Narrative:

During chkout it is not possible to say for certain my IOE. It is difficult to say from an experience standpoint if the landing was firm or not. I can say that in view of the short, very short runway available that I was concerned to follow air carrier procedures. The aircraft was stabilized in the slot and on speed and off autoplt as soon as the runway was visible below the overcast, about 1000 ft. I was concerned about the unusually short runway about 4800 ft beyond GS and therefore used autobrakes #4 and was determined to not float while looking for the perfect landing. In accordance with normal practice in a short field situation I broke the descent and touched down fine, but lack of experience with the application of the autobrakes #4 coupled with the concern over a tailstrike, caused the nose to come down to the runway faster than I would have liked. While trying to stop the sudden nose pitch-down, I applied additional back pressure causing the nosewheel to possibly bounce once thereby causing a rocking sensation in the aircraft. In retrospect, I should have briefed the passenger of the different landing technique required for the landing just as we do for the takeoff from sna. Also I now have more experience in working with autobrakes position #4 and will better anticipate the pitchdown characteristic caused by the brake application in order to prevent nose bounce.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: AN ACR B757 CAPT RPTS MAKING A FIRM LNDG AT SNA. HE WAS NEW TO THE ACFT AND CONCERNED ABOUT THE SHORT RWY AND UNUSED TO USING AUTOBRAKES.

Narrative: DURING CHKOUT IT IS NOT POSSIBLE TO SAY FOR CERTAIN MY IOE. IT IS DIFFICULT TO SAY FROM AN EXPERIENCE STANDPOINT IF THE LNDG WAS FIRM OR NOT. I CAN SAY THAT IN VIEW OF THE SHORT, VERY SHORT RWY AVAILABLE THAT I WAS CONCERNED TO FOLLOW ACR PROCS. THE ACFT WAS STABILIZED IN THE SLOT AND ON SPD AND OFF AUTOPLT AS SOON AS THE RWY WAS VISIBLE BELOW THE OVCST, ABOUT 1000 FT. I WAS CONCERNED ABOUT THE UNUSUALLY SHORT RWY ABOUT 4800 FT BEYOND GS AND THEREFORE USED AUTOBRAKES #4 AND WAS DETERMINED TO NOT FLOAT WHILE LOOKING FOR THE PERFECT LNDG. IN ACCORDANCE WITH NORMAL PRACTICE IN A SHORT FIELD SIT I BROKE THE DSCNT AND TOUCHED DOWN FINE, BUT LACK OF EXPERIENCE WITH THE APPLICATION OF THE AUTOBRAKES #4 COUPLED WITH THE CONCERN OVER A TAILSTRIKE, CAUSED THE NOSE TO COME DOWN TO THE RWY FASTER THAN I WOULD HAVE LIKED. WHILE TRYING TO STOP THE SUDDEN NOSE PITCH-DOWN, I APPLIED ADDITIONAL BACK PRESSURE CAUSING THE NOSEWHEEL TO POSSIBLY BOUNCE ONCE THEREBY CAUSING A ROCKING SENSATION IN THE ACFT. IN RETROSPECT, I SHOULD HAVE BRIEFED THE PAX OF THE DIFFERENT LNDG TECHNIQUE REQUIRED FOR THE LNDG JUST AS WE DO FOR THE TKOF FROM SNA. ALSO I NOW HAVE MORE EXPERIENCE IN WORKING WITH AUTOBRAKES POS #4 AND WILL BETTER ANTICIPATE THE PITCHDOWN CHARACTERISTIC CAUSED BY THE BRAKE APPLICATION IN ORDER TO PREVENT NOSE BOUNCE.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.