Narrative:

At the watsonville, ca, airport, a local instructor filed a complaint against me in the airport's 'complaint log.' I did not talk to that instructor about the event, but was told of her report by airport staff who met me upon landing. Here are the events which led to her report, and the conclusions I draw. I initially approached the airport in my american AA1A from roughly south, making a 45 degree entry to a left downwind to runway 20. I made standard traffic calls on the unicom frequency. Several other aircraft were in the pattern. I flew a standard l-hand pattern and flew a low approach, passing over the runway at approximately 400 ft AGL. I then climbed back to approximately 1000 ft AGL, extending upwind beyond the freeway approximately 1 mi beyond the departure end for noise abatement, and entering another l-hand pattern. Again I made standard traffic calls on the unicom frequency. I was following a high-wing aircraft which was not broadcasting on the unicom frequency. I learned later that the silent aircraft was the aircraft carrying the instructor who later filed the complaint. A high-wing taildragger was following me in the pattern. As I turned final, the high-wing ahead of me was on short final. I broadcast, 'watsonville traffic, grumman south turning on final for a low approach, watsonville.' shortly thereafter, the taildragger broadcast his intention on runway 26 due to some problem. I didn't catch the entire broadcast, but I was able to visually contact the taildragger on a close-in left base for runway 26. At that point, the high-wing ahead had touched down. Runway 26 intersects runway 20 near the approach end of runway 20 and near the midpoint of runway 26. Because my s- turns put me head-on to the taildragger on left base for runway 26, I stopped s-turning and resumed a straight-in final approach to runway 20. As I was on short final, the taildragger was over the numbers on runway 26. It was impossible for me to tell whether the taildragger would hold short of runway 20, but I was intending only a low approach in any case. At that point, the high-wing ahead was still rolling on runway 20, beyond the runway 26 intersection. I broadcast, 'watsonville, traffic, grumman on final for low approach has the aircraft landing runway 26 in sight, and the aircraft on runway 20 in sight, watsonville.' as I passed over the threshold, I lost sight of both aircraft, which both still were on the respective runways at that time. I had intended to fly a very low approach, but because of the aircraft on runway 20 and the conflict with the aircraft on runway 26, I determined to remain relatively high. I was concerned that the pilot of the aircraft on runway 20 would be annoyed by my overflt, but I thought it was the safest action. I leveled at approximately 200 ft AGL and flew down the runway at a level altitude, accelerating from an approach speed of 70 mph to a cruise climb speed of 105 mph. I climbed again to 1000 ft AGL, again making left traffic. As I turned downwind, the instructor in the high-wing broadcast on the unicom frequency, 'grumman, don't ever do that to me again.' that was the first broadcast I had heard from that aircraft during the entire sequence. I did not reply, as I didn't want to clutter the unicom frequency with personal chatter. I was very concerned and confused, because I thought she would have seen the necessity of my actions, and recognized that I was, after all, at a safe altitude. I flew around the pattern and made another low approach, this time accelerating along the runway at very low altitude, perhaps 20 ft AGL. On this pass there was no conflicting traffic. I climbed again to 1000 ft AGL, flew left traffic, and landed. Shortly after I landed, airport staff approached me and told me that they had to take my tail number for the airport's 'complaint log.' they said that the instructor in the high-wing aircraft had complained that I flew over her aircraft 'at about 20 ft' AGL. I scoffed at her report, as I knew I had been perhaps ten times higher. The airport staff speculated that perhaps the instructor would have preferred me to offset to the side of the runway or pass higher overhead, but I don't know whether they were relaying comments made by the instructor. I was very upset, especially by her exaggeration of the event, and in the end asked thearpt staff to add my protest to her complaint, and further to file a complaint against the instructor for not broadcasting on the unicom frequency and not clearing the runway expeditiously. That was a childish thing to do, as in fact I don't think she was on the runway any longer than necessary. I was following closely to begin with, and the necessity to stop s-turning put me even closer, so it is not surprising that she was unable to clear the runway before my arrival. I learned several things from this event. First, I have a tendency to follow other aircraft as closely as possible in the pattern. This is because my aircraft has a much higher sink rate at approach speed than other light aircraft, so I prefer to fly a much tighter pattern in general, for safety. Normally this causes no problem because I have learned to maintain adequate spacing. But I know that adequate spacing can quickly become inadequate if something unexpected happens, such as the taildragger's need to land on an intersecting runway. I must increase the spacing I maintain in the pattern out of consideration for other pilots' sensibilities, even if it entails somewhat more risk to my own flight. Second, I have learned that I must give even greater leeway to other pilots when judging whether an action is safe and appropriate. I considered my overflt of the high-wing to be quite safe, but the other pilot obviously was alarmed by it. She might have taken more extreme action, such as clearing the runway into a turf area, exposing her flight to greater risk. I could have avoided alarming her by beginning my climb to pattern altitude sooner, as soon as I saw the conflict arise, or I could have offset to one side of the runway.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: CONFLICT BTWN AN AMERICAN AA1A FOLLOWING TOO CLOSE TO A C172 ON FINAL AND PASSING OVERHEAD DURING THE ACFT'S ROLLOUT.

