Narrative:

The aircraft was pushed back from gate onto taxiway by our contract ground handler. When pushback was completed, I set the parking brakes (#3 engine already running) and completed starting #1 engine. We were starting #2 engine when the flight engineer advised me that the #1 'generator off' light was on. I advised him to reset the generator which then came on line. We noticed the #2 engine was very slow to spool during the start sequence and noticed the start valve had closed prematurely. Start had to be monitored very closely due to slow spool and higher than normal egt. I advised the ground handler to disconnect the interphone and we will look for the steering bypass pin on the right side. The flight engineer now advised me that the #2 'generator off' light was on. While we were solving that problem and understanding the inter-relationship of these items, I heard ground control issue us a taxi clearance to the active runway. I assumed the first officer initiated taxi clearance while I was talking to the flight engineer. About the time the flight engineer and I were satisfied of the integrity of our #2 starter, and the #1 and #2 generator, the first officer announced 'clear right.' on instinct, I cleared myself left, released the parking brake and barely cracked the throttles off the idle stop. I tried to confirm with the first officer if she saw the steering bypass pin. I heard no answer. (According to the flight engineer, she said 'I think the pin is under his arm and why are his arms crossed?) she then told me to 'stop.' I pulled the throttles back to the idle stop and depressed the brakes (we rolled about 2 ft). I could not personally see the marshaller. They are normally under the right (first officer) window. I then saw the marshaller rapidly walking backwards with his wands crossed. One of the ground handlers was on the nose tire closing an access panel at the time we rolled. He had to jump clear of the tire. 'He was not injured.' during the flight, we recounted the incident as a crew, and determined the first officer did not use SOP and terminology, causing additional confusion in an already busy cockpit. As the PIC, I should have demanded standard phraseology and procedures. The first officer lacked situational awareness, she should not have called for taxi clearance until I asked for it and I should not have accepted it. By the first officer saying 'clear right' my assumption was she received the departure salute and she saw the steering pin, when in fact she didn't. I should not have released the parking brake till I confirmed and demanded standard phraseology of our situation.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: DC10-10 BEGAN TAXIING BEFORE RECEIVING THE SALUTE FROM THE GND CREW. A MAN WAS STANDING ON A NOSEWHEEL AND HAD TO JUMP CLR EVEN THOUGH THE ACFT ONLY ROLLED ABOUT 2 FT. FO CALLED FOR TAXI CLRNC AND SAID 'CLR R' BEFORE SALUTE HAD BEEN RECEIVED CAUSING CAPT TO BELIEVE A SALUTE HAD BEEN RECEIVED.

Narrative: THE ACFT WAS PUSHED BACK FROM GATE ONTO TXWY BY OUR CONTRACT GND HANDLER. WHEN PUSHBACK WAS COMPLETED, I SET THE PARKING BRAKES (#3 ENG ALREADY RUNNING) AND COMPLETED STARTING #1 ENG. WE WERE STARTING #2 ENG WHEN THE FE ADVISED ME THAT THE #1 'GENERATOR OFF' LIGHT WAS ON. I ADVISED HIM TO RESET THE GENERATOR WHICH THEN CAME ON LINE. WE NOTICED THE #2 ENG WAS VERY SLOW TO SPOOL DURING THE START SEQUENCE AND NOTICED THE START VALVE HAD CLOSED PREMATURELY. START HAD TO BE MONITORED VERY CLOSELY DUE TO SLOW SPOOL AND HIGHER THAN NORMAL EGT. I ADVISED THE GND HANDLER TO DISCONNECT THE INTERPHONE AND WE WILL LOOK FOR THE STEERING BYPASS PIN ON THE R SIDE. THE FE NOW ADVISED ME THAT THE #2 'GENERATOR OFF' LIGHT WAS ON. WHILE WE WERE SOLVING THAT PROB AND UNDERSTANDING THE INTER-RELATIONSHIP OF THESE ITEMS, I HEARD GND CTL ISSUE US A TAXI CLRNC TO THE ACTIVE RWY. I ASSUMED THE FO INITIATED TAXI CLRNC WHILE I WAS TALKING TO THE FE. ABOUT THE TIME THE FE AND I WERE SATISFIED OF THE INTEGRITY OF OUR #2 STARTER, AND THE #1 AND #2 GENERATOR, THE FO ANNOUNCED 'CLR R.' ON INSTINCT, I CLRED MYSELF L, RELEASED THE PARKING BRAKE AND BARELY CRACKED THE THROTTLES OFF THE IDLE STOP. I TRIED TO CONFIRM WITH THE FO IF SHE SAW THE STEERING BYPASS PIN. I HEARD NO ANSWER. (ACCORDING TO THE FE, SHE SAID 'I THINK THE PIN IS UNDER HIS ARM AND WHY ARE HIS ARMS CROSSED?) SHE THEN TOLD ME TO 'STOP.' I PULLED THE THROTTLES BACK TO THE IDLE STOP AND DEPRESSED THE BRAKES (WE ROLLED ABOUT 2 FT). I COULD NOT PERSONALLY SEE THE MARSHALLER. THEY ARE NORMALLY UNDER THE R (FO) WINDOW. I THEN SAW THE MARSHALLER RAPIDLY WALKING BACKWARDS WITH HIS WANDS CROSSED. ONE OF THE GND HANDLERS WAS ON THE NOSE TIRE CLOSING AN ACCESS PANEL AT THE TIME WE ROLLED. HE HAD TO JUMP CLR OF THE TIRE. 'HE WAS NOT INJURED.' DURING THE FLT, WE RECOUNTED THE INCIDENT AS A CREW, AND DETERMINED THE FO DID NOT USE SOP AND TERMINOLOGY, CAUSING ADDITIONAL CONFUSION IN AN ALREADY BUSY COCKPIT. AS THE PIC, I SHOULD HAVE DEMANDED STANDARD PHRASEOLOGY AND PROCS. THE FO LACKED SITUATIONAL AWARENESS, SHE SHOULD NOT HAVE CALLED FOR TAXI CLRNC UNTIL I ASKED FOR IT AND I SHOULD NOT HAVE ACCEPTED IT. BY THE FO SAYING 'CLR R' MY ASSUMPTION WAS SHE RECEIVED THE DEP SALUTE AND SHE SAW THE STEERING PIN, WHEN IN FACT SHE DIDN'T. I SHOULD NOT HAVE RELEASED THE PARKING BRAKE TILL I CONFIRMED AND DEMANDED STANDARD PHRASEOLOGY OF OUR SIT.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.