Narrative:

Aborted takeoff jac. Aircraft deiced at gate following an all night freezing rain, snow. Copilot asked if he should go back and look at wings and tail prior to starting engines, and we agreed that in this instance this should be accomplished. The copilot returned and stated that the aircraft looked free of snow and ice to him. Jac ground personnel stated the aircraft was free of snow and ice. Aircraft gross weight 90000 pounds. We started engines, and timed the engines so that we would have at least 5 mins on the ground with engine anti-ice on and pitot heat on prior to beginning takeoff roll. We discussed runway condition, which was, by this time only slightly wet, and I stated that I always make a static takeoff at jac. This accomplished, we advanced the power, both engines spooled almost together, and once spooled, brakes released. An airspeed check done at 80 KTS, and I concurred (I was flying). At vr of 116, I attempted to rotate. The aircraft nose did not want to rotate, so I pulled further back, when the nose would not rotate sufficiently, I immediately aborted successfully. I began coming out of reverse with about 1500+ ft remaining, and was out of reverse with about 1000 ft remaining, and taxied slowly to the end of runway 18 at jac, and then to the gate. I asked that the local stations personnel stay clear of the tires and brakes, and to call our contract maintenance man. He was there within 5 mins, and we both checked the temperature of the brakes. The right side was only slightly warm, and the left side brakes could comfortably be touched, and were not hot (ie, less than 140 degrees F). The brakes were again checked at about 30 mins, 45 mins, and again at 1 hour. We both talked with maintenance coordination and discussed items to be checked. I stated that we would have to wait approximately 1 hour based on the brake energy abort chart (70 mins). All agreed on items to be checked by the local maintenance. Contract maintenance verified brakes were not hot, and that the aircraft was totally free of ice and snow. Then we performed control checks, along with an inspection of flaps for damage, hydraulic quantity checks, and tire and brake condition checks for maintenance control. All seemed in order. Thus, after approximately 75 mins on the ground, another takeoff was begun, and the flight continued to slc. The only anomalies that I could find was the fact that at this low gross weight, 90%+ of the passenger were seated at row 20 and forward (ie, in the first 12 rows of the aircraft) (33 passenger in first 12 rows and only 4 passenger in remaining 9 rows). In attempting to analyze what might have happened, I questioned whether we had valid or accurate airspeed indications on the first takeoff due to the freezing rain, drizzle, the brakes were not hot, as I could comfortably touch all 4, and the ease, and runway remaining on the abort. I have seen similar sits where the nose of the B737-300 is extremely heavy, and at times difficult to rotate, but at jac there is absolutely no time to attempt to analyze nor discuss the problem. I did not believe the aircraft was ready to fly at the indicated airspeed and thus I elected to abort. Supplemental information from acn 354132: cargo distribution was suspect but, was verified as normal distribution. Although deiced and with no precipitation some residual snow, ice could have remained on the horizontal stabilizer and elevator as only the leading edge of the horizontal stabilizer is visible to the flight crew. Although we obtained a satisfactory airspeed check we question the airspeed accuracy. Finally the B737-300 is unusually nose heavy. We have concluded that a combination of these factors caused the anomaly.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: TKOF ABORTED. PIC FLC RESPONSE WHEN B737-300 FAILS TO ROTATE AT PREDETERMINED ROTATION SPD.

