Narrative:

On aug/xx/96, at approximately XA05Z, I was working the radar east and west position (are & arw) at yng. I accepted a handoff from cle approach control on a T/batp/a. The aircraft was descending to 5000 ft MSL. Upon initial contact, the aircraft advised that the airport was in sight. Due to increasing workload and traffic, air carrier X was instructed to fly heading 090 degree vector for the airport. This heading would put the aircraft on a 5 mi final over the OM for runway 14. The pilot immediately started questioning the clearance. He advised me of traffic observed on his TCASII at his 2 O'clock, approximately 6 mi, squawking VFR, indicating 2000 ft MSL. I, having already observed the traffic and noted its track, had determined that the air carrier X would not ever become a factor. I attended to other higher priority duties. In less than 30 seconds I returned to air carrier X. The traffic was still no factor. Its location at this time approximately 1 1/2 mi north of air carrier X and climbing out of 2600 ft MSL. The target's track was approximately 220 and would pass well behind and 3000 ft MSL below air carrier X. Apparently, this was not enough separation for the pilot of air carrier X. I issued a descent clearance to air carrier X and the pilot replied, we'll just hold it off until we get past this traffic. Once again, the traffic was in no way no how a factor. The frequency at this time was busy with approximately 11 aircraft. I instructed the aircraft to descend and maintain 3000 ft MSL again. The pilot made some unprofessional remark about flying the airplane which I could not digest due to the workload. Creating frequency congestion on a busy control frequency is very unprofessional. A short time later, 1 min or so, I asked air carrier X if they had the airport in sight. The pilot replied that he still had the airport in sight. I cleared air carrier X for a visual approach to runway 14 at yng. The pilot read back the clearance and stated, 'see ya.' I advised the pilot to remain this frequency. This is required by local directives that state that aircraft should be changed to the tower between 12 and 7 mi from the airport. Air carrier X was 15 mi out. After coordinating a pointout with ZOB cip sector, I instructed air carrier X to contact the tower on 119.5 and then give the tower a call when on the ground. The professional way to handle the situation. Just a side note, after air carrier X departed the frequency, several other aircraft commented on frequency about the pilot's unprofessional attitude. This is not the first time this pilot has created this hazard. In addition, the pilot was very unprofessional with the area supervisor on the telephone. A few questions come to mind: does TCASII give pilot, who don't receive RA's, the right to deviate from any ATC clearance? The pilot admitted no RA involved in the situation. Shouldn't CRM extend to ATC also?

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: APCH CTLR COMPLAINT ABOUT AN ACR FLC NOT ACCEPTING A CLRNC TO DSND BECAUSE THEY SAW TFC ON THEIR TCASII BELOW THEM AND QUESTIONED THE CTLR'S CLRNC. TFC WAS A VFR C185 THAT WAS 3000 FT BELOW AND 2 PT 5 NM AWAY FROM THE ACR AND NOT A FACTOR. RPTR SAYS ACR CAPT WAS MAKING UNCALLED FOR REMARKS ON THE FREQ.

Narrative: ON AUG/XX/96, AT APPROX XA05Z, I WAS WORKING THE RADAR E AND W POS (ARE & ARW) AT YNG. I ACCEPTED A HDOF FROM CLE APCH CTL ON A T/BATP/A. THE ACFT WAS DSNDING TO 5000 FT MSL. UPON INITIAL CONTACT, THE ACFT ADVISED THAT THE ARPT WAS IN SIGHT. DUE TO INCREASING WORKLOAD AND TFC, ACR X WAS INSTRUCTED TO FLY HDG 090 DEG VECTOR FOR THE ARPT. THIS HDG WOULD PUT THE ACFT ON A 5 MI FINAL OVER THE OM FOR RWY 14. THE PLT IMMEDIATELY STARTED QUESTIONING THE CLRNC. HE ADVISED ME OF TFC OBSERVED ON HIS TCASII AT HIS 2 O'CLOCK, APPROX 6 MI, SQUAWKING VFR, INDICATING 2000 FT MSL. I, HAVING ALREADY OBSERVED THE TFC AND NOTED ITS TRACK, HAD DETERMINED THAT THE ACR X WOULD NOT EVER BECOME A FACTOR. I ATTENDED TO OTHER HIGHER PRIORITY DUTIES. IN LESS THAN 30 SECONDS I RETURNED TO ACR X. THE TFC WAS STILL NO FACTOR. ITS LOCATION AT THIS TIME APPROX 1 1/2 MI N OF ACR X AND CLBING OUT OF 2600 FT MSL. THE TARGET'S TRACK WAS APPROX 220 AND WOULD PASS WELL BEHIND AND 3000 FT MSL BELOW ACR X. APPARENTLY, THIS WAS NOT ENOUGH SEPARATION FOR THE PLT OF ACR X. I ISSUED A DSCNT CLRNC TO ACR X AND THE PLT REPLIED, WE'LL JUST HOLD IT OFF UNTIL WE GET PAST THIS TFC. ONCE AGAIN, THE TFC WAS IN NO WAY NO HOW A FACTOR. THE FREQ AT THIS TIME WAS BUSY WITH APPROX 11 ACFT. I INSTRUCTED THE ACFT TO DSND AND MAINTAIN 3000 FT MSL AGAIN. THE PLT MADE SOME UNPROFESSIONAL REMARK ABOUT FLYING THE AIRPLANE WHICH I COULD NOT DIGEST DUE TO THE WORKLOAD. CREATING FREQ CONGESTION ON A BUSY CTL FREQ IS VERY UNPROFESSIONAL. A SHORT TIME LATER, 1 MIN OR SO, I ASKED ACR X IF THEY HAD THE ARPT IN SIGHT. THE PLT REPLIED THAT HE STILL HAD THE ARPT IN SIGHT. I CLRED ACR X FOR A VISUAL APCH TO RWY 14 AT YNG. THE PLT READ BACK THE CLRNC AND STATED, 'SEE YA.' I ADVISED THE PLT TO REMAIN THIS FREQ. THIS IS REQUIRED BY LCL DIRECTIVES THAT STATE THAT ACFT SHOULD BE CHANGED TO THE TWR BTWN 12 AND 7 MI FROM THE ARPT. ACR X WAS 15 MI OUT. AFTER COORDINATING A POINTOUT WITH ZOB CIP SECTOR, I INSTRUCTED ACR X TO CONTACT THE TWR ON 119.5 AND THEN GIVE THE TWR A CALL WHEN ON THE GND. THE PROFESSIONAL WAY TO HANDLE THE SIT. JUST A SIDE NOTE, AFTER ACR X DEPARTED THE FREQ, SEVERAL OTHER ACFT COMMENTED ON FREQ ABOUT THE PLT'S UNPROFESSIONAL ATTITUDE. THIS IS NOT THE FIRST TIME THIS PLT HAS CREATED THIS HAZARD. IN ADDITION, THE PLT WAS VERY UNPROFESSIONAL WITH THE AREA SUPVR ON THE TELEPHONE. A FEW QUESTIONS COME TO MIND: DOES TCASII GIVE PLT, WHO DON'T RECEIVE RA'S, THE RIGHT TO DEVIATE FROM ANY ATC CLRNC? THE PLT ADMITTED NO RA INVOLVED IN THE SIT. SHOULDN'T CRM EXTEND TO ATC ALSO?

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.