Narrative:

This report will describe what happened and shed some light as to why the right tank of a cessna turbo 207 was not properly fueled prior to flight and consequently ran dry in-flight. I work for a tour operator. The route we fly requires that we carry full right tank fuel (36.5 gals useable) and 20 gals in the left tank. 23 gals of fuel is generally burned on the tour. On jun/mon/97, I preflted a cessna turbo 207 inside the hangar. The plane was behind two other aircraft. This is significant because it is the responsibility of the pilot who last flew the aircraft to make sure that the aircraft is either fueled or placed on the 'to be fueled list.' I commented to the assistant chief pilot that the aircraft was not properly filled. He informed me that the mechanics did not want the aircraft filled before maintenance, it was not filled. After the mechanic flew the aircraft, it was not filled nor was it placed on the 'to be filled board.' the aircraft was not used for the next 2 days. After preflting the aircraft, I helped pull all of the aircraft needed for the tour out of the hangar. Finishing that, I went inside the building to get my passenger, walk them to the plane, and load them. I started the engine, checked the oil gauges, tachometer, and manifold pressure gauges. I do not remember checking the fuel gauges. I taxied to runway 27L did my run-up, oil good, propeller good, magnetos good, everything good. I do not remember checking my fuel gauges. I departed runway 27L to the east without problems. About 1 hour into the flight, the engine lost power. I had been monitoring all engine instruments throughout the flight (standard procedure for me). I do not remember looking at the fuel gauges (normally I notice them but pay little attention to them because I have been taught that fuel gauges are inaccurate and to use my watch since hour one). As soon as the engine started to lose power, I switched tanks, turned on the boost pump for about 1 or 2 seconds, pitched for 80 KIAS (vg). The engine came back to life. No power surges occurred. I brought manifold pressure up to 29 inches and initiated a climb. More altitude, more options. I called the assistant chief, who was in another aircraft in my vicinity giving the same tour, and told him that my engine had lost power, and that I had it running again. I looked at the right fuel gauge. It was showing empty. The left was showing 20 gals. I had stuck this tank during my preflight. The assistant chief pilot said to land at point a (about 4 mi away) then asked if I thought I could make it to point B (about 10 mi away). I watched the fuel gauge for about a min to see if it was dropping rapidly, it was not. I replied that I thought I could make it to point B. I made a safe landing at point B. 45 mins of fuel was still onboard upon landing at point B. Continuing to my destination would have left me with 30 mins of fuel onboard. I did not realize until another of our personnel asked that I had not filled the right tank. This caused me to believe that something was wrong with the fuel system. I thought that the aircraft was burning more fuel than the fuel flow gauge was indicating. From the point where the problem occurred to point B, I ran the engine at 17 gph instead of the 20 gph that the company wants us to run at. I felt that I had enough fuel to make point B. To ensure that I made it, I climbed to 6500 ft AGL, to make it to either point a or B. Point B was a better place to land because it had a paved runway, and emergency equipment available. Factors that lent to my forgetting to fill the right tank included: I helped pull other aircraft and my own from the hangar. I had a cold. My passenger were arriving. The aircraft was supposed to already have fuel. The company has said it will implement a new policy requiring aircraft that need fuel to have a red flag hung from its wing tie down. This was suggested by a fellow pilot about 2 months prior to this incident, but was killed by more senior pilots opinions that we had not done this before, and did not need to start now. The blood principle.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: TOUR FLT OF C207T HAS FUEL TANK RUN DRY BUT WITH ENOUGH IN OTHER TANK TO MAKE IT TO AN ARPT. COMPANY PROCS FOR REFUELING ACFT WERE NOT FOLLOWED PRIOR TO FLT.

