Narrative:

We were on a regularly scheduled air carrier passenger flight from ord to atl. The flight was an IOE flight for me, conducted as part of my initial captain qualification on this aircraft and with a part 121 air carrier. A company line check airman (lca) was acting as my first officer. For training/evaluation purposes, he opted to have me fly the entire flight without autoplt, and once established in cruise at FL330, the autothrottles were disconnected for the balance of the flight. On the radar downwind for an ILS to runway 26R at atlanta, following a 'rome nine arrival' (bwg.RMG9), the lca disconnected my flight director. This resulted in a manual, raw data flight situation. Approach control gave us a right turn to a heading of 180 degrees for a base leg, with a descent to 4000 ft. This base leg would have intercepted the ILS runway 26R localizer just inside of 'freal' at approximately 12 DME/atl. This heading was soon modified to 240 degrees and then 250 degrees to join the localizer at 4000 ft and clearance for the ILS runway 26R. We were also instructed to contact the tower at that time. At 4000 ft, prior to being on the localizer course (I had overshot the intercept heading) I began to descend on the GS. At this time, the line check airman (first officer) was looking up the tower frequency. He looked up to notice my premature descent and heading overshoot and advised me to correct back to 4000 ft until on the localizer. The tower controller, noting our position, asked whether we had a problem and whether we had the airport in sight. The line check airman replied that there was no problem but that there was training in progress and that we had the field in sight. The tower controller then cleared us for a visual approach to runway 26R. In the premature descent, I noticed a minimal altitude of 3650- 3700 ft MSL, approximately 15 degrees north of the localizer course at about 10-12 DME/atl. The approach was fully stabilized by 2000 ft MSL (1000 ft AGL). From that point, we completed an uneventful visual approach and landing on runway 26R. Human performance: I was well aware of the restr and procedural requirements to maintain 4000 ft until established on the localizer course. I allowed myself to become fixated on the GS indicator, subduing my awareness of localizer proximity. That fixation also played a part in my overshooting the assigned intercept heading and detailed situational awareness. Contributing factors: for the past 5 yrs, I have been a first officer on B75/767/777 aircraft, flying almost exclusively trans-atlantic operations with augmented crews. Legs were infrequent (2 or 3 per month on average). Manual/raw data only operations were limited since the use of autoflt is preferred in the operation of these aircraft (as well as the A320). As a result, I have found that my manual/raw data flying skills have deteriorated somewhat. They are coming back but they obviously still need improvement.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: AN A320 CAPT IN TRAINING DSNDS ON GS BELOW THE AUTH ALT WHILE OFF THE LOC COURSE. THE CHK PLT HAD INSISTED ON THE TRAINEE USING ONLY RAW DATA FOR THE APCH AND THE TRAINEE OVERSHOT THE TURN TO INTERCEPT THE ILS. TWR CTLR GAVE THE FLT A VISUAL APCH CLRNC.

Narrative: WE WERE ON A REGULARLY SCHEDULED ACR PAX FLT FROM ORD TO ATL. THE FLT WAS AN IOE FLT FOR ME, CONDUCTED AS PART OF MY INITIAL CAPT QUALIFICATION ON THIS ACFT AND WITH A PART 121 ACR. A COMPANY LINE CHK AIRMAN (LCA) WAS ACTING AS MY FO. FOR TRAINING/EVALUATION PURPOSES, HE OPTED TO HAVE ME FLY THE ENTIRE FLT WITHOUT AUTOPLT, AND ONCE ESTABLISHED IN CRUISE AT FL330, THE AUTOTHROTTLES WERE DISCONNECTED FOR THE BAL OF THE FLT. ON THE RADAR DOWNWIND FOR AN ILS TO RWY 26R AT ATLANTA, FOLLOWING A 'ROME NINE ARR' (BWG.RMG9), THE LCA DISCONNECTED MY FLT DIRECTOR. THIS RESULTED IN A MANUAL, RAW DATA FLT SIT. APCH CTL GAVE US A R TURN TO A HDG OF 180 DEGS FOR A BASE LEG, WITH A DSCNT TO 4000 FT. THIS BASE LEG WOULD HAVE INTERCEPTED THE ILS RWY 26R LOC JUST INSIDE OF 'FREAL' AT APPROX 12 DME/ATL. THIS HEADING WAS SOON MODIFIED TO 240 DEGS AND THEN 250 DEGS TO JOIN THE LOC AT 4000 FT AND CLRNC FOR THE ILS RWY 26R. WE WERE ALSO INSTRUCTED TO CONTACT THE TWR AT THAT TIME. AT 4000 FT, PRIOR TO BEING ON THE LOC COURSE (I HAD OVERSHOT THE INTERCEPT HEADING) I BEGAN TO DSND ON THE GS. AT THIS TIME, THE LINE CHK AIRMAN (FO) WAS LOOKING UP THE TWR FREQ. HE LOOKED UP TO NOTICE MY PREMATURE DSCNT AND HEADING OVERSHOOT AND ADVISED ME TO CORRECT BACK TO 4000 FT UNTIL ON THE LOC. THE TWR CTLR, NOTING OUR POS, ASKED WHETHER WE HAD A PROB AND WHETHER WE HAD THE ARPT IN SIGHT. THE LINE CHK AIRMAN REPLIED THAT THERE WAS NO PROB BUT THAT THERE WAS TRAINING IN PROGRESS AND THAT WE HAD THE FIELD IN SIGHT. THE TWR CTLR THEN CLRED US FOR A VISUAL APCH TO RWY 26R. IN THE PREMATURE DSCNT, I NOTICED A MINIMAL ALT OF 3650- 3700 FT MSL, APPROX 15 DEGS N OF THE LOC COURSE AT ABOUT 10-12 DME/ATL. THE APCH WAS FULLY STABILIZED BY 2000 FT MSL (1000 FT AGL). FROM THAT POINT, WE COMPLETED AN UNEVENTFUL VISUAL APCH AND LNDG ON RWY 26R. HUMAN PERFORMANCE: I WAS WELL AWARE OF THE RESTR AND PROCEDURAL REQUIREMENTS TO MAINTAIN 4000 FT UNTIL ESTABLISHED ON THE LOC COURSE. I ALLOWED MYSELF TO BECOME FIXATED ON THE GS INDICATOR, SUBDUING MY AWARENESS OF LOC PROX. THAT FIXATION ALSO PLAYED A PART IN MY OVERSHOOTING THE ASSIGNED INTERCEPT HEADING AND DETAILED SITUATIONAL AWARENESS. CONTRIBUTING FACTORS: FOR THE PAST 5 YRS, I HAVE BEEN A FO ON B75/767/777 ACFT, FLYING ALMOST EXCLUSIVELY TRANS-ATLANTIC OPS WITH AUGMENTED CREWS. LEGS WERE INFREQUENT (2 OR 3 PER MONTH ON AVERAGE). MANUAL/RAW DATA ONLY OPS WERE LIMITED SINCE THE USE OF AUTOFLT IS PREFERRED IN THE OP OF THESE ACFT (AS WELL AS THE A320). AS A RESULT, I HAVE FOUND THAT MY MANUAL/RAW DATA FLYING SKILLS HAVE DETERIORATED SOMEWHAT. THEY ARE COMING BACK BUT THEY OBVIOUSLY STILL NEED IMPROVEMENT.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.