Narrative:

On 3RD shift mar/xx/97, air carrier line maintenance performed a routine inspection of aircraft #1 pylon fuse pins for condition. Inspection is driven by a routine job procedure card. The outboard fuse pin was found to be cracked. As required per the routine card, the descendant pin is to be replaced. The aircraft was at that time turned over to air carrier heavy maintenance hangar for repair. Engineering order was issued to the aircraft for replacement of the fuse pin. Upon input from the director of maintenance it was determined to replace the outboard fuse pin only. This being the damaged part found on the inspection. The outboard fuse pin was replaced per the engineering order and the replacement of the inboard fuse pin was cleared by myself. It is my understanding that aircraft records brought to our attention that both pins are required to be replaced at the same time. The only place this information is noted is on the routine job procedure card which line maintenance had signed off and entered as completed in the logbook. The only difference we could see by the engineering order issued to the aircraft was the inspection thresholds for the new and old pins. This information from records did not come for several days after the aircraft was released back to service. When this issue was discovered, the aircraft was routed back to heavy maintenance and the #1 pylon inboard fuse pin was replaced. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information: reporter states the aircraft was a 757-200. The reason the inboard pin was not replaced was because the only reference for both pin replacement was on the line maintenance job card for the fuse pin inspection which was signed off. This paperwork was not available to the overhaul shop.

Related reports:

Google
 

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A B757-200 WAS FOUND TO HAVE A #1 ENG PYLON ATTACH FUSE PIN CRACKED. THE FUSE PIN WAS REPLACED BUT THE JOB CARD REQUIRED REPLACEMENT OF BOTH PINS IF ONE FOUND CRACKED, WHICH WAS NOT DONE.

Narrative: ON 3RD SHIFT MAR/XX/97, ACR LINE MAINT PERFORMED A ROUTINE INSPECTION OF ACFT #1 PYLON FUSE PINS FOR CONDITION. INSPECTION IS DRIVEN BY A ROUTINE JOB PROC CARD. THE OUTBOARD FUSE PIN WAS FOUND TO BE CRACKED. AS REQUIRED PER THE ROUTINE CARD, THE DESCENDANT PIN IS TO BE REPLACED. THE ACFT WAS AT THAT TIME TURNED OVER TO ACR HVY MAINT HANGAR FOR REPAIR. ENGINEERING ORDER WAS ISSUED TO THE ACFT FOR REPLACEMENT OF THE FUSE PIN. UPON INPUT FROM THE DIRECTOR OF MAINT IT WAS DETERMINED TO REPLACE THE OUTBOARD FUSE PIN ONLY. THIS BEING THE DAMAGED PART FOUND ON THE INSPECTION. THE OUTBOARD FUSE PIN WAS REPLACED PER THE ENGINEERING ORDER AND THE REPLACEMENT OF THE INBOARD FUSE PIN WAS CLRED BY MYSELF. IT IS MY UNDERSTANDING THAT ACFT RECORDS BROUGHT TO OUR ATTN THAT BOTH PINS ARE REQUIRED TO BE REPLACED AT THE SAME TIME. THE ONLY PLACE THIS INFO IS NOTED IS ON THE ROUTINE JOB PROC CARD WHICH LINE MAINT HAD SIGNED OFF AND ENTERED AS COMPLETED IN THE LOGBOOK. THE ONLY DIFFERENCE WE COULD SEE BY THE ENGINEERING ORDER ISSUED TO THE ACFT WAS THE INSPECTION THRESHOLDS FOR THE NEW AND OLD PINS. THIS INFO FROM RECORDS DID NOT COME FOR SEVERAL DAYS AFTER THE ACFT WAS RELEASED BACK TO SVC. WHEN THIS ISSUE WAS DISCOVERED, THE ACFT WAS ROUTED BACK TO HVY MAINT AND THE #1 PYLON INBOARD FUSE PIN WAS REPLACED. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: RPTR STATES THE ACFT WAS A 757-200. THE REASON THE INBOARD PIN WAS NOT REPLACED WAS BECAUSE THE ONLY REF FOR BOTH PIN REPLACEMENT WAS ON THE LINE MAINT JOB CARD FOR THE FUSE PIN INSPECTION WHICH WAS SIGNED OFF. THIS PAPERWORK WAS NOT AVAILABLE TO THE OVERHAUL SHOP.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.