Narrative:

When flying home from a vacation wkend, I believe that I inadvertently entered the sfo class B airspace without a clearance, and I landed more than 1 hour after airport closure. Outlook briefings and a standard briefing from FSS before departure established that a cold front was coming in and was expected to pass my departure airport at XH00. Ceilings were expected to be plenty high for a safe passage of some nearby mountains until after XD00. Good VFR was expected for the entire flight, with a possibility of scattered clouds 1000-3000 ft in the san francisco bay area. Should we miss this window, I was told it could be 3 days before we would be able to return VFR to my home base. Weight and balance dictated that I not carry full fuel on board, so I filled the plane to 55 gallons or an estimated 4 hours of fuel. I checked weight and balance, and we were well balanced and near but below maximum gross takeoff weight. The no-wind flight plan prepared when planning the trip a few days in advance showed a 2 hour 7 min estimated time en route. The briefing included both headwinds and tailwinds for my route of flight, and I did not complete a detailed plan with an updated ete. The primary purpose of our vacation was to attend events which would finish before XA00 allowing me to expect an XA45 departure. I was told by FSS that airport closure was XD30, meaning that I had sufficient time to complete my flight before airport closure. (While I have many hours of night flying experience, it had been more than 90 days since I had made 3 night lndgs.) we arrived at the airport about XA20. The plane had previously been made for fuel and tie-down fees, so all we needed to do was load, preflight, and go. Except, a friend discovered that he left behind at our lodgings a piece of paper required for professional certification. He insisted on returning to the room to search for it. He returned a few mins after XB00. While waiting, I was watching the clouds getting lower, but still above 8000 ft, I'm sure. XB15 we were airborne. Our airspeed was fine, but our ground speed seemed very low for the first half of the flight, as low as 95 KTS at times. We had very strong headwinds, probably a local phenomenon of funneling winds between the mountains. Approaching the bay area, the coastal stratus was closing in. While palo alto was VFR, occasional scattered clouds at 3000 ft, oakland was overcast. Because of concern about the overcast, I asked ZOA to arrange a class B clearance and I was told to expect a clearance past the sgd VOR. I was cruising at 5500 ft MSL. While flipping frequencys to check the WX, I inadvertently dialed ZOA out of my communication, and had to call FSS to learn the frequency. This distraction me as I was approaching sgd. Further adding to my concern, the fuel gauges were beginning to bounce around below the quarter tank marks. The other factor detracting from my comfort with the fuel situation was that our club policy is to lean to 100 degrees rich of peak egt, which is slightly richer than the recommended mixture in the manual. So, was I burning a little more than the 14 gph I used for planning? Probably not, but I do not know. Yrs ago, I once landed this same rented aircraft 30 mins shy of my destination with the gauges reading about 1/8 tank, even though my calculations showed that I should have had almost 1 1/2 hours of gas. Filling the tanks, I learned that I indeed had more than 1 hour of gas. Thus, I had some reason to believe that I should be able to land at pao with 1 hour of fuel in the tanks. Still, seeing the needles getting low, with clouds below caused great concern. I checked pao WX frequently. A short distance before entering the class B airspace, I was called