Narrative: THIS RPT WILL DESCRIBE WHAT HAPPENED AND SHED SOME LIGHT AS TO WHY THE R TANK OF A CESSNA TURBO 207 WAS NOT PROPERLY FUELED PRIOR TO FLT AND CONSEQUENTLY RAN DRY INFLT. I WORK FOR A TOUR OPERATOR. THE RTE WE FLY REQUIRES THAT WE CARRY FULL R TANK FUEL (36.5 GALS USEABLE) AND 20 GALS IN THE L TANK. 23 GALS OF FUEL IS GENERALLY BURNED ON THE TOUR. ON JUN/MON/97, I PREFLTED A CESSNA TURBO 207 INSIDE THE HANGAR. THE PLANE WAS BEHIND TWO OTHER ACFT. THIS IS SIGNIFICANT BECAUSE IT IS THE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE PLT WHO LAST FLEW THE ACFT TO MAKE SURE THAT THE ACFT IS EITHER FUELED OR PLACED ON THE 'TO BE FUELED LIST.' I COMMENTED TO THE ASSISTANT CHIEF PLT THAT THE ACFT WAS NOT PROPERLY FILLED. HE INFORMED ME THAT THE MECHS DID NOT WANT THE ACFT FILLED BEFORE MAINT, IT WAS NOT FILLED. AFTER THE MECH FLEW THE ACFT, IT WAS NOT FILLED NOR WAS IT PLACED ON THE 'TO BE FILLED BOARD.' THE ACFT WAS NOT USED FOR THE NEXT 2 DAYS. AFTER PREFLTING THE ACFT, I HELPED PULL ALL OF THE ACFT NEEDED FOR THE TOUR OUT OF THE HANGAR. FINISHING THAT, I WENT INSIDE THE BUILDING TO GET MY PAX, WALK THEM TO THE PLANE, AND LOAD THEM. I STARTED THE ENG, CHKED THE OIL GAUGES, TACHOMETER, AND MANIFOLD PRESSURE GAUGES. I DO NOT REMEMBER CHKING THE FUEL GAUGES. I TAXIED TO RWY 27L DID MY RUN-UP, OIL GOOD, PROP GOOD, MAGNETOS GOOD, EVERYTHING GOOD. I DO NOT REMEMBER CHKING MY FUEL GAUGES. I DEPARTED RWY 27L TO THE E WITHOUT PROBS. ABOUT 1 HR INTO THE FLT, THE ENG LOST PWR. I HAD BEEN MONITORING ALL ENG INSTS THROUGHOUT THE FLT (STANDARD PROC FOR ME). I DO NOT REMEMBER LOOKING AT THE FUEL GAUGES (NORMALLY I NOTICE THEM BUT PAY LITTLE ATTN TO THEM BECAUSE I HAVE BEEN TAUGHT THAT FUEL GAUGES ARE INACCURATE AND TO USE MY WATCH SINCE HR ONE). AS SOON AS THE ENG STARTED TO LOSE PWR, I SWITCHED TANKS, TURNED ON THE BOOST PUMP FOR ABOUT 1 OR 2 SECONDS, PITCHED FOR 80 KIAS (VG). THE ENG CAME BACK TO LIFE. NO PWR SURGES OCCURRED. I BROUGHT MANIFOLD PRESSURE UP TO 29 INCHES AND INITIATED A CLB. MORE ALT, MORE OPTIONS. I CALLED THE ASSISTANT CHIEF, WHO WAS IN ANOTHER ACFT IN MY VICINITY GIVING THE SAME TOUR, AND TOLD HIM THAT MY ENG HAD LOST PWR, AND THAT I HAD IT RUNNING AGAIN. I LOOKED AT THE R FUEL GAUGE. IT WAS SHOWING EMPTY. THE L WAS SHOWING 20 GALS. I HAD STUCK THIS TANK DURING MY PREFLT. THE ASSISTANT CHIEF PLT SAID TO LAND AT POINT A (ABOUT 4 MI AWAY) THEN ASKED IF I THOUGHT I COULD MAKE IT TO POINT B (ABOUT 10 MI AWAY). I WATCHED THE FUEL GAUGE FOR ABOUT A MIN TO SEE IF IT WAS DROPPING RAPIDLY, IT WAS NOT. I REPLIED THAT I THOUGHT I COULD MAKE IT TO POINT B. I MADE A SAFE LNDG AT POINT B. 45 MINS OF FUEL WAS STILL ONBOARD UPON LNDG AT POINT B. CONTINUING TO MY DEST WOULD HAVE LEFT ME WITH 30 MINS OF FUEL ONBOARD. I DID NOT REALIZE UNTIL ANOTHER OF OUR PERSONNEL ASKED THAT I HAD NOT FILLED THE R TANK. THIS CAUSED ME TO BELIEVE THAT SOMETHING WAS WRONG WITH THE FUEL SYS. I THOUGHT THAT THE ACFT WAS BURNING MORE FUEL THAN THE FUEL FLOW GAUGE WAS INDICATING. FROM THE POINT WHERE THE PROB OCCURRED TO POINT B, I RAN THE ENG AT 17 GPH INSTEAD OF THE 20 GPH THAT THE COMPANY WANTS US TO RUN AT. I FELT THAT I HAD ENOUGH FUEL TO MAKE POINT B. TO ENSURE THAT I MADE IT, I CLBED TO 6500 FT AGL, TO MAKE IT TO EITHER POINT A OR B. POINT B WAS A BETTER PLACE TO LAND BECAUSE IT HAD A PAVED RWY, AND EMER EQUIP AVAILABLE. FACTORS THAT LENT TO MY FORGETTING TO FILL THE R TANK INCLUDED: I HELPED PULL OTHER ACFT AND MY OWN FROM THE HANGAR. I HAD A COLD. MY PAX WERE ARRIVING. THE ACFT WAS SUPPOSED TO ALREADY HAVE FUEL. THE COMPANY HAS SAID IT WILL IMPLEMENT A NEW POLICY REQUIRING ACFT THAT NEED FUEL TO HAVE A RED FLAG HUNG FROM ITS WING TIE DOWN. THIS WAS SUGGESTED BY A FELLOW PLT ABOUT 2 MONTHS PRIOR TO THIS INCIDENT, BUT WAS KILLED BY MORE SENIOR PLTS OPINIONS THAT WE HAD NOT DONE THIS BEFORE, AND DID NOT NEED TO START NOW. THE BLOOD PRINCIPLE.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.