Narrative:

Approximately 30 mi west of smo VOR, ATC advised us to go direct to smo and depart on a 080 degree heading. At approximately 7 NM east of smo on a 080 degree heading, we called the runway in sight. ATC said we had B737 traffic at 2 O'clock on a 7 mi final. Shortly after that we called B737 traffic in sight. We were then cleared for a visual approach to runway 24R. We realized that the 080 degree heading after the VOR put us on a tight downwind, so I was going to widen it out a little. But ATC said for us to start our base, traffic to follow us. Knowing that we were in tight on downwind, I put in the maximum allowable bank (30 degrees) all the way around the turn. At approximately 150 degree aircraft heading, ATC advised us to keep our turn as tight as possible. We told them that we were. At approximately 190 degree aircraft heading, TCASII told us to monitor vertical speed. I was descending at about 800 FPM and I reduced it to 100-200 FPM. ATC then advised us that we had traffic at 12 O'clock and 1-2 mi. The 30 degrees of bank did not allow us to see the traffic. They advised us to maintain 3000 ft. At that time I was already level due to the TCASII advisory earlier. We then saw the commuter aircraft pass under us on his way to one of the 25 runways. As we completed our turn into the airport, we had to correct back to the north due to the tight downwind that we were given from the 080 degree assigned heading after smo VOR. I feel that some of the factors that contributed to the TCASII warning were: not being cleared for the stadium visual runway 24L/right. Not being told about the commuter traffic earlier. The high amount of xmissions on the frequency making it hard for us to advise or request additional turning radius from ATC. As far as we knew, the only aircraft we were advised of was the B737 that passed us and was well ahead of us. The 080 degree heading after the smo VOR is not enough room to make the turn to final in a DC10. In closing, once the TCASII warned us, and ATC advised us to maintain 3000 ft, which we had already done, the safety of the flight was never in question. ATC, TCASII, and our actions prevented a near miss from developing.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A FLC IN AN ACR DC10 OVERSHOT THEIR TURN TO FINAL APCH AND HAD A CONFLICT WITH AN ACFT ON A PARALLEL APCH. BOTH TCASII AND THE APCH CTLR ALERTED THE FLC AS TO THE SIT.

Narrative: APPROX 30 MI W OF SMO VOR, ATC ADVISED US TO GO DIRECT TO SMO AND DEPART ON A 080 DEG HDG. AT APPROX 7 NM E OF SMO ON A 080 DEG HDG, WE CALLED THE RWY IN SIGHT. ATC SAID WE HAD B737 TFC AT 2 O'CLOCK ON A 7 MI FINAL. SHORTLY AFTER THAT WE CALLED B737 TFC IN SIGHT. WE WERE THEN CLRED FOR A VISUAL APCH TO RWY 24R. WE REALIZED THAT THE 080 DEG HDG AFTER THE VOR PUT US ON A TIGHT DOWNWIND, SO I WAS GOING TO WIDEN IT OUT A LITTLE. BUT ATC SAID FOR US TO START OUR BASE, TFC TO FOLLOW US. KNOWING THAT WE WERE IN TIGHT ON DOWNWIND, I PUT IN THE MAX ALLOWABLE BANK (30 DEGS) ALL THE WAY AROUND THE TURN. AT APPROX 150 DEG ACFT HDG, ATC ADVISED US TO KEEP OUR TURN AS TIGHT AS POSSIBLE. WE TOLD THEM THAT WE WERE. AT APPROX 190 DEG ACFT HDG, TCASII TOLD US TO MONITOR VERT SPD. I WAS DSNDING AT ABOUT 800 FPM AND I REDUCED IT TO 100-200 FPM. ATC THEN ADVISED US THAT WE HAD TFC AT 12 O'CLOCK AND 1-2 MI. THE 30 DEGS OF BANK DID NOT ALLOW US TO SEE THE TFC. THEY ADVISED US TO MAINTAIN 3000 FT. AT THAT TIME I WAS ALREADY LEVEL DUE TO THE TCASII ADVISORY EARLIER. WE THEN SAW THE COMMUTER ACFT PASS UNDER US ON HIS WAY TO ONE OF THE 25 RWYS. AS WE COMPLETED OUR TURN INTO THE ARPT, WE HAD TO CORRECT BACK TO THE N DUE TO THE TIGHT DOWNWIND THAT WE WERE GIVEN FROM THE 080 DEG ASSIGNED HDG AFTER SMO VOR. I FEEL THAT SOME OF THE FACTORS THAT CONTRIBUTED TO THE TCASII WARNING WERE: NOT BEING CLRED FOR THE STADIUM VISUAL RWY 24L/R. NOT BEING TOLD ABOUT THE COMMUTER TFC EARLIER. THE HIGH AMOUNT OF XMISSIONS ON THE FREQ MAKING IT HARD FOR US TO ADVISE OR REQUEST ADDITIONAL TURNING RADIUS FROM ATC. AS FAR AS WE KNEW, THE ONLY ACFT WE WERE ADVISED OF WAS THE B737 THAT PASSED US AND WAS WELL AHEAD OF US. THE 080 DEG HDG AFTER THE SMO VOR IS NOT ENOUGH ROOM TO MAKE THE TURN TO FINAL IN A DC10. IN CLOSING, ONCE THE TCASII WARNED US, AND ATC ADVISED US TO MAINTAIN 3000 FT, WHICH WE HAD ALREADY DONE, THE SAFETY OF THE FLT WAS NEVER IN QUESTION. ATC, TCASII, AND OUR ACTIONS PREVENTED A NEAR MISS FROM DEVELOPING.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.