Narrative: AT THE WATSONVILLE, CA, ARPT, A LCL INSTRUCTOR FILED A COMPLAINT AGAINST ME IN THE ARPT'S 'COMPLAINT LOG.' I DID NOT TALK TO THAT INSTRUCTOR ABOUT THE EVENT, BUT WAS TOLD OF HER RPT BY ARPT STAFF WHO MET ME UPON LNDG. HERE ARE THE EVENTS WHICH LED TO HER RPT, AND THE CONCLUSIONS I DRAW. I INITIALLY APCHED THE ARPT IN MY AMERICAN AA1A FROM ROUGHLY S, MAKING A 45 DEG ENTRY TO A L DOWNWIND TO RWY 20. I MADE STANDARD TFC CALLS ON THE UNICOM FREQ. SEVERAL OTHER ACFT WERE IN THE PATTERN. I FLEW A STANDARD L-HAND PATTERN AND FLEW A LOW APCH, PASSING OVER THE RWY AT APPROX 400 FT AGL. I THEN CLBED BACK TO APPROX 1000 FT AGL, EXTENDING UPWIND BEYOND THE FREEWAY APPROX 1 MI BEYOND THE DEP END FOR NOISE ABATEMENT, AND ENTERING ANOTHER L-HAND PATTERN. AGAIN I MADE STANDARD TFC CALLS ON THE UNICOM FREQ. I WAS FOLLOWING A HIGH-WING ACFT WHICH WAS NOT BROADCASTING ON THE UNICOM FREQ. I LEARNED LATER THAT THE SILENT ACFT WAS THE ACFT CARRYING THE INSTRUCTOR WHO LATER FILED THE COMPLAINT. A HIGH-WING TAILDRAGGER WAS FOLLOWING ME IN THE PATTERN. AS I TURNED FINAL, THE HIGH-WING AHEAD OF ME WAS ON SHORT FINAL. I BROADCAST, 'WATSONVILLE TFC, GRUMMAN S TURNING ON FINAL FOR A LOW APCH, WATSONVILLE.' SHORTLY THEREAFTER, THE TAILDRAGGER BROADCAST HIS INTENTION ON RWY 26 DUE TO SOME PROB. I DIDN'T CATCH THE ENTIRE BROADCAST, BUT I WAS ABLE TO VISUALLY CONTACT THE TAILDRAGGER ON A CLOSE-IN L BASE FOR RWY 26. AT THAT POINT, THE HIGH-WING AHEAD HAD TOUCHED DOWN. RWY 26 INTERSECTS RWY 20 NEAR THE APCH END OF RWY 20 AND NEAR THE MIDPOINT OF RWY 26. BECAUSE MY S- TURNS PUT ME HEAD-ON TO THE TAILDRAGGER ON L BASE FOR RWY 26, I STOPPED S-TURNING AND RESUMED A STRAIGHT-IN FINAL APCH TO RWY 20. AS I WAS ON SHORT FINAL, THE TAILDRAGGER WAS OVER THE NUMBERS ON RWY 26. IT WAS IMPOSSIBLE FOR ME TO TELL WHETHER THE TAILDRAGGER WOULD HOLD SHORT OF RWY 20, BUT I WAS INTENDING ONLY A LOW APCH IN ANY CASE. AT THAT POINT, THE HIGH-WING AHEAD WAS STILL ROLLING ON RWY 20, BEYOND THE RWY 26 INTXN. I BROADCAST, 'WATSONVILLE, TFC, GRUMMAN ON FINAL FOR LOW APCH HAS THE ACFT LNDG RWY 26 IN SIGHT, AND THE ACFT ON RWY 20 IN SIGHT, WATSONVILLE.' AS I PASSED OVER THE THRESHOLD, I LOST SIGHT OF BOTH ACFT, WHICH BOTH STILL WERE ON THE RESPECTIVE RWYS AT THAT TIME. I HAD INTENDED TO FLY A VERY LOW APCH, BUT BECAUSE OF THE ACFT ON RWY 20 AND THE CONFLICT WITH THE ACFT ON RWY 26, I DETERMINED TO REMAIN RELATIVELY HIGH. I WAS CONCERNED THAT THE PLT OF THE ACFT ON RWY 20 WOULD BE ANNOYED BY MY OVERFLT, BUT I THOUGHT IT WAS THE SAFEST ACTION. I LEVELED AT APPROX 200 FT AGL AND FLEW DOWN THE RWY AT A LEVEL ALT, ACCELERATING FROM AN APCH SPD OF 70 MPH TO A CRUISE CLB SPD OF 105 MPH. I CLBED AGAIN TO 1000 FT AGL, AGAIN MAKING L TFC. AS I TURNED DOWNWIND, THE INSTRUCTOR IN THE HIGH-WING BROADCAST ON THE UNICOM FREQ, 'GRUMMAN, DON'T EVER DO THAT TO ME AGAIN.' THAT