Narrative:

I was the first officer on flight from den to okc when we nearly had an accident on the ramp after engine start-up. After a lengthy boarding delay in den, the agents closed the main cabin door and captain proceeded to start engine #2. A normal start was achieved and the condition lever was advanced from feather to minimum (as per the fom) to get some airflow to the cabin and cockpit. Then engine #1 was started. Again a normal start was achieved, captain advanced the #1 condition lever from feather to minimum, and asked for the after start checklist. In doing my after start flow I noticed a cas message on the EICAS indicating brake temperature indicator. I pointed this out to captain and at this point we expected to have a further delay due to maintenance. Before moving the aircraft I went to reach behind my seat for the MEL, when all of a sudden I felt the brakes being applied by captain. The aircraft had obviously been moving. At this point we had not called for taxi clearance or been marshalled away from the gate by our ramp personnel. When I looked up, the marshaller was signaling to stop the left engine and at that time captain cut the left engine. After checking out the left side of the aircraft and determining there was nothing wrong, captain again started the left engine so he could taxi the aircraft around again to park properly at the gate. We then shut down the engines and called maintenance. While waiting for maintenance, captain exited the aircraft to talk to the ground personnel. They informed him that when the aircraft moved forward, the propeller came close to striking the gpu and one of our ground crew. I'm not sure how the aircraft could have moved forward like it did unless the parking brake was released, the feet brakes not applied and the chocks removed. When I initially got into the cockpit everything appeared normal -- including the brake set. However, it may somehow have been released during the boarding process due to many weight and balance sheets, load manifests and other paperwork on the throttle quadrant. Maintenance inspected the parking brake shortly after the incident and discovered that if it is bumped, it could be knocked out of its detent. Due to this incident, our company is in the process of revising some procedures pertinent to the flcs and ground personnel. They are also looking into the turn-around times to determine if the crews and ground personnel have sufficient time to turn the aircraft. I believe there are times when too much emphasis is placed on the on-time performance and we all need to slow down and be a little more thorough in our duties.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: LTT FLC HAS ACFT MOVE FORWARD AND ALMOST HIT THE GPU AND GND PERSONNEL. THE DETENT ON THE PARKING BRAKE APPARENTLY WAS BUMPED AND MOVED OUT OF POS. COMPANY IS REVISING PROCS TO AVOID A REPEAT. THEY ARE ALSO LOOKING AT THE TURN AROUND TIMES TO DETERMINE IF THEY NEED TO SLOW DOWN AND BE MORE THOROUGH IN PROCS.

Narrative: I WAS THE FO ON FLT FROM DEN TO OKC WHEN WE NEARLY HAD AN ACCIDENT ON THE RAMP AFTER ENG START-UP. AFTER A LENGTHY BOARDING DELAY IN DEN, THE AGENTS CLOSED THE MAIN CABIN DOOR AND CAPT PROCEEDED TO START ENG #2. A NORMAL START WAS ACHIEVED AND THE CONDITION LEVER WAS ADVANCED FROM FEATHER TO MINIMUM (AS PER THE FOM) TO GET SOME AIRFLOW TO THE CABIN AND COCKPIT. THEN ENG #1 WAS STARTED. AGAIN A NORMAL START WAS ACHIEVED, CAPT ADVANCED THE #1 CONDITION LEVER FROM FEATHER TO MINIMUM, AND ASKED FOR THE AFTER START CHKLIST. IN DOING MY AFTER START FLOW I NOTICED A CAS MESSAGE ON THE EICAS INDICATING BRAKE TEMP INDICATOR. I POINTED THIS OUT TO CAPT AND AT THIS POINT WE EXPECTED TO HAVE A FURTHER DELAY DUE TO MAINT. BEFORE MOVING THE ACFT I WENT TO REACH BEHIND MY SEAT FOR THE MEL, WHEN ALL OF A SUDDEN I FELT THE BRAKES BEING APPLIED BY CAPT. THE ACFT HAD OBVIOUSLY BEEN MOVING. AT THIS POINT WE HAD NOT CALLED FOR TAXI CLRNC OR BEEN MARSHALLED AWAY FROM THE GATE BY OUR RAMP PERSONNEL. WHEN I LOOKED UP, THE MARSHALLER WAS SIGNALING TO STOP THE L ENG AND AT THAT TIME CAPT CUT THE L ENG. AFTER CHKING OUT THE L SIDE OF THE ACFT AND DETERMINING THERE WAS NOTHING WRONG, CAPT AGAIN STARTED THE L ENG SO HE COULD TAXI THE ACFT AROUND AGAIN TO PARK PROPERLY AT THE GATE. WE THEN SHUT DOWN THE ENGS AND CALLED MAINT. WHILE WAITING FOR MAINT, CAPT EXITED THE ACFT TO TALK TO THE GND PERSONNEL. THEY INFORMED HIM THAT WHEN THE ACFT MOVED FORWARD, THE PROP CAME CLOSE TO STRIKING THE GPU AND ONE OF OUR GND CREW. I'M NOT SURE HOW THE ACFT COULD HAVE MOVED FORWARD LIKE IT DID UNLESS THE PARKING BRAKE WAS RELEASED, THE FEET BRAKES NOT APPLIED AND THE CHOCKS REMOVED. WHEN I INITIALLY GOT INTO THE COCKPIT EVERYTHING APPEARED NORMAL -- INCLUDING THE BRAKE SET. HOWEVER, IT MAY SOMEHOW HAVE BEEN RELEASED DURING THE BOARDING PROCESS DUE TO MANY WT AND BAL SHEETS, LOAD MANIFESTS AND OTHER PAPERWORK ON THE THROTTLE QUADRANT. MAINT INSPECTED THE PARKING BRAKE SHORTLY AFTER THE INCIDENT AND DISCOVERED THAT IF IT IS BUMPED, IT COULD BE KNOCKED OUT OF ITS DETENT. DUE TO THIS INCIDENT, OUR COMPANY IS IN THE PROCESS OF REVISING SOME PROCS PERTINENT TO THE FLCS AND GND PERSONNEL. THEY ARE ALSO LOOKING INTO THE TURN-AROUND TIMES TO DETERMINE IF THE CREWS AND GND PERSONNEL HAVE SUFFICIENT TIME TO TURN THE ACFT. I BELIEVE THERE ARE TIMES WHEN TOO MUCH EMPHASIS IS PLACED ON THE ON-TIME PERFORMANCE AND WE ALL NEED TO SLOW DOWN AND BE A LITTLE MORE THOROUGH IN OUR DUTIES.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.