by bay approach and told to descend at my discretion to remain clear of the class B. Because of the distrs of the frequency fumble, fuel worries, and cloud worries, and as I had been expecting a class B clearance, I was not mentally prepared, and studied my chart for perhaps 2 mins to figure out my altitude requirements to remain clear of the class B airspace. I decided that I was ok until the 15 sfo DME and began a descent. At about 19 DME from sfo, I called center to request a clearance because of concern with the clouds below, and was told that I was in the class B airspace. I had misread the chart, for my altitude 20 NM was the edge of the class B. After promptly turning away from sfo, I departed the class B airspace and then descended towards oak, as I drew near to the 3000 ft MSL, the floor of the class B ahead, I realized and communicated that the overcast below would prevent me from going below the floor of the class B. I was cleared into the class B airspace. (Thank you, ATC.) while this was going on, stress was interfering with my thinking. I tried to reply to ATC without keying the microphone, and ATC told me that I had 'stuck microphone' once. I assume I was unintentionally keying the microphone switch on the yoke. When I was vectored away from pao and some traffic, I told ATC that I was concerned about fuel, giving the deteriorating conditions, and that I would need to either proceed directly to pao, or else I would need to head directly to some other VFR airport. From this point on, ATC was most helpful, probably because they correctly assessed that I was not performing very well as a pilot. Pao was crystal clear with winds right down the runway, and I learned that I can make a smooth, full-stall landing while being extremely tense. When calling to close my flight plan, I noticed that I was late. Factors and errors in the chain of events: 1) I was unduly fixated on getting home because of a long potential delay from the WX. 2) under the circumstances, 4 hours of fuel for an estimated 2 hour 7 min flight was not enough for comfort. 3) while the headwinds were stronger than forecast, if I had recalculated my ete, I would have rethought my safety margin for the flight, and my ability to land before XD30. 4) the combination of worries about clouds below, low fuel gauge readings even though there was adequate fuel aboard given calculations and experience, and that some additional flying would be required if pao was fogged in, that traffic and ATC could increase the time required to get to paoand see that it is VFR, and anger with myself for, after 14 yrs of flying out of pao, busting the class B airspace, all combined to make me quite tense. I exhibited a pronounced lack of flexibility in my thinking. I could have landed in the central valley. I could have circled immediately when I was not offered a class B clearance. I could have flown around to the east of oak. I could have sooner explained my situation to ATC and asked for vectors and a reasonable altitude. As for prevention, I should not embark upon a flight when there is any risk of not comfortably landing on time if I am not current at night. I should check out in and fly a C206 when flying 4 adults to oregon, so I can carry even more fuel. This flight would have been trivial under IFR. I should become IFR rated. I understand that ATC for good reason may tell me to expect a clearance and then not deliver it. I should always be prepared for that to happen. If I ever have my own airplane, I should invest in a more accurate and capable fuel quantity and usage system than the standard cessna fuel gauges. Lastly, and most important, if I find myself getting even a little worried about a flight, I should land.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A C182 PLT, WHO IS NOT NIGHT CURRENT, ENTERS CLASS B AIRSPACE WITHOUT AUTH AND THEN LANDS AFTER OFFICIAL ARPT CLOSURE. THE RPTR ALSO ADMITS THAT HE DID NOT UPDATE HIS ETE OR PROPERLY COMPUTE HIS FUEL REQUIRED.

