Narrative:

We were on a short flight clt to gso. Our descent and approach to the airport was in direct line with our route of flight. At 20 NM from gso VOR we were at 6000 ft MSL and requested lower. At 18 NM we were cleared to 3000 flight MSL and given a vector to intercept the localizer for the ILS runway 5 approach. The glideslope was out of service. As we descended and configured the aircraft, we planned for and briefed the localizer approach profiles. We later realized we neglected to discuss how we would identify the FAF. We asked for our distance from the FAF. Were told we were '3 NM from the marker.' we switched controllers and were given an additional vector to intercept the localizer. The controller then said 'maintain 2800 ft until the localizer, cleared the ILS runway 5 approach, GS out of service.' both of us felt we would intercept at the FAF. The #2 navigation was tuned to the localizer and the #1 navigation was tuned to the gso VOR. At localizer intercept the gso DME read 3.5 to 4 NM. I cross checked the distance from the FAF to the end of runway on my approach chart and saw it was 5.5 NM. I was confused and thought I was 2 NM inside the FAF and had gotten behind on the approach. As the localizer centered I began the descent to MDA. As we passed through 2200 ft MSL I observed the OM tone and light and realized I had started down early. I continued the approach, leveled at MDA of 1300 ft MSL and landed with no further problems. Contributing factors: 1) we were very familiar with this airport and approach. Also that this flight profile tends to let the pilots get in a hurry. The WX was marginal, but we felt very confident we would see the airport. We discussed the approach and the localizer only profiles but still missed the approach timing and how we would identify the FAF. This was the root of the problem. 2) we were aware that we were close to the airport and high on altitude. Also that our approach would be a straight-in approach. This caused us to get in a hurry. Descending, configuring the aircraft, running the checklist, briefing the approach, and talking to controllers all takes time. We started this rpocess about 20 NM from the runway and missed briefing items due to our rush. 3) almost every airport we serve has an ILS approach. We fly ILS approachs almost exclusively. The controllers issue ILS approach clrncs more than any other. The clearance we received sounded just like an ILS approach clearance. ATC said 'maintain 2800 ft until the localizer, cleared the ILS runway 5 approach, GS out of service.' this verbiage reinforces the ILS approach profiles which allows descent below vector altitudes once on the localizer. 4) while writing this report I went back and studied the approach chart. I discovered a small note that gave the distance and radial from the gso VOR to the FAF. It was located in an area that I normally overlook since it is not a primart part of the approach. Had this note been given more prominence or better associated with the FAF, I would have had an exact location for the FAF. A location based on localizer/DME or a close VOR radial and DME is far superior to this situation which is a crossing radial from a VOR 22 NM away.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A B737-200 FLYING A NON PRECISION APCH AT GSO DSNDS TOO EARLY. FLC DISCOVERS WHAT MISLEADS THEM DURING THE APCH TO DSND EARLY.

