Narrative:

As we descended toward the destination airport the PNF checked ATIS. We briefed for a captain monitored approach as we were on base. Special WX reported 1 scattered RVR 6000 ft and the captain stated that I would (first officer) make the landing since the WX was above minimums for captain monitored. However, as the approach controller turned us on to the localizer he said 'contact the tower'.) the turn on shot us through the localizer and at the same time it appeared as if the fog was obscuring the runway again. I became focused on reintercepting the localizer and assumed the captain (PNF) had contacted the tower. I called for the landing checklist. It was completed without incident. Just inside the OM we got a master caution for our 'propeller heat.' the captain cycled propeller heat and I landed the aircraft. As we were turning off the runway, I (first officer) noticed the radio was still on approach frequency. I stated a few expletives and said we just landed without a clearance. The captain called the tower and we were instructed to taxi to parking, remain on tower frequency. We called the tower on our own instruction to discuss the incident. They mentioned there was no conflict, no problem. I feel a number of events led to this unfortunate incident. First, we switched to a first officer landing late in the approach. Second, there was a lack of xchking of the other pilot with regard to radio communications. Third, developed over confidence in captain's abilities and became complacent. Fourth, the approach controller was complacent, in stating 'contact the tower' versus giving us the tower frequency, which I feel instinctively leads one to switch frequency. Fifth, I believe the master caution distraction the captain at a critical phase of flight possibly preventing a switch to tower. I feel there was a breakdown in CRM between the captain and first officer. We should have stayed with the captain monitored approach since that is what we briefed and because the WX was marginal. My perception of the captain's level of awareness I feel played into the situation also because I heard the approach controller say 'contact the tower,' I assumed he had done it and he gave no indication of urgency about me landing the aircraft. I believe the WX was a contributing factor because the WX was reported as freezing fog which required us to land with our ice protection on. This meant that our reference speed was increased by about 20 KTS, it was night and my workload was high. I should, however, have been aware of our landing clearance.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: COMMUTER ACFT LANDS AT SPOKANE WITHOUT LNDG CLRNC. UNAUTH LNDG RWY OP.

Narrative: AS WE DSNDED TOWARD THE DEST ARPT THE PNF CHKED ATIS. WE BRIEFED FOR A CAPT MONITORED APCH AS WE WERE ON BASE. SPECIAL WX RPTED 1 SCATTERED RVR 6000 FT AND THE CAPT STATED THAT I WOULD (FO) MAKE THE LNDG SINCE THE WX WAS ABOVE MINIMUMS FOR CAPT MONITORED. HOWEVER, AS THE APCH CTLR TURNED US ON TO THE LOC HE SAID 'CONTACT THE TWR'.) THE TURN ON SHOT US THROUGH THE LOC AND AT THE SAME TIME IT APPEARED AS IF THE FOG WAS OBSCURING THE RWY AGAIN. I BECAME FOCUSED ON REINTERCEPTING THE LOC AND ASSUMED THE CAPT (PNF) HAD CONTACTED THE TWR. I CALLED FOR THE LNDG CHKLIST. IT WAS COMPLETED WITHOUT INCIDENT. JUST INSIDE THE OM WE GOT A MASTER CAUTION FOR OUR 'PROP HEAT.' THE CAPT CYCLED PROP HEAT AND I LANDED THE ACFT. AS WE WERE TURNING OFF THE RWY, I (FO) NOTICED THE RADIO WAS STILL ON APCH FREQ. I STATED A FEW EXPLETIVES AND SAID WE JUST LANDED WITHOUT A CLRNC. THE CAPT CALLED THE TWR AND WE WERE INSTRUCTED TO TAXI TO PARKING, REMAIN ON TWR FREQ. WE CALLED THE TWR ON OUR OWN INSTRUCTION TO DISCUSS THE INCIDENT. THEY MENTIONED THERE WAS NO CONFLICT, NO PROB. I FEEL A NUMBER OF EVENTS LED TO THIS UNFORTUNATE INCIDENT. FIRST, WE SWITCHED TO A FO LNDG LATE IN THE APCH. SECOND, THERE WAS A LACK OF XCHKING OF THE OTHER PLT WITH REGARD TO RADIO COMS. THIRD, DEVELOPED OVER CONFIDENCE IN CAPT'S ABILITIES AND BECAME COMPLACENT. FOURTH, THE APCH CTLR WAS COMPLACENT, IN STATING 'CONTACT THE TWR' VERSUS GIVING US THE TWR FREQ, WHICH I FEEL INSTINCTIVELY LEADS ONE TO SWITCH FREQ. FIFTH, I BELIEVE THE MASTER CAUTION DISTR THE CAPT AT A CRITICAL PHASE OF FLT POSSIBLY PREVENTING A SWITCH TO TWR. I FEEL THERE WAS A BREAKDOWN IN CRM BTWN THE CAPT AND FO. WE SHOULD HAVE STAYED WITH THE CAPT MONITORED APCH SINCE THAT IS WHAT WE BRIEFED AND BECAUSE THE WX WAS MARGINAL. MY PERCEPTION OF THE CAPT'S LEVEL OF AWARENESS I FEEL PLAYED INTO THE SIT ALSO BECAUSE I HEARD THE APCH CTLR SAY 'CONTACT THE TWR,' I ASSUMED HE HAD DONE IT AND HE GAVE NO INDICATION OF URGENCY ABOUT ME LNDG THE ACFT. I BELIEVE THE WX WAS A CONTRIBUTING FACTOR BECAUSE THE WX WAS RPTED AS FREEZING FOG WHICH REQUIRED US TO LAND WITH OUR ICE PROTECTION ON. THIS MEANT THAT OUR REF SPD WAS INCREASED BY ABOUT 20 KTS, IT WAS NIGHT AND MY WORKLOAD WAS HIGH. I SHOULD, HOWEVER, HAVE BEEN AWARE OF OUR LNDG CLRNC.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.