Narrative:

Our flight of 2 citations was departing ict for a late afternoon test flight from the company factory flight test department. We were the chase aircraft, and as a company engineering test pilot, I was pilot of the chase. Per our company policy, we do not do formation takeoffs. The reason for this is if the lead aircraft has to abort the takeoff, the possibility of the chase aircraft contacting the lead during the aborted takeoff is high. An interval takeoff is much safer. We do interval takeoffs which involves waiting up to 10 seconds after the lead aircraft starts his takeoff roll before the chase aircraft starts his takeoff roll. So after takeoff, the aircraft are not in standard formation, they are in the process of a formation join-up, with the chase aircraft several mi in trail. That was the situation on the afternoon of dec xx 1996. Our lead aircraft took off, and we started our takeoff roll just as he started to lift off. Our clearance was 'cleared for takeoff, turn right to heading 230 degrees.' also per our company policy and standard formation practice, our lead aircraft handled the communications for the flight with ATC and also the squawk. We were squawking standby, and were in communication with the lead aircraft on company frequency, and monitoring ATC. The 230 degree heading took the flight directly into the setting sun. We soon lost sight of the lead aircraft as he flew directly into the sun. At this point we were 4-5 mi in trail and slowly closing. The flight then received a clearance to turn right to heading 270 degrees, and later that was modified to turn further right to heading 280 degrees. This would set us up for a perfect rejoin so we initiated a slow turn to 270 degrees and waited for the lead to appear on the other side of the sun. We then made visual contact with what we thought was the lead aircraft and started to join up. The closure rate was fairly high and it was clear that we were going to overshoot, so we deployed speed brakes and brought the throttles to idle. The closure rate was still too high so I thought about lowering the landing gear to increase drag further. We then realized that we were not joining on our lead from behind, but on a B737 from in front. We rapidly rolled left and pulled to ensure separation and then rolled back to the right to regain visual contact to ensure separation. We saw the B737 go by on the right without deviating from his course. We estimated the separation to be approximately 1000 ft above and 1500 ft laterally. I noted that we had pulled only 2 G's on the g-meter (4.25 limit on this aircraft). At this point we resumed our westerly heading and made visual contact with the lead momentarily until again blinded by the sun. We called lost contact, and the lead aircraft requested a turn back to the east from ATC for a rejoin. The flight rejoined and proceeded without further incident. I believe that we followed ATC instructions throughout this flight. I do not believe that this was even a near miss. Our aircraft was a military T47A (cessna citation C552) which has hydraulically boosted ailerons. It is capable of much higher roll rates, speeds, and load factor than any other citation. So a 2 G pull was not an extreme maneuver by any means. The real question in my mind is why did ATC vector a formation flight in the process of an initial joinup in front of another aircraft. I believe what really caused the problem was a lack of understanding on ATC's part that initially after departure a formation flight typically is in nonstandard formation for several mins until joined up. A reminder to ATC on our part would have avoided the situation. Supplemental information from acn 355329: I was not wearing sun glasses which would have been beneficial in this situation. When we lost sight of our lead we should have immediately notified approach control and asked for our own squawk code and not assumed that the next airplane we saw was our lead. Our airplane was not equipped with TCASII which would have been of great value on this flight. In addition, a possible procedural change where ATC should consider our flight as nonstandard until we notify them that we have joined would be beneficial for all parties. Also, as far as I know, there are no specific civilian procedures for either intentional or unintentional breakups of a formation that is on an IFR flight plan. Supplemental information from acn 355330: lead communicated with ATC and both aircraft monitored ATC replies. Communication between lead and chase was on a discrete company frequency. Chase reported to lead that he had lost sight of us during the turn due to being blinded by the setting sun. Chase requested our position, and we provided a radial and distance off the ict VOR, as well as our altitude. At about the same time, we were handed off to ZKC. We informed center that our chase aircraft had lost sight and was not with us. Center returned us to ict approach and lead received clearance to turn back to the east. Supplemental information from acn 355331: descending into ict with the first officer at the controls, we are vectored on a northerly heading for a visual approach to runway 19R. Approach asked us to expedite our descent through 11000 ft, a pair of cessna citations were wbound out of ict. Through 12000 ft we are advised that we are cleared of traffic. At 11500 ft we see a cessna citation pass off our right side. Inside 500 ft! Our TCASII did not alert us of this traffic. I told approach control that it was close and had no TCASII warning. We landed without incident in ict. I filed a near miss report with approach control.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: NMAC OCCURS WHEN 2 CITATIONS ATTEMPT A JOINUP FOR A FORMATION FLT. #2 ACFT, CHASE ACFT, MISIDENTED AN INBOUND ACR B737 AS THE LEAD ACFT AND FLIES TOO CLOSE TO IT PRIOR TO REALIZING HIS ERROR.