WAS THE FIRST BROADCAST I HAD HEARD FROM THAT ACFT DURING THE ENTIRE SEQUENCE. I DID NOT REPLY, AS I DIDN'T WANT TO CLUTTER THE UNICOM FREQ WITH PERSONAL CHATTER. I WAS VERY CONCERNED AND CONFUSED, BECAUSE I THOUGHT SHE WOULD HAVE SEEN THE NECESSITY OF MY ACTIONS, AND RECOGNIZED THAT I WAS, AFTER ALL, AT A SAFE ALT. I FLEW AROUND THE PATTERN AND MADE ANOTHER LOW APCH, THIS TIME ACCELERATING ALONG THE RWY AT VERY LOW ALT, PERHAPS 20 FT AGL. ON THIS PASS THERE WAS NO CONFLICTING TFC. I CLBED AGAIN TO 1000 FT AGL, FLEW L TFC, AND LANDED. SHORTLY AFTER I LANDED, ARPT STAFF APCHED ME AND TOLD ME THAT THEY HAD TO TAKE MY TAIL NUMBER FOR THE ARPT'S 'COMPLAINT LOG.' THEY SAID THAT THE INSTRUCTOR IN THE HIGH-WING ACFT HAD COMPLAINED THAT I FLEW OVER HER ACFT 'AT ABOUT 20 FT' AGL. I SCOFFED AT HER RPT, AS I KNEW I HAD BEEN PERHAPS TEN TIMES HIGHER. THE ARPT STAFF SPECULATED THAT PERHAPS THE INSTRUCTOR WOULD HAVE PREFERRED ME TO OFFSET TO THE SIDE OF THE RWY OR PASS HIGHER OVERHEAD, BUT I DON'T KNOW WHETHER THEY WERE RELAYING COMMENTS MADE BY THE INSTRUCTOR. I WAS VERY UPSET, ESPECIALLY BY HER EXAGGERATION OF THE EVENT, AND IN THE END ASKED THEARPT STAFF TO ADD MY PROTEST TO HER COMPLAINT, AND FURTHER TO FILE A COMPLAINT AGAINST THE INSTRUCTOR FOR NOT BROADCASTING ON THE UNICOM FREQ AND NOT CLRING THE RWY EXPEDITIOUSLY. THAT WAS A CHILDISH THING TO DO, AS IN FACT I DON'T THINK SHE WAS ON THE RWY ANY LONGER THAN NECESSARY. I WAS FOLLOWING CLOSELY TO BEGIN WITH, AND THE NECESSITY TO STOP S-TURNING PUT ME EVEN CLOSER, SO IT IS NOT SURPRISING THAT SHE WAS UNABLE TO CLR THE RWY BEFORE MY ARR. I LEARNED SEVERAL THINGS FROM THIS EVENT. FIRST, I HAVE A TENDENCY TO FOLLOW OTHER ACFT AS CLOSELY AS POSSIBLE IN THE PATTERN. THIS IS BECAUSE MY ACFT HAS A MUCH HIGHER SINK RATE AT APCH SPD THAN OTHER LIGHT ACFT, SO I PREFER TO FLY A MUCH TIGHTER PATTERN IN GENERAL, FOR SAFETY. NORMALLY THIS CAUSES NO PROB BECAUSE I HAVE LEARNED TO MAINTAIN ADEQUATE SPACING. BUT I KNOW THAT ADEQUATE SPACING CAN QUICKLY BECOME INADEQUATE IF SOMETHING UNEXPECTED HAPPENS, SUCH AS THE TAILDRAGGER'S NEED TO LAND ON AN INTERSECTING RWY. I MUST INCREASE THE SPACING I MAINTAIN IN THE PATTERN OUT OF CONSIDERATION FOR OTHER PLTS' SENSIBILITIES, EVEN IF IT ENTAILS SOMEWHAT MORE RISK TO MY OWN FLT. SECOND, I HAVE LEARNED THAT I MUST GIVE EVEN GREATER LEEWAY TO OTHER PLTS WHEN JUDGING WHETHER AN ACTION IS SAFE AND APPROPRIATE. I CONSIDERED MY OVERFLT OF THE HIGH-WING TO BE QUITE SAFE, BUT THE OTHER PLT OBVIOUSLY WAS ALARMED BY IT. SHE MIGHT HAVE TAKEN MORE EXTREME ACTION, SUCH AS CLRING THE RWY INTO A TURF AREA, EXPOSING HER FLT TO GREATER RISK. I COULD HAVE AVOIDED ALARMING HER BY BEGINNING MY CLB TO PATTERN ALT SOONER, AS SOON AS I SAW THE CONFLICT ARISE, OR I COULD HAVE OFFSET TO ONE SIDE OF THE RWY.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.