Narrative: WHEN FLYING HOME FROM A VACATION WKEND, I BELIEVE THAT I INADVERTENTLY ENTERED THE SFO CLASS B AIRSPACE WITHOUT A CLRNC, AND I LANDED MORE THAN 1 HR AFTER ARPT CLOSURE. OUTLOOK BRIEFINGS AND A STANDARD BRIEFING FROM FSS BEFORE DEP ESTABLISHED THAT A COLD FRONT WAS COMING IN AND WAS EXPECTED TO PASS MY DEP ARPT AT XH00. CEILINGS WERE EXPECTED TO BE PLENTY HIGH FOR A SAFE PASSAGE OF SOME NEARBY MOUNTAINS UNTIL AFTER XD00. GOOD VFR WAS EXPECTED FOR THE ENTIRE FLT, WITH A POSSIBILITY OF SCATTERED CLOUDS 1000-3000 FT IN THE SAN FRANCISCO BAY AREA. SHOULD WE MISS THIS WINDOW, I WAS TOLD IT COULD BE 3 DAYS BEFORE WE WOULD BE ABLE TO RETURN VFR TO MY HOME BASE. WT AND BAL DICTATED THAT I NOT CARRY FULL FUEL ON BOARD, SO I FILLED THE PLANE TO 55 GALLONS OR AN ESTIMATED 4 HRS OF FUEL. I CHKED WT AND BAL, AND WE WERE WELL BALANCED AND NEAR BUT BELOW MAX GROSS TKOF WT. THE NO-WIND FLT PLAN PREPARED WHEN PLANNING THE TRIP A FEW DAYS IN ADVANCE SHOWED A 2 HR 7 MIN ESTIMATED TIME ENRTE. THE BRIEFING INCLUDED BOTH HEADWINDS AND TAILWINDS FOR MY RTE OF FLT, AND I DID NOT COMPLETE A DETAILED PLAN WITH AN UPDATED ETE. THE PRIMARY PURPOSE OF OUR VACATION WAS TO ATTEND EVENTS WHICH WOULD FINISH BEFORE XA00 ALLOWING ME TO EXPECT AN XA45 DEP. I WAS TOLD BY FSS THAT ARPT CLOSURE WAS XD30, MEANING THAT I HAD SUFFICIENT TIME TO COMPLETE MY FLT BEFORE ARPT CLOSURE. (WHILE I HAVE MANY HRS OF NIGHT FLYING EXPERIENCE, IT HAD BEEN MORE THAN 90 DAYS SINCE I HAD MADE 3 NIGHT LNDGS.) WE ARRIVED AT THE ARPT ABOUT XA20. THE PLANE HAD PREVIOUSLY BEEN MADE FOR FUEL AND TIE-DOWN FEES, SO ALL WE NEEDED TO DO WAS LOAD, PREFLT, AND GO. EXCEPT, A FRIEND DISCOVERED THAT HE LEFT BEHIND AT OUR LODGINGS A PIECE OF PAPER REQUIRED FOR PROFESSIONAL CERTIFICATION. HE INSISTED ON RETURNING TO THE ROOM TO SEARCH FOR IT. HE RETURNED A FEW MINS AFTER XB00. WHILE WAITING, I WAS WATCHING THE CLOUDS GETTING LOWER, BUT STILL ABOVE 8000 FT, I'M SURE. XB15 WE WERE AIRBORNE. OUR AIRSPD WAS FINE, BUT OUR GND SPD SEEMED VERY LOW FOR THE FIRST HALF OF THE FLT, AS LOW AS 95 KTS AT TIMES. WE HAD VERY STRONG HEADWINDS, PROBABLY A LCL PHENOMENON OF FUNNELING WINDS BTWN THE MOUNTAINS. APCHING THE BAY AREA, THE COASTAL STRATUS WAS CLOSING IN. WHILE PALO ALTO WAS VFR, OCCASIONAL SCATTERED CLOUDS AT 3000 FT, OAKLAND WAS OVCST. BECAUSE OF CONCERN ABOUT THE OVCST, I ASKED ZOA TO ARRANGE A CLASS B CLRNC AND I WAS TOLD TO EXPECT A CLRNC PAST THE SGD VOR. I WAS CRUISING AT 5500 FT MSL. WHILE FLIPPING FREQS TO CHK THE WX, I INADVERTENTLY DIALED ZOA OUT OF MY COM, AND HAD TO CALL FSS TO LEARN THE FREQ. THIS DISTR ME AS I WAS APCHING SGD. FURTHER ADDING TO MY CONCERN, THE FUEL GAUGES WERE BEGINNING TO BOUNCE AROUND BELOW THE QUARTER TANK MARKS. THE OTHER FACTOR DETRACTING FROM MY COMFORT WITH THE FUEL SIT WAS THAT OUR CLUB POLICY IS TO LEAN TO 100 DEGS RICH OF PEAK EGT, WHICH IS SLIGHTLY RICHER THAN THE RECOMMENDED MIXTURE IN THE MANUAL. SO, WAS I BURNING A LITTLE MORE THAN THE 14 GPH I USED FOR PLANNING? PROBABLY NOT, BUT I DO NOT KNOW. YRS AGO, I ONCE LANDED THIS SAME RENTED ACFT 30 MINS SHY OF MY DEST WITH THE GAUGES READING ABOUT 1/8 TANK, EVEN THOUGH MY CALCULATIONS SHOWED THAT I SHOULD HAVE HAD ALMOST 1 1/2 HRS OF GAS. FILLING THE TANKS, I LEARNED THAT I INDEED HAD MORE THAN 1 HR OF GAS. THUS, I HAD SOME REASON TO BELIEVE THAT I SHOULD BE ABLE TO LAND AT PAO WITH 1 HR OF FUEL IN THE TANKS. STILL, SEEING THE NEEDLES GETTING LOW, WITH CLOUDS BELOW CAUSED GREAT CONCERN. I CHKED PAO WX FREQUENTLY. A