Narrative:

During cruise we received a hydraulic system #1 low quantity message on the EICAS. We turned around and headed back to our departure airport. We ran the appropriate checklists and extended the gear manually. Approach and landing were completed uneventfully. On the landing rollout, tower advised us to expedite to the high speed taxiway due to a DC9 on short final behind us. Due to the hydraulic system malfunction, we were unable to steer the aircraft with the tiller, and had to rely on differential braking. Transitioning to the high speed taxiway the emergency brake was applied to bring the aircraft to a stop, due to a partial loss of the brake system. The aircraft stopped partially on the taxiway, and partially on the runway (left wingtip and tail). We immediately advised the tower that we were not clear of the runway. The DC9 was never advised to go around. (Perhaps our xmissions blocked each other out.) the aircraft was able to land and slow to taxi speed before passing us on the runway and exiting at the next taxiway. We advised tower that we would need to be towed in. In the future I will strive to make it clear to ATC that with a partial hydraulic loss, we will not be as maneuverable on the ground and will need to take our time exiting the runway. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information: this reporter said that he was on an instructional ride as a new captain on the EMB145 when the #1 hydraulic system started to lose its fluid. The instructor, in the right seat, decided to return to iah. Both the instructor and the other captain trainee did not want to declare an emergency. Their thinking, according to the reporter, was that this was not a big deal. The reporter said that he disagreed with this and the later problems may not have happened if his view had prevailed. After landing, the aircraft slowed fairly normally, but the flight crew used all of the brake accumulator capability to slow and steer the aircraft, using differential braking for the latter, according to the reporter. The tower controller wanted them to clear the runway quickly to allow a DC9 to land, but they could not because the aircraft had come to a stop using the parking brake, but was still partially on the runway. The reporter had no estimate of how close the DC9 came to their EMB145 as it passed. When they were finally towed to the gate the maintenance personnel mentioned several possibilities as the cause of the fluid loss, but the reporter said that he does not know the actual cause. Some of the manufacturer's representatives were there to assist with the problem.

Google
 

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: AN ACR EMB145 ON A TRAINING FLT LOSES THE HYD FLUID FOR THE #1 SYS. THE LNDG GEAR WAS EXTENDED MANUALLY AND THE ACFT RETURNED TO ITS BASE ARPT FOR LNDG WITHOUT DECLARING AN EMER. AFTER LNDG, THE ACFT REMAINED PARTIALLY EXTENDED OVER THE RWY AS A DC9 LANDED BEHIND THEM.

Narrative: DURING CRUISE WE RECEIVED A HYD SYS #1 LOW QUANTITY MESSAGE ON THE EICAS. WE TURNED AROUND AND HEADED BACK TO OUR DEP ARPT. WE RAN THE APPROPRIATE CHKLISTS AND EXTENDED THE GEAR MANUALLY. APCH AND LNDG WERE COMPLETED UNEVENTFULLY. ON THE LNDG ROLLOUT, TWR ADVISED US TO EXPEDITE TO THE HIGH SPD TXWY DUE TO A DC9 ON SHORT FINAL BEHIND US. DUE TO THE HYD SYS MALFUNCTION, WE WERE UNABLE TO STEER THE ACFT WITH THE TILLER, AND HAD TO RELY ON DIFFERENTIAL BRAKING. TRANSITIONING TO THE HIGH SPD TXWY THE EMER BRAKE WAS APPLIED TO BRING THE ACFT TO A STOP, DUE TO A PARTIAL LOSS OF THE BRAKE SYS. THE ACFT STOPPED PARTIALLY ON THE TXWY, AND PARTIALLY ON THE RWY (L WINGTIP AND TAIL). WE IMMEDIATELY ADVISED THE TWR THAT WE WERE NOT CLR OF THE RWY. THE DC9 WAS NEVER ADVISED TO GAR. (PERHAPS OUR XMISSIONS BLOCKED EACH OTHER OUT.) THE ACFT WAS ABLE TO LAND AND SLOW TO TAXI SPD BEFORE PASSING US ON THE RWY AND EXITING AT THE NEXT TXWY. WE ADVISED TWR THAT WE WOULD NEED TO BE TOWED IN. IN THE FUTURE I WILL STRIVE TO MAKE IT CLR TO ATC THAT WITH A PARTIAL HYD LOSS, WE WILL NOT BE AS MANEUVERABLE ON THE GND AND WILL NEED TO TAKE OUR TIME EXITING THE RWY. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: THIS RPTR SAID THAT HE WAS ON AN INSTRUCTIONAL RIDE AS A NEW CAPT ON THE EMB145 WHEN THE #1 HYD SYS STARTED TO LOSE ITS FLUID. THE INSTRUCTOR, IN THE R SEAT, DECIDED TO RETURN TO IAH. BOTH THE INSTRUCTOR AND THE OTHER CAPT TRAINEE DID NOT WANT TO DECLARE AN EMER. THEIR THINKING, ACCORDING TO THE RPTR, WAS THAT THIS WAS NOT A BIG DEAL. THE RPTR SAID THAT HE DISAGREED WITH THIS AND THE LATER PROBS MAY NOT HAVE HAPPENED IF HIS VIEW HAD PREVAILED. AFTER LNDG, THE ACFT SLOWED FAIRLY NORMALLY, BUT THE FLC USED ALL OF THE BRAKE ACCUMULATOR CAPABILITY TO SLOW AND STEER THE ACFT, USING DIFFERENTIAL BRAKING FOR THE LATTER, ACCORDING TO THE RPTR. THE TWR CTLR WANTED THEM TO CLR THE RWY QUICKLY TO ALLOW A DC9 TO LAND, BUT THEY COULD NOT BECAUSE THE ACFT HAD COME TO A STOP USING THE PARKING BRAKE, BUT WAS STILL PARTIALLY ON THE RWY. THE RPTR HAD NO ESTIMATE OF HOW CLOSE THE DC9 CAME TO THEIR EMB145 AS IT PASSED. WHEN THEY WERE FINALLY TOWED TO THE GATE THE MAINT PERSONNEL MENTIONED SEVERAL POSSIBILITIES AS THE CAUSE OF THE FLUID LOSS, BUT THE RPTR SAID THAT HE DOES NOT KNOW THE ACTUAL CAUSE. SOME OF THE MANUFACTURER'S REPRESENTATIVES WERE THERE TO ASSIST WITH THE PROB.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.