Narrative:

Approaching dfw from the northwest gate we were told to expect runway 36L for landing. On downwind runway was switched to runway 35R, on which neither I nor first officer had landed. We were very busy setting up for the approach with no time to brief. On crosswind we were switched to tower frequency -- very busy. We got clearance to land about 300 ft above touchdown. I had to break in to tower who was giving crossing instructions to aircraft on the ground. He was working 2 frequencys and controling (?) 4 runways. On landing rollout, we were given instructions in extremely rapid fire fashion to clear at a high speed, get on 3 different txwys, cross an active runway and hold short of another one. In trying to comply with the instructions that neither one of us got, we turned onto taxiway el, which I thought was taxiway Q, which was the first one in the instructions and the first one we came to off the high speed. Once we were on it, we realized something was wrong and neither of us understood the instructions. They were given way too fast, too soon -- were still rolling out on runway, and too complex. The local controller then got sarcastic and critical, telling us we were on a closed taxiway ( we could not turn around). Taxiway was not notamed out, was not marked out and was not mentioned on ATIS as being out. We also had no time to review txwys on east side of airport prior to landing. The only thing we could have done to prevent this is stop on the high speed turnoff and wait to get a word in and clarify. I considered that to be unsafe as traffic landing right behind us.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: RAPID FIRE, COMPLEX, TAXI DIRECTIONS ISSUED TO LNDG B757 CREW. PIC TAXIES ONTO A CLOSED TXWY AND ENGENDERS THE TWR CTLR'S WRATH. CTLR HAD BEEN WORKING 2 FREQS AND CTLING 4 RWYS. THE B757 HAD BEEN ASSIGNED A LAST MIN RWY CHANGE PRIOR TO LNDG.

Narrative: APCHING DFW FROM THE NW GATE WE WERE TOLD TO EXPECT RWY 36L FOR LNDG. ON DOWNWIND RWY WAS SWITCHED TO RWY 35R, ON WHICH NEITHER I NOR FO HAD LANDED. WE WERE VERY BUSY SETTING UP FOR THE APCH WITH NO TIME TO BRIEF. ON XWIND WE WERE SWITCHED TO TWR FREQ -- VERY BUSY. WE GOT CLRNC TO LAND ABOUT 300 FT ABOVE TOUCHDOWN. I HAD TO BREAK IN TO TWR WHO WAS GIVING XING INSTRUCTIONS TO ACFT ON THE GND. HE WAS WORKING 2 FREQS AND CTLING (?) 4 RWYS. ON LNDG ROLLOUT, WE WERE GIVEN INSTRUCTIONS IN EXTREMELY RAPID FIRE FASHION TO CLR AT A HIGH SPD, GET ON 3 DIFFERENT TXWYS, CROSS AN ACTIVE RWY AND HOLD SHORT OF ANOTHER ONE. IN TRYING TO COMPLY WITH THE INSTRUCTIONS THAT NEITHER ONE OF US GOT, WE TURNED ONTO TXWY EL, WHICH I THOUGHT WAS TXWY Q, WHICH WAS THE FIRST ONE IN THE INSTRUCTIONS AND THE FIRST ONE WE CAME TO OFF THE HIGH SPD. ONCE WE WERE ON IT, WE REALIZED SOMETHING WAS WRONG AND NEITHER OF US UNDERSTOOD THE INSTRUCTIONS. THEY WERE GIVEN WAY TOO FAST, TOO SOON -- WERE STILL ROLLING OUT ON RWY, AND TOO COMPLEX. THE LCL CTLR THEN GOT SARCASTIC AND CRITICAL, TELLING US WE WERE ON A CLOSED TXWY ( WE COULD NOT TURN AROUND). TXWY WAS NOT NOTAMED OUT, WAS NOT MARKED OUT AND WAS NOT MENTIONED ON ATIS AS BEING OUT. WE ALSO HAD NO TIME TO REVIEW TXWYS ON E SIDE OF ARPT PRIOR TO LNDG. THE ONLY THING WE COULD HAVE DONE TO PREVENT THIS IS STOP ON THE HIGH SPD TURNOFF AND WAIT TO GET A WORD IN AND CLARIFY. I CONSIDERED THAT TO BE UNSAFE AS TFC LNDG RIGHT BEHIND US.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.