Narrative: OUR FLT OF 2 CITATIONS WAS DEPARTING ICT FOR A LATE AFTERNOON TEST FLT FROM THE COMPANY FACTORY FLT TEST DEPT. WE WERE THE CHASE ACFT, AND AS A COMPANY ENGINEERING TEST PLT, I WAS PLT OF THE CHASE. PER OUR COMPANY POLICY, WE DO NOT DO FORMATION TKOFS. THE REASON FOR THIS IS IF THE LEAD ACFT HAS TO ABORT THE TKOF, THE POSSIBILITY OF THE CHASE ACFT CONTACTING THE LEAD DURING THE ABORTED TKOF IS HIGH. AN INTERVAL TKOF IS MUCH SAFER. WE DO INTERVAL TKOFS WHICH INVOLVES WAITING UP TO 10 SECONDS AFTER THE LEAD ACFT STARTS HIS TKOF ROLL BEFORE THE CHASE ACFT STARTS HIS TKOF ROLL. SO AFTER TKOF, THE ACFT ARE NOT IN STANDARD FORMATION, THEY ARE IN THE PROCESS OF A FORMATION JOIN-UP, WITH THE CHASE ACFT SEVERAL MI IN TRAIL. THAT WAS THE SIT ON THE AFTERNOON OF DEC XX 1996. OUR LEAD ACFT TOOK OFF, AND WE STARTED OUR TKOF ROLL JUST AS HE STARTED TO LIFT OFF. OUR CLRNC WAS 'CLRED FOR TKOF, TURN R TO HDG 230 DEGS.' ALSO PER OUR COMPANY POLICY AND STANDARD FORMATION PRACTICE, OUR LEAD ACFT HANDLED THE COMS FOR THE FLT WITH ATC AND ALSO THE SQUAWK. WE WERE SQUAWKING STANDBY, AND WERE IN COM WITH THE LEAD ACFT ON COMPANY FREQ, AND MONITORING ATC. THE 230 DEG HDG TOOK THE FLT DIRECTLY INTO THE SETTING SUN. WE SOON LOST SIGHT OF THE LEAD ACFT AS HE FLEW DIRECTLY INTO THE SUN. AT THIS POINT WE WERE 4-5 MI IN TRAIL AND SLOWLY CLOSING. THE FLT THEN RECEIVED A CLRNC TO TURN R TO HDG 270 DEGS, AND LATER THAT WAS MODIFIED TO TURN FURTHER R TO HDG 280 DEGS. THIS WOULD SET US UP FOR A PERFECT REJOIN SO WE INITIATED A SLOW TURN TO 270 DEGS AND WAITED FOR THE LEAD TO APPEAR ON THE OTHER SIDE OF THE SUN. WE THEN MADE VISUAL CONTACT WITH WHAT WE THOUGHT WAS THE LEAD ACFT AND STARTED TO JOIN UP. THE CLOSURE RATE WAS FAIRLY HIGH AND IT WAS CLR THAT WE WERE GOING TO OVERSHOOT, SO WE DEPLOYED SPD BRAKES AND BROUGHT THE THROTTLES TO IDLE. THE CLOSURE RATE WAS STILL TOO HIGH SO I THOUGHT ABOUT LOWERING THE LNDG GEAR TO INCREASE DRAG FURTHER. WE THEN REALIZED THAT WE WERE NOT JOINING ON OUR LEAD FROM BEHIND, BUT ON A B737 FROM IN FRONT. WE RAPIDLY ROLLED L AND PULLED TO ENSURE SEPARATION AND THEN ROLLED BACK TO THE R TO REGAIN VISUAL CONTACT TO ENSURE SEPARATION. WE SAW THE B737 GO BY ON THE R WITHOUT DEVIATING FROM HIS COURSE. WE ESTIMATED THE SEPARATION TO BE APPROX 1000 FT ABOVE AND 1500 FT LATERALLY. I NOTED THAT WE HAD PULLED ONLY 2 G'S ON THE G-METER (4.25 LIMIT ON THIS ACFT). AT THIS POINT WE RESUMED OUR WESTERLY HDG AND MADE VISUAL CONTACT WITH THE LEAD MOMENTARILY UNTIL AGAIN BLINDED BY THE SUN. WE CALLED LOST CONTACT, AND THE LEAD ACFT REQUESTED A TURN BACK TO THE E FROM ATC FOR A REJOIN. THE FLT REJOINED AND PROCEEDED WITHOUT FURTHER