Narrative: ABORTED TKOF JAC. ACFT DEICED AT GATE FOLLOWING AN ALL NIGHT FREEZING RAIN, SNOW. COPLT ASKED IF HE SHOULD GO BACK AND LOOK AT WINGS AND TAIL PRIOR TO STARTING ENGS, AND WE AGREED THAT IN THIS INSTANCE THIS SHOULD BE ACCOMPLISHED. THE COPLT RETURNED AND STATED THAT THE ACFT LOOKED FREE OF SNOW AND ICE TO HIM. JAC GND PERSONNEL STATED THE ACFT WAS FREE OF SNOW AND ICE. ACFT GROSS WT 90000 LBS. WE STARTED ENGS, AND TIMED THE ENGS SO THAT WE WOULD HAVE AT LEAST 5 MINS ON THE GND WITH ENG ANTI-ICE ON AND PITOT HEAT ON PRIOR TO BEGINNING TKOF ROLL. WE DISCUSSED RWY CONDITION, WHICH WAS, BY THIS TIME ONLY SLIGHTLY WET, AND I STATED THAT I ALWAYS MAKE A STATIC TKOF AT JAC. THIS ACCOMPLISHED, WE ADVANCED THE PWR, BOTH ENGS SPOOLED ALMOST TOGETHER, AND ONCE SPOOLED, BRAKES RELEASED. AN AIRSPD CHK DONE AT 80 KTS, AND I CONCURRED (I WAS FLYING). AT VR OF 116, I ATTEMPTED TO ROTATE. THE ACFT NOSE DID NOT WANT TO ROTATE, SO I PULLED FURTHER BACK, WHEN THE NOSE WOULD NOT ROTATE SUFFICIENTLY, I IMMEDIATELY ABORTED SUCCESSFULLY. I BEGAN COMING OUT OF REVERSE WITH ABOUT 1500+ FT REMAINING, AND WAS OUT OF REVERSE WITH ABOUT 1000 FT REMAINING, AND TAXIED SLOWLY TO THE END OF RWY 18 AT JAC, AND THEN TO THE GATE. I ASKED THAT THE LCL STATIONS PERSONNEL STAY CLR OF THE TIRES AND BRAKES, AND TO CALL OUR CONTRACT MAINT MAN. HE WAS THERE WITHIN 5 MINS, AND WE BOTH CHKED THE TEMP OF THE BRAKES. THE R SIDE WAS ONLY SLIGHTLY WARM, AND THE L SIDE BRAKES COULD COMFORTABLY BE TOUCHED, AND WERE NOT HOT (IE, LESS THAN 140 DEGS F). THE BRAKES WERE AGAIN CHKED AT ABOUT 30 MINS, 45 MINS, AND AGAIN AT 1 HR. WE BOTH TALKED WITH MAINT COORD AND DISCUSSED ITEMS TO BE CHKED. I STATED THAT WE WOULD HAVE TO WAIT APPROX 1 HR BASED ON THE BRAKE ENERGY ABORT CHART (70 MINS). ALL AGREED ON ITEMS TO BE CHKED BY THE LCL MAINT. CONTRACT MAINT VERIFIED BRAKES WERE NOT HOT, AND THAT THE ACFT WAS TOTALLY FREE OF ICE AND SNOW. THEN WE PERFORMED CTL CHKS, ALONG WITH AN INSPECTION OF FLAPS FOR DAMAGE, HYD QUANTITY CHKS, AND TIRE AND BRAKE CONDITION CHKS FOR MAINT CTL. ALL SEEMED IN ORDER. THUS, AFTER APPROX 75 MINS ON THE GND, ANOTHER TKOF WAS BEGUN, AND THE FLT CONTINUED TO SLC. THE ONLY ANOMALIES THAT I COULD FIND WAS THE FACT THAT AT THIS LOW GROSS WT, 90%+ OF THE PAX WERE SEATED AT ROW 20 AND FORWARD (IE, IN THE FIRST 12 ROWS OF THE ACFT) (33 PAX IN FIRST 12 ROWS AND ONLY 4 PAX IN REMAINING 9 ROWS). IN ATTEMPTING TO ANALYZE WHAT MIGHT HAVE HAPPENED, I QUESTIONED WHETHER WE HAD VALID OR ACCURATE AIRSPD INDICATIONS ON THE FIRST TKOF DUE TO THE FREEZING RAIN, DRIZZLE, THE BRAKES WERE NOT HOT, AS I COULD COMFORTABLY TOUCH ALL 4, AND THE EASE, AND RWY REMAINING ON THE ABORT. I HAVE SEEN SIMILAR SITS WHERE THE NOSE OF THE B737-300 IS EXTREMELY HVY, AND AT TIMES DIFFICULT TO ROTATE, BUT AT JAC THERE IS ABSOLUTELY NO TIME TO ATTEMPT TO ANALYZE NOR DISCUSS THE PROB. I DID NOT BELIEVE THE ACFT WAS READY TO FLY AT THE INDICATED AIRSPD AND THUS I ELECTED TO ABORT. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 354132: CARGO DISTRIBUTION WAS SUSPECT BUT, WAS VERIFIED AS NORMAL DISTRIBUTION. ALTHOUGH DEICED AND WITH NO PRECIPITATION SOME RESIDUAL SNOW, ICE COULD HAVE REMAINED ON THE HORIZ STABILIZER AND ELEVATOR AS ONLY THE LEADING EDGE OF THE HORIZ STABILIZER IS VISIBLE TO THE FLC. ALTHOUGH WE OBTAINED A SATISFACTORY AIRSPD CHK WE QUESTION THE AIRSPD ACCURACY. FINALLY THE B737-300 IS UNUSUALLY NOSE HVY. WE HAVE CONCLUDED THAT A COMBINATION OF THESE FACTORS CAUSED THE ANOMALY.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.