING NEAR THE ISLAND OF FLORES WE ASKED ABOUT THE ARPT THERE (4800 FT STRIP) 100 MI W OF LAJES. WE WOULD TRY THAT BEFORE PUTTING IT IN THE WATER. THE LEAD CABIN ATTENDANT NEVER CAME UP AND WENT OVER HIS CHKLIST (TEST) WITH CAPT. EMER SIT AT UNFAMILIAR ARPT, ARPT PERSONNEL NOT FAMILIAR WITH YOUR OP MAKES FOR A LONG DAY. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: THE RPTR WAS THE INTL RELIEF OFFICER ON A B767-200 FLT FROM EUROPE TO PHL WHEN THE FLC DETECTED AN ELECTRICAL ODOR AND SMOKE IN THE COCKPIT. AFTER A BRIEF CHK TO SEE IF THE GALLEY COULD BE THE SOURCE, THEY DONNED OXYGEN MASKS AND STARTED THROUGH THE SMOKE AND FUMES CHKLIST WITHOUT BEING ABLE TO FIND THE SOURCE OF THE SMOKE. THE CAPT HAD BEEN NOTIFIED AND HE HAD RETURNED AND THE RPTR SAID THAT THE CAPT MADE AN IMMEDIATE DECISION TO DECLARE AN EMER AND TO DIVERT TO THE NEAREST SUITABLE ARPT. THE RPTR WAS TASKED WITH PLANNING THE DIVERT AND WITH PLOTTING GENERAL COURSES TO ALL AVAILABLE ARPTS IN THE AREA. THE LPPO CTLR SUGGESTED DIVERTING TO LAJ AND THE FLC USED THE FMS TO NAV DIRECTLY THERE. THE RPTR SAID THAT THE SUPPORT FROM ARTCC AND THE PERSONNEL AT LAJ WAS EXCELLENT. HE ALSO USED THE FMS TO PLOT AND UPDATE COURSES TO SMALLER ARPTS AND ISLANDS ALONG THE DIVERSION RTE IF, IN CASE AN ACTUAL FIRE STARTED, THEY HAD TO DITCH OR MAKE A LNDG AT AN UNSUITABLE ARPT. THE RPTR HAD RECENT PRACTICE IN THIS EXERCISE, HE SAID, BECAUSE HE HAD DIVERTED 1 MONTH AGO WHEN A FORWARD EQUIP COOLING FAN HAD FAILED AND CAUSED VIBRATION AND SMOKE IN THE ACFT. AFTER LNDG, THE MAINT TECHNICIANS FROM A FOREIGN FLAG CARRIER FOUND A SHORT IN THE ELECTRICAL CIRCUIT TO THE RADAR AND TCASII DISPLAY. THEY WERE ABLE TO REPAIR THE CIRCUIT IN A FEW HRS, BUT THE FLC WAS BY THIS TIME FORCED BY DUTY TIME CONSIDERATIONS TO REST OVERNIGHT. INCIDENTALLY, THE ACFT WAS ALREADY OPERATING UNDER MEL PROVISIONS WITH THE R ENG INTEGRATED DRIVE GENERATOR INOP, BUT THERE WERE NO PARTS AVAILABLE TO REPAIR THAT PROB. THE MEL ACTIONS TO CONTINUE WITHOUT THE INTEGRATED DRIVE GENERATOR WERE COMPLETED BY THE MAINT TECHNICIANS, BUT THE FLC FORGOT TO COMPLETE THE SIGNOFFS IN THE LOGBOOK. THE RPTR WAS CRITICAL OF THELEAD CABIN ATTENDANT WHO, APPARENTLY, DID NOT FUNCTION VERY WELL DURING THIS EMER. HE SAID THAT THE FLC WAS UNABLE TO GET THE LEAD TO COME TO THE COCKPIT OR TALK ABOUT THEIR PLANNING OR CHKLIST COORD.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.