SHORT DISTANCE BEFORE ENTERING THE CLASS B AIRSPACE, I WAS CALLED BY BAY APCH AND TOLD TO DSND AT MY DISCRETION TO REMAIN CLR OF THE CLASS B. BECAUSE OF THE DISTRS OF THE FREQ FUMBLE, FUEL WORRIES, AND CLOUD WORRIES, AND AS I HAD BEEN EXPECTING A CLASS B CLRNC, I WAS NOT MENTALLY PREPARED, AND STUDIED MY CHART FOR PERHAPS 2 MINS TO FIGURE OUT MY ALT REQUIREMENTS TO REMAIN CLR OF THE CLASS B AIRSPACE. I DECIDED THAT I WAS OK UNTIL THE 15 SFO DME AND BEGAN A DSCNT. AT ABOUT 19 DME FROM SFO, I CALLED CTR TO REQUEST A CLRNC BECAUSE OF CONCERN WITH THE CLOUDS BELOW, AND WAS TOLD THAT I WAS IN THE CLASS B AIRSPACE. I HAD MISREAD THE CHART, FOR MY ALT 20 NM WAS THE EDGE OF THE CLASS B. AFTER PROMPTLY TURNING AWAY FROM SFO, I DEPARTED THE CLASS B AIRSPACE AND THEN DSNDED TOWARDS OAK, AS I DREW NEAR TO THE 3000 FT MSL, THE FLOOR OF THE CLASS B AHEAD, I REALIZED AND COMMUNICATED THAT THE OVCST BELOW WOULD PREVENT ME FROM GOING BELOW THE FLOOR OF THE CLASS B. I WAS CLRED INTO THE CLASS B AIRSPACE. (THANK YOU, ATC.) WHILE THIS WAS GOING ON, STRESS WAS INTERFERING WITH MY THINKING. I TRIED TO REPLY TO ATC WITHOUT KEYING THE MIKE, AND ATC TOLD ME THAT I HAD 'STUCK MIKE' ONCE. I ASSUME I WAS UNINTENTIONALLY KEYING THE MIKE SWITCH ON THE YOKE. WHEN I WAS VECTORED AWAY FROM PAO AND SOME TFC, I TOLD ATC THAT I WAS CONCERNED ABOUT FUEL, GIVING THE DETERIORATING CONDITIONS, AND THAT I WOULD NEED TO EITHER PROCEED DIRECTLY TO PAO, OR ELSE I WOULD NEED TO HEAD DIRECTLY TO SOME OTHER VFR ARPT. FROM THIS POINT ON, ATC WAS MOST HELPFUL, PROBABLY BECAUSE THEY CORRECTLY ASSESSED THAT I WAS NOT PERFORMING VERY WELL AS A PLT. PAO WAS CRYSTAL CLR WITH WINDS RIGHT DOWN THE RWY, AND I LEARNED THAT I CAN MAKE A SMOOTH, FULL-STALL LNDG WHILE BEING EXTREMELY TENSE. WHEN CALLING TO CLOSE MY FLT PLAN, I NOTICED THAT I WAS LATE. FACTORS AND ERRORS IN THE CHAIN OF EVENTS: 1) I WAS UNDULY FIXATED ON GETTING HOME BECAUSE OF A LONG POTENTIAL DELAY FROM THE WX. 2) UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES, 4 HRS OF FUEL FOR AN ESTIMATED 2 HR 7 MIN FLT WAS NOT ENOUGH FOR COMFORT. 3) WHILE THE HEADWINDS WERE STRONGER THAN FORECAST, IF I HAD RECALCULATED MY ETE, I WOULD HAVE RETHOUGHT MY SAFETY MARGIN FOR THE FLT, AND MY ABILITY TO LAND BEFORE XD30. 4) THE COMBINATION OF WORRIES ABOUT CLOUDS BELOW, LOW FUEL GAUGE READINGS EVEN THOUGH THERE WAS ADEQUATE FUEL ABOARD GIVEN CALCULATIONS AND EXPERIENCE, AND THAT SOME ADDITIONAL FLYING WOULD BE REQUIRED IF PAO WAS FOGGED IN, THAT TFC AND ATC COULD INCREASE THE TIME REQUIRED TO GET TO PAOAND SEE THAT IT IS VFR, AND ANGER WITH MYSELF FOR, AFTER 14 YRS OF FLYING OUT OF PAO, BUSTING THE CLASS B AIRSPACE, ALL COMBINED TO MAKE ME QUITE TENSE. I EXHIBITED A PRONOUNCED LACK OF FLEXIBILITY IN MY THINKING. I COULD HAVE LANDED IN THE CENTRAL VALLEY. I COULD HAVE CIRCLED IMMEDIATELY WHEN I WAS NOT OFFERED A CLASS B CLRNC. I COULD HAVE FLOWN AROUND TO THE E OF OAK. I COULD HAVE SOONER EXPLAINED MY SIT TO ATC AND ASKED FOR VECTORS AND A REASONABLE ALT. AS FOR PREVENTION, I SHOULD NOT EMBARK UPON A FLT WHEN THERE IS ANY RISK OF NOT COMFORTABLY LNDG ON TIME IF I AM NOT CURRENT AT NIGHT. I SHOULD CHK OUT IN AND FLY A C206 WHEN FLYING 4 ADULTS TO OREGON, SO I CAN CARRY EVEN MORE FUEL. THIS FLT WOULD HAVE BEEN TRIVIAL UNDER IFR. I SHOULD BECOME IFR RATED. I UNDERSTAND THAT ATC FOR GOOD REASON MAY TELL ME TO EXPECT A CLRNC AND THEN NOT DELIVER IT. I SHOULD ALWAYS BE PREPARED FOR THAT TO HAPPEN. IF I EVER HAVE MY OWN AIRPLANE, I SHOULD INVEST IN A MORE ACCURATE AND CAPABLE FUEL QUANTITY AND USAGE SYS THAN THE STANDARD CESSNA FUEL GAUGES. LASTLY, AND MOST IMPORTANT, IF I FIND MYSELF GETTING EVEN A LITTLE WORRIED ABOUT A FLT, I SHOULD LAND.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.