INCIDENT. I BELIEVE THAT WE FOLLOWED ATC INSTRUCTIONS THROUGHOUT THIS FLT. I DO NOT BELIEVE THAT THIS WAS EVEN A NEAR MISS. OUR ACFT WAS A MIL T47A (CESSNA CITATION C552) WHICH HAS HYDRAULICALLY BOOSTED AILERONS. IT IS CAPABLE OF MUCH HIGHER ROLL RATES, SPDS, AND LOAD FACTOR THAN ANY OTHER CITATION. SO A 2 G PULL WAS NOT AN EXTREME MANEUVER BY ANY MEANS. THE REAL QUESTION IN MY MIND IS WHY DID ATC VECTOR A FORMATION FLT IN THE PROCESS OF AN INITIAL JOINUP IN FRONT OF ANOTHER ACFT. I BELIEVE WHAT REALLY CAUSED THE PROB WAS A LACK OF UNDERSTANDING ON ATC'S PART THAT INITIALLY AFTER DEP A FORMATION FLT TYPICALLY IS IN NONSTANDARD FORMATION FOR SEVERAL MINS UNTIL JOINED UP. A REMINDER TO ATC ON OUR PART WOULD HAVE AVOIDED THE SIT. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 355329: I WAS NOT WEARING SUN GLASSES WHICH WOULD HAVE BEEN BENEFICIAL IN THIS SIT. WHEN WE LOST SIGHT OF OUR LEAD WE SHOULD HAVE IMMEDIATELY NOTIFIED APCH CTL AND ASKED FOR OUR OWN SQUAWK CODE AND NOT ASSUMED THAT THE NEXT AIRPLANE WE SAW WAS OUR LEAD. OUR AIRPLANE WAS NOT EQUIPPED WITH TCASII WHICH WOULD HAVE BEEN OF GREAT VALUE ON THIS FLT. IN ADDITION, A POSSIBLE PROCEDURAL CHANGE WHERE ATC SHOULD CONSIDER OUR FLT AS NONSTANDARD UNTIL WE NOTIFY THEM THAT WE HAVE JOINED WOULD BE BENEFICIAL FOR ALL PARTIES. ALSO, AS FAR AS I KNOW, THERE ARE NO SPECIFIC CIVILIAN PROCS FOR EITHER INTENTIONAL OR UNINTENTIONAL BREAKUPS OF A FORMATION THAT IS ON AN IFR FLT PLAN. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 355330: LEAD COMMUNICATED WITH ATC AND BOTH ACFT MONITORED ATC REPLIES. COM BTWN LEAD AND CHASE WAS ON A DISCRETE COMPANY FREQ. CHASE RPTED TO LEAD THAT HE HAD LOST SIGHT OF US DURING THE TURN DUE TO BEING BLINDED BY THE SETTING SUN. CHASE REQUESTED OUR POS, AND WE PROVIDED A RADIAL AND DISTANCE OFF THE ICT VOR, AS WELL AS OUR ALT. AT ABOUT THE SAME TIME, WE WERE HANDED OFF TO ZKC. WE INFORMED CTR THAT OUR CHASE ACFT HAD LOST SIGHT AND WAS NOT WITH US. CTR RETURNED US TO ICT APCH AND LEAD RECEIVED CLRNC TO TURN BACK TO THE E. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 355331: DSNDING INTO ICT WITH THE FO AT THE CTLS, WE ARE VECTORED ON A NORTHERLY HDG FOR A VISUAL APCH TO RWY 19R. APCH ASKED US TO EXPEDITE OUR DSCNT THROUGH 11000 FT, A PAIR OF CESSNA CITATIONS WERE WBOUND OUT OF ICT. THROUGH 12000 FT WE ARE ADVISED THAT WE ARE CLRED OF TFC. AT 11500 FT WE SEE A CESSNA CITATION PASS OFF OUR R SIDE. INSIDE 500 FT! OUR TCASII DID NOT ALERT US OF THIS TFC. I TOLD APCH CTL THAT IT WAS CLOSE AND HAD NO TCASII WARNING. WE LANDED WITHOUT INCIDENT IN ICT. I FILED A NEAR MISS RPT WITH APCH CTL.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.