Narrative:

Experienced an engine fire loop failure followed by an engine fire (#2). We declared an emergency with san juan ATC requesting that emergency equipment be standing by and conducted the appropriate procedures, checklists, and visual inspection. We had to discharge the left fire extinguishing agent bottle on engine #2. Within the allowable time limit, the engine fire warning ceased. Also, the high pressure bleed system on engine #2 was under deferred maintenance allowance (dmi) at the time of this occurrence. Subsequently, we were able to proceed with a normal single engine approach and landing on runway 8 at sju (our destination). The airport emergency crews observed nothing unusual as in fire, smoke, fumes, etc, therefore we proceeded with a normal taxi to the gate/jetway while being accompanied by several fire and rescue crews/vehicles. My understanding is that the aircraft was inspected, fire bottle replaced, and then the company deferred (dmi) 1 of the 2 fire loop system and placed the aircraft back into service the following day. The high pressure bleed system still being deferred. In my opinion these are not prudent nor safe maintenance attitudes/procedures. After this incident to have an aircraft back into service with both an inoperative fire loop detection system and high pressure bleed problems is quite frankly ridiculous. What ever happened to common (horse) sense? Sure doesn't seem to be much of this in our airline's maintenance department. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information: reporter had the flight crew follow all the fire procedures and shut the engine down. Preceding this, they had a warning of a fire loop failure so the good fire detector loop was selected. When the fire alarm sounded they felt it had to be a properly working indicator, therefore the engine was shut down and an emergency declared. Upon landing, the fire trucks followed the aircraft into the gate area after a short inspection for fire damage. No damage was found, so the fire was triggered by the other fire detector loop. The next day the aircraft was dispatched to fly again and to reporter's knowledge, nothing else was changed in the way of maintenance requirements. The aircraft had another false fire warning during the next day's flying. Reporter is very concerned that maintenance is poor and he is doomed to be flying aircraft that have all types of problems because the aircraft are not adequately maintained.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: AN A300B4 DECLARES AN EMER WHILE DSNDING INTO SJU, PR, BECAUSE OF AN ENG FIRE WARNING. FIRE WARNING TURNS OUT TO BE FALSE AS THE FIRE WARNING WAS CAUSED BY LOOSE DUCTING FROM THE PNEUMATIC SYS. NO DAMAGE TO ACFT.

Narrative: EXPERIENCED AN ENG FIRE LOOP FAILURE FOLLOWED BY AN ENG FIRE (#2). WE DECLARED AN EMER WITH SAN JUAN ATC REQUESTING THAT EMER EQUIP BE STANDING BY AND CONDUCTED THE APPROPRIATE PROCS, CHKLISTS, AND VISUAL INSPECTION. WE HAD TO DISCHARGE THE L FIRE EXTINGUISHING AGENT BOTTLE ON ENG #2. WITHIN THE ALLOWABLE TIME LIMIT, THE ENG FIRE WARNING CEASED. ALSO, THE HIGH PRESSURE BLEED SYS ON ENG #2 WAS UNDER DEFERRED MAINT ALLOWANCE (DMI) AT THE TIME OF THIS OCCURRENCE. SUBSEQUENTLY, WE WERE ABLE TO PROCEED WITH A NORMAL SINGLE ENG APCH AND LNDG ON RWY 8 AT SJU (OUR DEST). THE ARPT EMER CREWS OBSERVED NOTHING UNUSUAL AS IN FIRE, SMOKE, FUMES, ETC, THEREFORE WE PROCEEDED WITH A NORMAL TAXI TO THE GATE/JETWAY WHILE BEING ACCOMPANIED BY SEVERAL FIRE AND RESCUE CREWS/VEHICLES. MY UNDERSTANDING IS THAT THE ACFT WAS INSPECTED, FIRE BOTTLE REPLACED, AND THEN THE COMPANY DEFERRED (DMI) 1 OF THE 2 FIRE LOOP SYS AND PLACED THE ACFT BACK INTO SVC THE FOLLOWING DAY. THE HIGH PRESSURE BLEED SYS STILL BEING DEFERRED. IN MY OPINION THESE ARE NOT PRUDENT NOR SAFE MAINT ATTITUDES/PROCS. AFTER THIS INCIDENT TO HAVE AN ACFT BACK INTO SVC WITH BOTH AN INOP FIRE LOOP DETECTION SYS AND HIGH PRESSURE BLEED PROBS IS QUITE FRANKLY RIDICULOUS. WHAT EVER HAPPENED TO COMMON (HORSE) SENSE? SURE DOESN'T SEEM TO BE MUCH OF THIS IN OUR AIRLINE'S MAINT DEPT. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: RPTR HAD THE FLC FOLLOW ALL THE FIRE PROCS AND SHUT THE ENG DOWN. PRECEDING THIS, THEY HAD A WARNING OF A FIRE LOOP FAILURE SO THE GOOD FIRE DETECTOR LOOP WAS SELECTED. WHEN THE FIRE ALARM SOUNDED THEY FELT IT HAD TO BE A PROPERLY WORKING INDICATOR, THEREFORE THE ENG WAS SHUT DOWN AND AN EMER DECLARED. UPON LNDG, THE FIRE TRUCKS FOLLOWED THE ACFT INTO THE GATE AREA AFTER A SHORT INSPECTION FOR FIRE DAMAGE. NO DAMAGE WAS FOUND, SO THE FIRE WAS TRIGGERED BY THE OTHER FIRE DETECTOR LOOP. THE NEXT DAY THE ACFT WAS DISPATCHED TO FLY AGAIN AND TO RPTR'S KNOWLEDGE, NOTHING ELSE WAS CHANGED IN THE WAY OF MAINT REQUIREMENTS. THE ACFT HAD ANOTHER FALSE FIRE WARNING DURING THE NEXT DAY'S FLYING. RPTR IS VERY CONCERNED THAT MAINT IS POOR AND HE IS DOOMED TO BE FLYING ACFT THAT HAVE ALL TYPES OF PROBS BECAUSE THE ACFT ARE NOT ADEQUATELY MAINTAINED.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.