Narrative: WE WERE ON A SHORT FLT CLT TO GSO. OUR DSCNT AND APCH TO THE ARPT WAS IN DIRECT LINE WITH OUR RTE OF FLT. AT 20 NM FROM GSO VOR WE WERE AT 6000 FT MSL AND REQUESTED LOWER. AT 18 NM WE WERE CLRED TO 3000 FLT MSL AND GIVEN A VECTOR TO INTERCEPT THE LOC FOR THE ILS RWY 5 APCH. THE GLIDESLOPE WAS OUT OF SERVICE. AS WE DSNDED AND CONFIGURED THE ACFT, WE PLANNED FOR AND BRIEFED THE LOC APCH PROFILES. WE LATER REALIZED WE NEGLECTED TO DISCUSS HOW WE WOULD IDENT THE FAF. WE ASKED FOR OUR DISTANCE FROM THE FAF. WERE TOLD WE WERE '3 NM FROM THE MARKER.' WE SWITCHED CTLRS AND WERE GIVEN AN ADDITIONAL VECTOR TO INTERCEPT THE LOCALIZER. THE CTLR THEN SAID 'MAINTAIN 2800 FT UNTIL THE LOCALIZER, CLRED THE ILS RWY 5 APCH, GS OUT OF SERVICE.' BOTH OF US FELT WE WOULD INTERCEPT AT THE FAF. THE #2 NAV WAS TUNED TO THE LOCALIZER AND THE #1 NAV WAS TUNED TO THE GSO VOR. AT LOC INTERCEPT THE GSO DME READ 3.5 TO 4 NM. I CROSS CHKED THE DISTANCE FROM THE FAF TO THE END OF RWY ON MY APCH CHART AND SAW IT WAS 5.5 NM. I WAS CONFUSED AND THOUGHT I WAS 2 NM INSIDE THE FAF AND HAD GOTTEN BEHIND ON THE APCH. AS THE LOC CTRED I BEGAN THE DSCNT TO MDA. AS WE PASSED THROUGH 2200 FT MSL I OBSERVED THE OM TONE AND LIGHT AND REALIZED I HAD STARTED DOWN EARLY. I CONTINUED THE APCH, LEVELED AT MDA OF 1300 FT MSL AND LANDED WITH NO FURTHER PROBS. CONTRIBUTING FACTORS: 1) WE WERE VERY FAMILIAR WITH THIS ARPT AND APCH. ALSO THAT THIS FLT PROFILE TENDS TO LET THE PLTS GET IN A HURRY. THE WX WAS MARGINAL, BUT WE FELT VERY CONFIDENT WE WOULD SEE THE ARPT. WE DISCUSSED THE APCH AND THE LOC ONLY PROFILES BUT STILL MISSED THE APCH TIMING AND HOW WE WOULD IDENT THE FAF. THIS WAS THE ROOT OF THE PROB. 2) WE WERE AWARE THAT WE WERE CLOSE TO THE ARPT AND HIGH ON ALT. ALSO THAT OUR APCH WOULD BE A STRAIGHT-IN APCH. THIS CAUSED US TO GET IN A HURRY. DSNDING, CONFIGURING THE ACFT, RUNNING THE CHKLIST, BRIEFING THE APCH, AND TALKING TO CTLRS ALL TAKES TIME. WE STARTED THIS RPOCESS ABOUT 20 NM FROM THE RWY AND MISSED BRIEFING ITEMS DUE TO OUR RUSH. 3) ALMOST EVERY ARPT WE SERVE HAS AN ILS APCH. WE FLY ILS APCHS ALMOST EXCLUSIVELY. THE CTLRS ISSUE ILS APCH CLRNCS MORE THAN ANY OTHER. THE CLRNC WE RECEIVED SOUNDED JUST LIKE AN ILS APCH CLRNC. ATC SAID 'MAINTAIN 2800 FT UNTIL THE LOC, CLRED THE ILS RWY 5 APCH, GS OUT OF SERVICE.' THIS VERBIAGE REINFORCES THE ILS APCH PROFILES WHICH ALLOWS DSCNT BELOW VECTOR ALTS ONCE ON THE LOC. 4) WHILE WRITING THIS RPT I WENT BACK AND STUDIED THE APCH CHART. I DISCOVERED A SMALL NOTE THAT GAVE THE DISTANCE AND RADIAL FROM THE GSO VOR TO THE FAF. IT WAS LOCATED IN AN AREA THAT I NORMALLY OVERLOOK SINCE IT IS NOT A PRIMART PART OF THE APCH. HAD THIS NOTE BEEN GIVEN MORE PROMINENCE OR BETTER ASSOCIATED WITH THE FAF, I WOULD HAVE HAD AN EXACT LOCATION FOR THE FAF. A LOCATION BASED ON LOC/DME OR A CLOSE VOR RADIAL AND DME IS FAR SUPERIOR TO THIS SITUATION WHICH IS A CROSSING RADIAL FROM A VOR 22 NM AWAY.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.